EurasiaNet Civil Society - Opposition Strives to Establish Parallel Authority in Kyrgyzstan

CIVIL SOCIETY

OPPOSITION STRIVES TO ESTABLISH PARALLEL AUTHORITY IN KYRGYZSTAN
3/15/05

Dissatisfied with the conduct of parliamentary elections, opposition leaders took steps March 15 to create a parallel system of authority in Kyrgyzstan.

Opposition activists maintain that the results of two rounds of parliamentary voting � held on February 27 and March 13, -- were skewed by widespread irregularities. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rather than seeking redress in Kyrgyz courts, or through complaints to government agencies, opposition leaders seem intent on courting public opinion directly. Their main aim is ensuring that President Askar Akayev steps down, as currently required by the country’s constitution, when his current term in office expires following the October presidential election. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The southern city of Jalal-Abad has developed into the de facto capital of the opposition movement. On March 15, roughly 15,000 protesters gathered to criticize the government’s election conduct. At the same time, opposition leaders convened a congress -- involving activists from every region of Kyrgyzstan -- that resolved to establish a so-called Coordinating Council of Kyrgyz National Unity. The congress went on to select Jusupbek Jeenbekov as the council’s chairman.

Opposition leaders envision the coordinating council as an alternate governing body, enabling them to negotiate with Akayev from a position of greater political strength. In the coming days, they will seek to expand the council’s public reach, especially in southern and eastern Kyrgyzstan, where support for the opposition has traditionally been strong. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Akayev’s chief bastion of support is in northern Kyrgyzstan. Opposition congresses, or kurultais, are scheduled to be held in Talas and Osh provinces, with the dual goals of making the opposition movement a more cohesive entity, while expanding its anti-Akayev message in southern Kyrgyzstan.

The opposition action appears to be the first move in what could prove a prolonged political chess match. At this stage, Akayev appears reluctant to directly confront the challenge to his authority. Police in Jalal-Abad, for example, made no attempt to disrupt the protest or prevent the opposition congress from meeting.

In addition, the president reportedly engaged in quiet diplomacy in an attempt to defuse on-going opposition protests in southern cities. According to an article published in the opposition newspaper MSN, a presidential representative held discussions March 12 with opposition leaders. During those talks, Akayev allegedly offered a political deal in which the president would install new regional governors that met with opposition approval in return for the cessation of protest actions.

Human rights activist Tolekan Ismailova told EurasiaNet that opposition leaders rejected the bargain, citing a lack of faith in Akayev’s desire to implement his pledge. "After the Aksy shooting incident [in 2002], the government did not fulfill all the promises that it made," Ismailova explained.

While continuing to challenge the president, opposition leaders appear to be toning down their rhetoric, in particular scaling back calls for Akayev’s early resignation. A presidential aide recently suggested that Akayev might try to organize a nationwide referendum that would extend his presidential term another five years, if opposition calls for his resignation persisted. Given the advantages of incumbency, along with the fact that the unified opposition movement remains in its formative stage, opposition leaders want to avoid a national plebiscite in the near term, especially one that could provide Akayev with a legal basis to run for re-election.

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