EurasiaNet Civil Society - Tajikistan: President Rahmonov is Taking No Re-Election Chances

CIVIL SOCIETY

TAJIKISTAN: PRESIDENT RAHMONOV IS TAKING NO RE-ELECTION CHANCES
Sue Simon: 5/17/06

With Tajikistan’s presidential election fast approaching, President Imomali Rahmonov appears intent on removing all possible obstacles to his re-election. Armed with the knowledge that both the United States and Russia want to increase their influence in Tajikistan, and, therefore, are unlikely to protest moves to restrict political rights, Rahmonov is increasing the pressure on his opponents.

Rahmonov’s political supremacy has gone unchallenged since his People’s Democratic Party dominated the February 2005 parliamentary elections, which international monitors characterized as tainted. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Tajik authorities followed up on their election triumph with a crackdown against opposition parties, motivated in part by concerns about the spread of revolutionary fervor from Kyrgyzstan, where former president Askar Akayev was ousted on March 24, 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Perhaps the highest profile incident in 2005 involving the political opposition was the mysterious detention of Democratic Party leader Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, who disappeared in Moscow in April of last year only to resurface in custody days later in the Tajik capital Dushanbe. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The country’s main opposition groups -- especially the Social Democratic Party (SDPT) and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) � have struggled to regain their balance since the suffering the blowout in the parliamentary vote. Representatives of both parties say they intend to field candidates to run in the presidential election, expected to be held in the fall. But each time opposition party leaders have attempted to reenter the political fray in recent weeks, Rahmonov and his allies have taken quick action to thoroughly stifle criticism of the government.

Underscoring the regime’s brutal determination to compel silence on the part of its political opponents, an IRP activist, Sadullo Marufov, was apparently murdered May 4 while in official custody in the northern town Isfara. The circumstances surrounding Marufov’s arrest the previous day remain unclear. Initially, authorities claimed that Marufov committed suicide by jumping from the third story of an Interior Ministry building. IRP officials immediately asserted that Marufov had been killed, and on May 10 three Interior Ministry employees were arrested in connection with the incident, according to the Avesta news agency.

On May 12, the IRP issued a statement alleging that the Interior Ministry has been carrying out a clandestine operation in northern Soghd Province to undermine the IRP’s image and to harass and arrest party activists. The statement, distributed by the Asia-Plus news agency, went on to assert that "many" IRP activists had been illegally detained over the past two years. The IRP, which constitution the main opposition to Rahmonov during Tajikistan’s 1992-97 civil war, warned ominously that the Interior Ministry’s actions heightened distrust, and raised the possibility of renewed political violence. "Such incidents might cause destabilization in society," the statement said. Soghd Province, which encompasses part of volatile Ferghana Valley, is considered a hotbed of Islamic radical activity in Tajikistan.

Prior to the Marufov incident, Tajik authorities lashed out at IRP leader, Said Abdullo Nuri, who in a newspaper interview aired allegations of widespread corruption and mismanagement in connection with Dushanbe’s waterworks. IRP activists maintain the government’s rhetorical counter-offensive was designed to undermine Nuri’s credibility in the eyes of voters.

Officials took a more confrontational approach against SDPT leader Rahmatullo Zoirov, who in March claimed that the government was holding roughly 1,000 political prisoners. Authorities vigorously denied the charge, and on May 4, Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov threatened to bring criminal charges against Zoirov unless he produced evidence to support his claim. Zoirov asserts that Iskandarov is among those Tajiks imprisoned on account of his dissenting political beliefs. Officials maintain Iskandarov committed numerous criminal acts, including carrying out subversive activity.

Rahmonov has not concentrated solely on keeping the political opposition hemmed in. The government has gone to great lengths to root out Islamic radicalism. On May 15, for example, Tajik media outlets reported that nine women were convicted of stirring up "ethnic, racial and religious enmity" while carrying out agitprop activities for the banned Islamic radical group Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The government crackdown is likely to intensify following recent clashes at the Tajik-Kyrgyz border between militants and border troops. Officials claim Islamic radicals were responsible for the outbreak of violence.

In addition, Rahmonov in intent on preventing the emergence of a rival from within the governing apparatus. During his April 20 address to the nation, Rahmonov railed against official corruption. "How is it possible to speak about transparency of [government] minister’s activities, when some of our ministries have [assumed the characteristics of] family businesses," Rahmonov said. A few days earlier, he noted that about 800 officials had been arrested over the past five years on corruption charges in connection with narcotics trafficking. While such rhetoric could bolster Rahmonov’s election-year image as a corruption fighter, some analysts contend that using graft allegations offers a convenient way to get rid of perceived rivals inside the government.

As he goes about arranging the political landscape in advance of the presidential election, Rahmonov does not seem to have to worry about coming under outside pressure to moderate his policies. Russia, which has greatly expanded its strategic and economic presence in the country over the past year, is routinely mum on rights abuses in CIS states that it considers to be friendly to Moscow. The United States, meanwhile, appears reluctant to push a democratization agenda on Tajikistan, given that Washington badly wants to improve its strategic position in the Central Asian nation to compensate for the breakdown in US-Uzbekistani ties. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Tajikistan also figures prominently in a US plan to reorient Central Asia away from Russia and toward South Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

On May 8, US Assistance Secretary of State Richard Boucher stressed strategic and economic ties during a visit to Dushanbe, while making muted references to the need for greater press freedom and stronger mechanisms to ensure fair elections. He ignored the far more serious democratization-related issues of political prisoners and political violence practiced against opposition activists.

"Our cooperation is very good, and we are looking for ways to make it better," Boucher said in Dushanbe. "I was pleased to hear the President’s interest in projects where we can improve regional integration, and offer new markets for Tajikistan."

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