Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's book, The New Russian Diplomacy, is instructive for both what it says and doesn't say. Ivanov charts a course for the revival of Russia's geopolitical fortunes, yet the foreign minister shies away from confronting the contradictions that face the Russian government. The book thus leaves unanswered important questions that appear to be critical to the success of Russia's diplomatic strategy.
Ivanov sets forth a clear description, as well as a defense of, Moscow's current foreign policies. Moscow's twin priorities, in Ivanov's words, are "creating the most favorable conditions possible for internal reform" and "not allowing the country's international position to be weakened." He goes on to explore how the specifics of Moscow's current foreign policies are intended to further these two principal goals. But while Ivanov presents a clear and lucid account of policy, his exposition also exposes contradictions that he does not address.
Ivanov states that Russian policy makers in the post-Soviet era seek to incorporate the best characteristics of their Tsarist and Soviet predecessors. Ivanov especially admires the 19th century Russian diplomat, Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov, who directed Russian foreign policy "after Russia had been weakened by the Crimean War and was in danger of becoming a second-rate state." Ivanov cites Gorchakov's memo to Tsar Alexander II advising the pursuit of foreign policies designed to support Russia's internal development and preventing damage to its international position. He also mentions other Tsarist and Soviet diplomats who pursued these aims when Russia was relatively weak. The pursuit of these strategic goals by post-Soviet Russia now is seen as being in the best tradition of Russian diplomacy.
But nowhere in the book does Ivanov discuss the question concerning the extent to which promoting internal reform and preserving Russia's international position are mutually compatible. Ivanov appears to assume that they are, but this is not at all clear. While maintaining close relations with Saddam Hussein has helped preserve Moscow's position in Iraq, for example, it does not appear that this policy has done anything to promote Russia's internal reform.
Indeed, it can be argued that close cooperation with Saddam has served to strengthen authoritarian tendencies within Russia itself. At the same time, Russia's support for the Iraqi strongman has preserved Russian influence in Iraq while Saddam remains in power. Yet, this may later serve to undercut Russia's influence there with a post-Saddam regime. Russian support for dictatorships elsewhere poses similar problems.
Post-Soviet Russia, of course, is not the only government to pursue close relations with dictatorial regimes. The United States, for instance, supported Central American caudillos for decades. But it is worth noting that where Washington-supported dictatorships were toppled, US influence often suffered due to popular resentment over American support for the old regime. Cuba is perhaps the prime example of this phenomenon. Does Ivanov think that Russia is immune to a long-term loss of influence in a country where Russia currently supports a dictatorship? He does not acknowledge that this is even a possibility.
Ivanov also argues that only multilateral initiatives can resolve international security problems, and that unilateral (i.e., American) efforts cannot do so. He insists that regional organizations (such as NATO) must not undertake intervention without approval from the UN Security Council (where Russia wields a veto). He seems to imply that "unilateral" intervention by the United States and its allies is more of a threat to international security than whatever it is designed to thwart. But what if the UN Security Council cannot or will not respond to a crisis? Ivanov provides no guidance on this possibility.
The book contains discussions of Russian foreign policy toward various regions of the world. In this section, Ivanov follows up on his earlier criticism of American unilateralist tendencies, making it clear that Moscow does not welcome the presence of any outside power on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): "Russia will not tolerate attempts by third-party states to act within the CIS in a way that undermines Russian interests
Editor's note:
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, and a frequent contributor to EurasiaNet.
