THE COMING CRISIS IN CENTRAL ASIA
Mark N. Katz: 3/01/02

Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid xviii + 281 pp. $24.00 (hardcover) New Haven and London: Yale University Press/World Policy Institute, 2002

In this new book, acclaimed journalist Ahmed Rashid examines the rise of militant Islamic movements in the newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia. The post-Soviet regimes of the region blame this phenomenon on outside support from the Taliban, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Rashid disagrees, arguing strongly that the repressive nature of these regimes, combined with their inability - even unwillingness - to foster economic development, has provided a breeding ground for militant Islamic movements. It is an argument the regimes and their supporters, including the United States, would do well to heed.

In Part I, Rashid briefly reviews the history of Islam and Central Asia: the pre-Soviet story of Central Asia and the role it played in the Muslim world and beyond; how Islam survived underground in the face of fierce repression during the Soviet era; and the failure of the post-Soviet regimes to foster either democracy or development, despite the presence of substantial petroleum resources in some of them.

The heart of the book, though, is Part II, "Islamic Movements in Central Asia Since 1991." In it, Rashid devotes a chapter to each of the principal post-Soviet Islamic movements in Central Asia - the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). He notes that these three movements are quite different from one another.

While the IRP fought against ex-communist forces in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997, this was not simply an ideological conflict but one that involved regional rivalries. After the 1997 peace accord, the IRP actually joined the government - and has lost much of its credibility as a result, since it has been unable to relieve Tajikistan's grinding poverty.

Unlike the IRP in the past and the IMU now, the HT espouses a non-violent approach that "envisages a moment when millions of its supporters will simply rise up and topple the Central Asian governments…by sheer force of numbers," Rashid writes (p. 124). The HT seeks to unite the entire Muslim world in a Caliphate, as existed for a period following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Doing this, the HT maintains, will resolve all the problems of the Muslim world, including Central Asia. Rashid reports that this movement has become increasingly popular in Central Asia.

The immediate goal of the IMU is to forcefully overthrow the regime of Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov and replace it with an Islamic one. It appears, however, that the IMU's ambitions spread beyond Uzbekistan to Central Asia as a whole. It is the IMU that allied with the Taliban and al Qaeda, fighting with them against their common enemies. The September 11 attacks cut short the IMU's 2001 campaign in the Ferghana Valley, since its fighters were redeployed to defend the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The insurgent group reportedly suffered serious loses during the US-led antiterrorism campaign. Reports that one of the movement's top leaders, Juma Namangani, was killed during the campaign have not been independently verified, however.

In chapter 8, Rashid describes and analyzes the IMU's 1999 and 2000 military campaigns in the Ferghana Valley and beyond. Although the number of fighters under Namangani's command was relatively small, he used them effectively. His experience with the Soviet Army in Afghanistan allowed him to anticipate how the ex-Soviet officered government forces he was fighting would react, and he was able to outsmart them. And by launching his campaign in the Ferghana Valley, Namangani was able to take advantage of the lack of trust and cooperation among the governments of the three countries (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) which occupy it.

Chapter 9 analyzes American, Russian and Chinese policies toward Central Asia. Despite their various rivalries, all thee of these powers regard the dictatorial regimes of Central Asia as allies against an Islamic fundamentalist threat. Not one of them - including the United States - is working for the kind of democratization and development that would undercut the appeal of Islamic revolutionary movements in the region.

In the concluding chapter, Rashid argues forcefully that it is repression and poverty that are the root causes of rebellion in Central Asia, saying that "whilst poverty and unemployment increase - and economic opportunities decrease - Central Asia's debt-ridden societies are ripe for any organization or party that offers hope for a better life" (p. 228). Attempting to militarily defeat these Islamic revolutionary movements, then, will not eliminate the true causes. Only development and democratization will.

While this book appears to have been largely written before September 11, Rashid was able to update it in places through the fall. On the surface, the rapid defeat of the Taliban by the US-led coalition might seem to reduce the urgency of Rashid's warnings about the potential for a wider crisis in Central Asia. But Rashid's warnings remain pertinent. It would be an unfortunate mistake to believe that the threat has passed. The defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan has done nothing to end poverty and repression in Central Asia. So long as these factors remain, the potential for Islamic revolution will also remain.

While Rashid's previous book, Taliban, was well received after it first appeared in 2000, its readership expanded greatly only after the crisis that began on September 11. Let us hope that this pattern will not be repeated. Reading and taking to heart the lessons of Jihad now may allow policymakers to forestall the crisis in Central Asia that will most certainly develop if they do not.

Editor's Note: Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, and a regular contributor to EurasiaNet.

	The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, politcal and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.