EurasiaNet Business & Economics - Russian Blockade of South Caucasus Leaves Armenians Fuming

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS

RUSSIAN BLOCKADE OF SOUTH CAUCASUS LEAVES ARMENIANS FUMING
Emil Danielyan 10/18/04

Russia’s decision to close border-crossing points with Georgia and Azerbaijan, purportedly to frustrate movements by Chechen militants, has produced widespread discontent, even anger in Armenia � Moscow’s long-time strategic ally in the Caucasus. Some in Yerevan suggest the move may prompt a reassessment of Armenia’s special relationship with Russia.

Armenia � a landlocked country already squeezed by embargos enforced by neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan � had depended heavily on a trade route via Georgia to Russia, known as the Upper Lars Pass. The Kremlin’s decision in September to close its border with Georgia has added to Armenia’s isolation, severing one of its two overland export routes to Russia. Armenian businesses dependent on trade with Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union are facing ruin.

Armenian leaders have pressed Russian President Vladimir Putin to reconsider the border closure. Yerevan rejected a Russian proposal to transport goods via South Ossetia, saying the route was impractical due to the high level of tension in the region. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin indicated during talks with Armenian official on October 14 that the Upper Lars Pass would remain closed for at least another month so that Moscow can implement "anti-terrorist measures." Levitin also claimed that a trade route via Iran and the Caspian Sea was a cheaper alternative for Armenia than sending goods to Russia via the Upper Lars Pass.

The maximum Moscow could do, Levitin said, is to again reopen the Upper Lars Pass for a few hours. This is what happened on October 10 when nearly 600 Armenian trucks, personal cars and buses stranded on the mountain pass for a month were allowed to cross into Georgia and proceed to Armenia.

Russian authorities ordered the closure of Georgian-Russian checkpoint, including Upper Lars, immediately after the September 3 hostage tragedy in Beslan, North Ossetia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian officials insist that the Chechen separatists have used Georgia and Azerbaijan as safe heavens to carry out terrorist acts. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Officials in Baku and Tbilisi strongly dispute the Kremlin’s claim.

Armenian authorities have yet to offer an estimate of the financial damage done to the Armenian economy. Officials have made contradictory assessments, with Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian citing "serious consequences," while Trade Minister Karen Chshmaritian suggested that the direct damage was not substantial.

Whatever the true extent of the disruption, many in Armenia consider Russia’s actions as unjustified. Vahan Hovannisian, a leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, a traditionally pro-Russian party represented in Kocharian’s coalition cabinet, branded the border closings as "hasty and not fully calculated."

Opposition politicians have been even more outspoken in their criticism of Moscow. "I am convinced that it [the border decision] has nothing to do with terrorism," said Vazgen Manukian, a former prime minister. "This is simply political pressure on Georgia. That Armenia is suffering from it doesn’t matter to Russia. It [Moscow] will trample our national interests for the sake of its own interests."

Such resentment is echoed by the Armenia’s politically diverse print media, which has been unanimous in condemning Moscow’s policy. Many Armenian political experts are warning that the Russians’ actions risk alienating their main regional ally, which, they some go on to note, has strengthened its ties with the West in recent months. "The Russian-Armenian strategic relationship is called into question," declared Azg, an independent daily normally supportive of Russia.

The Russian-language newspaper Golos Armenii complained that Putin’s administration was "measuring all Caucasians with the same yardstick."

"There is a growing number of organizations in Armenia that are not carriers of Armenians’ traditional pro-Russian orientation," the editorial continued. "And that is not only the result of the West’s actions [to improve its relations with Armenia], but also Russian steps leading nowhere."

Some opinion polls appear to confirm that traditionally strong Armenian-Russian ties are eroding. One survey last May -- conducted by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS), an independent think-tank �- found that almost two-thirds of the 50 political and public-policy experts interviewed wanted Armenia to join NATO within the next decade. In addition, most experts identified Russia as the foreign power that "limits Armenia’s independence."

An ACNIS survey in August, however, found that opinions among the broader Armenian population remain strongly pro-Russian. Almost 90 percent of 2,000 respondents described Russia as a friendly nation. Only 47 percent had the same perception of the United States.

The pro-Russian sentiment is deeply rooted in the Armenians’ sense of insecurity, generated largely by decades of hostility between Armenia and Turkey, and fueled by the unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A Karabakh settlement, though unlikely in the near future, would presumably help ease Armenians’ siege mentality. The pro-Western outlook of a growing number of intellectuals could also reflect on public opinion over time.

Russian-Armenian relations have a strong socio-economic component. Since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens have moved to Russia in search of jobs. Their regular cash remittances back to Armenia are a major source of income for many families in the impoverished country.

At the same time, Russia’s share of Armenia’s external trade has steadily declined over the past decade. Indeed, in 2004, the European Union emerged as Armenia’s single largest trading partner. Official figures for the first half of this year show the EU accounting for over 40 percent of the country’s commercial exchange. Russia’s share was less than 20 percent. A recent survey, conducted by the independent Vox Populi polling organization, found that a majority of Armenians would prefer to join the European Union, rather than remain in the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States.

The closure of the Russian-Georgian border stands to accelerate the decline in Russian-Armenian commercial ties. Some media commentaries suggest that public attitudes in Armenia towards Russia may also start shifting soon. As a commentator for the Azg daily stated in early October; "If Russia really wants to stir up anti-Russian sentiment among Armenia’s political circles and public in general, it can continue this blockade."

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.