European Institute for the Media
Zollhof 2a
D-40221 Dusseldorf
Email:
6 November 2000
Tel: +49-211-90104-58
Tel. in Baku: +994-12-923026
Email: sorgu@azdata.net
Preliminary report on Monitoring of Media Coverage during the Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan November 2000
The European Institute for the Media (EIM), a non-profit, non-government, policy-oriented research institution, has carried out a mission to monitor media coverage of the Azerbaijan parliamentary elections. The mission was partly funded by the European Commission through the Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. Since 1992, the EIM has carried out more than 40 media monitoring missions during parliamentary and presidential elections in countries of east and central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This is the third EIM media monitoring mission in Azerbaijan. This report remains the sole responsibility of the EIM and reflects only the views of the Institute.
The mission sought to evaluate whether the media provided impartial and balanced coverage of the issues to be addressed and the political choices facing the electorate. Monitoring was carried out from 15 October to 4 November 2000 and included observation of adherence of the authorities and the parties to the recognised democratic norms concerning the media.
Monitoring was conducted using qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Quantitative analysis measured the amount of time and space devoted to political parties on five television channels (AzTV-1, AzTV-2, ANS, Space, Lider) and ten newspapers (Azadliq, Yeni Musavat, Millet, Yeni Azerbaijan, Ekspress, Zerkalo, Xalq, Azerbaycan, Respublika, Bakinskiy Rabochiy). The Baku-based research company SORGU carried out the empirical research under EIM supervision. All conclusions are those of the Institute. The EIM team consists of the following members:
- Gillian McCormack (UK), EIM Project Manager,
- Aflatun Amashov (AZER), EIM local coordinator;
- Dr Daphne Skillen (UK), media and elections expert.
Summary
The run up to the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan was fraught with difficulties for opposition parties and independent media. Nevertheless, during the election period, all of the participating parties and blocs were allocated free time to present their platforms through the state media. The ruling party, the New Azerbaijan Party (NAP), dominated in terms of coverage throughout the state-controlled media and through large amounts of advertising placed in independent media. The strong bias of the state-controlled media in favour of NAP was however offset by the more balanced coverage evident in the non-state media. The performance of the non-state media in terms of professionalism was assessed as being higher than in previous elections.
Preliminary Findings
- Overall, people living in the Baku area were able to receive a variety of information about the main parties from non-state media. In the regions, independent media and newspapers are far less accessible and the population there was more reliant on AzTV as the major source of information about the elections.
- AzTV-1 provided free time according to the election law to all parties participating in the elections, which was a dramatic change for the better from previous elections. Since it is the only channel which can be received throughout the republic, AzTV has special responsibilities, both in the election law and also in terms of the fair standards which should be expected of a publicly-funded broadcaster during an election period. Although AzTV observed the law in the giving of free air time, it failed to present fair opportunities to all parties in news and other programmes. AzTV-1 devoted 90% of its newscoverage to NAP, all but ignoring the other political parties.
- The opposition parties suffered from inequitable conditions. The eight opposition parties initially excluded from registration missed weeks of canvassing, several weeks of potential free and paid newspaper advertising and at least one week of potential free and paid advertising on television. The time missed was not replaced.
Background to the Elections
A significant factor adding intensity to the parliamentary elections – known in the media as the "X factor" - is the state of the 77-year-old President Heidar Aliev’s health and the issue of succession. President Aliev heads the ruling party, the New Azerbaijan Party (NAP), which held an overwhelming majority in the last parliament. Since the presidential elections in 1998 President Aliev has undergone major heart bypass surgery and received treatment for various ailments, raising questions about the future of the country in which he has been a dominant force for 30 years. The recent scare about his health, as well as false reports of his death when he spent two weeks at a clinic in Cleveland, Ohio in September sparked fears of instability in the pre-election period.
The issue of succession is crucial to NAP, which has the president’s 39-year-old son, Ilham Aliev, in top position on its party’s parliamentary list. Ilham, who is vice-president of the state oil company, has been making use of his father’s aura in the campaign, but has also increasingly appeared as an independent political figure. The greater stakes involved in these elections may have been behind attempts by those in power to eliminate political opposition in a series of events, related both to electoral procedure and free speech, that caused an outcry among domestic and international human rights and media organisations.
The most serious case was the initial disqualification of the main opposition parties from participating in the elections. On the intervention of President Aliev, the Central Electoral Commission was persuaded on 8 October to reverse its ruling barring the parties, although it hesitated for a few days, suggesting that a decision be made by the outgoing parliament. Although the parties were finally registered, there is no doubt that they were handicapped by having lost weeks of canvassing and political advertising .
Acts of intimidation against opposition journalists, apparently designed to suppress political criticism, have also caused grave concern. The most prominent case has focussed on the arrest of Rauf Arifoglu, editor of the largest circulation daily Yeni Musavat. Arifoglu was charged with terrorism, illegal possession of arms and attempted hijacking, with a further charge thrown in later of "calling for a coup d’etat". If convicted on all counts, he could face up to 25 years imprisonment. Arifoglu was released six weeks after his arrest in August, but the charges have not been dropped.
These elections have nonetheless shown some significant improvements. The eventual registration of 12 parties and one bloc is seen as a triumph compared with previous elections when many opposition parties were not registered or presidential candidates boycotted the elections due to impossible conditions. This time round journalists have had the right to attend all sessions of the Central Electoral Commission.
In terms of the media, broadcasting executives and editors have praised the clearer regulations guiding the media and the required publication of price lists, providing equal rates for all registered candidates and parties for paid political advertising. All parties have received 16 minutes of free television and radio airtime a week on state-controlled AzTV-1 and the first state radio programme to promote their policies; round-table discussions were also held between all representatives of parties on Saturdays. All candidates in single seat constituencies had the right to receive five minutes on AzTV-2.
During the last few years the press, which does not have wide readership, has been able to speak openly and critically on most matters, but this is the first time on television, in the 16 minute slots, that viewers have had a chance to hear opposition voices expressing outspoken, diverse and sharply critical views, sometimes with irony and sarcasm, on a wide spectrum of issues.
Against these improvements, there are many shortcomings and complaints voiced by opposition candidates and mdia heads.
Although censorship was formally abolished in 1998, other methods of creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and purveying the threat of reprisals are equally effective. The closure of the newspaper, Monitor, the threat of closure following three defamation cases of Uch Nogte and the high fines against Avropa – equivalent to the newspaper’s expenditure for three months – with a higher fine by the tax inspectorate a few days before the elections are ways of keeping the press in line. By the admission of the latter two newspapers, they have had to put a stop to any investigative journalism or serious criticism. It is for this reason, they believe, that the court has postponed their appeals until after the elections. They also fear reprisals may follow once the elections are over, as happened after the 1998 presidential elections.
In the last year, the popular Baku-based TV and radio company SARA was closed down by the authorities. The owners of SARA have been opposing the closure of their company, which was conducted as a police raid rather than the standard legal process. The closure of the company coincided with the popularity on the TV company of a programme in which members of the political opposition were interviewed live on air.
The closure on 3 October of the independent entertainment TV station, Azerbaijan Broadcasting Agency (ABA), which does not broadcast news or current affairs, was unexpected and the reasons somewhat unclear. According to the Ministry of Communications, ABA had not paid its debt of $200,000. According to ABA’s president, Faig Zulfugarov, the presidential apparatus had put pressure on him to place his station under the government’s unofficial control. Even after the debt had been paid, it was not until ten days later that transmission was restored. Although the closure during the electoral campaign may have been coincidental, some observers considered this to be another example to frighten off the media.
In the press a sudden doubling in the price of paper caused financial and technical problems for newspapers in the period leading to the elections. The price of paper from about $450 a ton rose at the end of June to about $850 a ton.
Regulatory Framework
Laws regulating the media are set out in the Law on Elections to the Milli Majlis (parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan of July 6 2000, the Approved Resolution of the Central Electoral Commission of the Azerbaijan Republic of 18 September 2000 No.18/75 and the Law on the Media of the Azerbaijan Republic of 7 December 1999, which came into effect on 13 February 2000.
Some articles on electoral administration in the election law were fiercely resisted by opposition parties who, for a time boycotted the elections as a result, but the law in so far as it pertains to the regulation of the media is not seen to be obstructive. The problem lies in the fact that, in general, laws are either not implemented or they are wilfully disregarded by public officials and the courts, which are not regarded as independent.
According to the Election Law equal conditions are provided in the electoral campaign for all registered candidates, parties and blocs. Representatives of parties and blocs received free airtime to promote their parties on state television, radio and newspapers.
Article 19:4 of the Law on the Media causes particular concern for journalists. It states that a media outlet can be closed if in the space of a year it has lost three cases for biased publications. Given that the courts are not considered to be independent, a pretext can always be found to close down a media outlet. Some commentators felt that this clause was applied to punish the newspaper Uch Nogte before the elections as a warning to others to tone down the critical content of their material.
The acquisition of a licence for television has been a problem for a long time. The main stumbling block has been the state commission, which has been reluctant to hand out frequencies. Only one private and one hybrid (20% owned by the municipality) television company in the regions, in Ganca and Lenkoran, have been assigned a licence and one municipality-controlled station in Xacmaz. The other six have been broadcasting without licences, depending on the good will of the local executive powers and subject to their demands. They have at different periods been closed down several times.
Broadcast media
Television is the most powerful medium for news and information in the country, especially as newspapers on a regular basis are not affordable to large sections of the population . The main parties stated that the financial resources at their disposal would be most effective if put into political advertising on television.
There are two central state-controlled television channels, AzTV-1 and AzTV-2, as well as four private channels broadcasting from Baku. Of these ANS and Space TV run news bulletins and provided paid advertising time. Of the other two, Lider TV runs news bulletins but did not show political advertising clips; ABA did not participate either in news coverage or advertising.
In the period monitored, the party New Azerbaijan took 48% of the time devoted to political parties monitored on all channels together. The Popular Front was second with 13% and Musavat and the Party of National Independence were joint third with 8%. Rasul Guliev's Democratic Party was fourth with 6%. All other parties garnered around 2% of the total coverage.
AzTV-1
State-controlled AzTV-1 is the only channel whose reach covers the whole country. The chairman of Gosteleradio, Hezami Hudiev, is a member of the board of the ruling party, who officially stood down from his post as he was taking part in the elections. In its news coverage and outspoken propaganda for the ruling elite, AzTV-1 is reminiscent of Soviet-era television. The free time allocated to the opposition parties did not make up for their disadvantaged coverage in the overall news and current affairs programming, which was given over mainly to the president, his son and the ruling party.
AzTV-1’s price list was the highest for paid political advertising, ranging from $288 to $540 per minute. Most opposition parties claimed they did not have sufficient funding for any major advertising campaign. Some parties were leaving their main advertising on AzTV till the last week, but the cost for smaller parties was prohibitive. Officially NAP claimed it would spend $70,000 on its campaign, as told by the executive secretary to EIM.
In the period indicated, AzTV-1 devoted over five hours of coverage to the activities of New Azerbaijan. The next most mentioned party was the Popular Front with one hour and twenty minutes. The third most mentioned party was Etibar Mamedov's Party of National Independence with around one hour and ten minutes. All of the other parties received around 50 minutes of coverage. NAP was the most active advertiser with one hour and forty minutes, compared to just five minutes of advertising for the Popular Front.
On news programmes, AzTV-1 devoted 90% of its coverage of the political parties to New Azerbaijan. There were also many programmes featuring Ilham Aliev in his role as chairman of the Olympic Committee. Although the tone of journalists on AzTV-1 programmes was restrained and neutral, the channel clearly had a policy of promoting the party of power, NAP, by showing its activities in far more detail than that given to other parties. The news was skewed to give the impression that other parties were not active during the campaign, which was untrue and gave a misleading impression to viewers.
AzTV-2
AzTV-2 ‘s reach covers Baku and the surrounding 60km. It allocated five minutes free time for each candidate on the majoritarian system. The thinking behind this decision on AzTV-2 is not clear as it means that many candidates standing in the regions would not have been seen by their constituents. Only candidates from Baku and surrounding areas would have been able to appeal to their voters.
AzTV-2 was far less active in covering the elections than AzTV-1. Nevertheless, a simlar tendency was in evidence, with NAP garnering nearly two hours of coverage on the channel, compared to just 16 minutes for the next most mentioned party -- the Party of National Independence. NAP only advertised for five minutes on AzTV-2, where the only other advertiser was Musavat with less than one minute. In news programmes, the channel devoted 80% of its coverage to NAP. The Popular Front and the Party of National Independence had around three minutes each on the news in this three-week period. The tone of coverage on the channel was reserved, but a disproportionate amount of coverage was devoted to NAP, as on AzTV-1.
ANS
ANS, the first private channel in the country started 10 years ago, comes under the ANS Group, which includes two radio stations, a production studio, a sales house and other communication ventures. Its reach takes in Baku and 10 regions ranging 300 km from Baku.
NAP got five and a half hours of coverage on ANS, followed by the Popular Front with two hours and twenty minutes. Musavat and the Party of National Independence had one and a half hours each. Most paid advertising went to ANS TV whose price was about 10 times cheaper, at an average of $35 per minute. The fact that ANS is considered to have the highest ratings and differs considerably in style and professionalism from AzTV was an added bonus for advertising. NAP was the most active advertiser with three hours and ten minutes. The Popular Front and Musavat had around 35 minutes of advertising, followed by the Party of National Independence with around 30 minutes. The Civil Solidarity Party, the Communist Party, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party all had small amounts of advertising. The division of news on ANS was quite different to that on AzTV, with coverage of the Popular Front taking up 40%, followed by NAP with 28%. The Democratic Party, Musavat and the Party of National Independence were all covered also. News coverage accurately reflected events as they took place. Tone of coverage was mainly neutral, although some positive comments were noted regarding a variety of parties during the campaign, including NAP, the Popular Front and the Democratic Party. ANS also showed an entertaining satirical programme "Gulp" twice a week during the elections with repeats, lampooning the political parties and their slogans.
Space
Space TV has been operating for three years. It takes in Baku and 150 km of the surrounding territory reaching Sumgait, broadcasting to 40% of the population. Their price for advertising was $100 per minute. Space was very active in covering the campaign, devoting more time to it than either of the state broadcasters. The most coverage went to NAP which had just over 6 hours. The Popular Front was second with two hours and twenty minutes. Musavat was third with just over 50 minutes in total. NAP was the most active advertiser on this channel, with three hours of clips and special reports on Ilham Aliev's visits to the regions. The second most active advertiser was the Party of National Independence with 17 minutes, third was Musavat with five minutes. The Civic Solidarity Party, the Communist Party, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party all advertised clips amounting to one and a half minutes. The news on Space, as on ANS, reflected far more precisely what was actually newsworthy in the campaign. The Popular Front had 46%, NAP had 30%, Musavat had 13% and the Party of National Independence had 5%. Nevertheless, monitors noted a positive tone in the presentation of information by some Space journalists regarding NAP, whereas coverage of all the other parties was mainly neutral.
Lider
Lider covered political parties through the news, devoting 53% to NAP. The most mentioned party after NAP was Musavat with just eight minutes. Although little time was devoted to them, Lider news tended to criticise the opposition parties. There was no advertising on Lider but there were two and a half hours of programmes devoted to NAP.
Print media
Newspapers proliferate in the country, but they are not affordable to the mass of the population and consequently readership is low. After the economic boom of 1996-1998, which saw the emergence of many papers, advertising revenue fell 10% and many newspapers are now close to being bankrupt. Under such economic problems it is difficult to maintain an independent profile. Nevertheless it is the press which is seen as the main institution keeping ideas of free speech and democracy alive. Newspapers engage in sharp criticism and hard-nosed investigative journalism.
The press enjoys considerable free speech and there is little that cannot be said, but principles of impartiality and balance are often overlooked.
There are six pro-government newspapers which were obliged according to the law to provide free space of up to 10% of the overall size of each issue. Candidates from opposition parties did not however make use of this free space. One of the most respected editors in the pro-government group, Mahal Ismailoglu, advertised in his paper Xalq all September persuading opposition candidates to take up the offer, but without much success. Distrust amongst the different sides was too great to be overcome, nor would it have helped the image of an opposition party.
There was little overt paid advertising in newspapers. Often though, there was very little distinction between news coverage and political advertising. Political advertisements were not always marked, as required by law.
The overall picture of coverage of the parties in newspapers was quite different to that of the electronic media monitored. In percentage terms, the division of space in articles, photos and advertisements in all newspapers monitored as a whole was far more evenly spread. NAP had 32%, Musavat and the Popular Front had 22% each, the Party of National Independence had 12% and the Democratic Party had 8%. Looking at individual papers, a slightly different picture emerges. The government-controlled press were openly biased, praising NAP and criticising the opposition. In the party-affiliated press, there was a tendency to overrepresent the importance of their party of preference. However, there was definitely an attempt to cover the newsworthy aspects of the campaign and a certain openness to accept advertising from other parties.
Newspapers with political party affiliations
Azadliq, which is now independent but which was formerly the organ of the Popular Front, gave a high proportion of its coverage to that party -- more than three times as much as the next most mentioned party, which was NAP. The paper concentrated on the most newsworthy parties in the campaign, devoting attention to Musavat, the Party of National Independence, the Democratic Party and the Civic Solidarity Party as well. The tone of the newspaper was mainly neutral, although there was some praise of the Popular Front and criticism of NAP and Musavat in particular.
Yeni Musavat concentrated on the Musavat party, somewhat unsurprisingly. It also devoted attention to issues relating to the Popular Front, NAP, the Democratic Party and the Party of National Independence. It tended to be favourable towards Musavat and critical of NAP and the Popular Front, however on the whole it maintained a fairly objective stance.
Millet devoted the most coverage to the Party of National Independence, which is its political affiliation and therefore to be expected. It also covered NAP, the Popular Front, the Democratic Party and Musavat. Approximately half of all articles monitored about NAP were critical ones. The Popular Front, the Democratic Party and Musavat also came in for some criticism.
In Yeni Azerbaijan newspaper NAP had six times as much coverage as any other party in a large number of articles praising its activities. It also devoted some attention to the Popular Front, the Democratic Party, Musavat and the Party of National Independence but mainly in order to criticise them.
Non-affiliated newspapers
Ekspress gave the most coverage to the Popular Front. Some of these articles were critical and some were positive, most were neutral. NAP came second with the same proportion of positive articles and some critical ones. The Party of National Independence, Musavat, the Democratic Party and the Civil Solidarity Party were also covered. All these parties occasionally came in for criticism and praise, apart from the Civil Solidarity Party which had nearly 50% positive coverage.
Zerkalo gave a fairly even spread of coverage to the major parties competing in the elections. The Popular Front was slightly ahead, followed by NAP, the Democratic Party, the Party of National Independence, Musavat, the Liberal Party and the Communist Party. Zerkalo maintained an objective stance during the monitoring period, as it did during the last EIM monitoring in Azerbaijan in 1998. It also published a useful election supplement with the clear positions of the different parties on a variety of important issues.
State-controlled press
Xalq devoted the most article space to NAP, followed by Musavat, the Popular Front, the Democratic Party and the Party of National Independence. Over half of the articles devoted to NAP were positive. Half or more of the articles devoted to the opposition parties were negative in tone.
Azerbaycan newspaper devoted the vast majority of article space to NAP and the activities of the government. The paper also covered the Democratic Party, Musavat, the Popular Front and the Party of National Independence but mainly in order to criticise them.
Respublika devoted itself almost entirely to NAP, occasionally pausing to criticise Musavat, the Democratic Party and the Party of National Independence.
Bakinskiy Rabochiy had exactly the same editorial policy as the other state-controlled press. It devoted the most space to NAP and the government. There were also articles referring to Musavat, the Democratic Party, the Popular Front and the Party of National Independence, in an almost exclusively critical tone.
Shortcomings
There appears to be no worked out system for complaints and the adjudication of grievances that candidates can use in relation to the media. No special working group was set up in the Central Electoral Commission to deal with media complaints, according to the head of the press office of the commission. Candidates can turn either to the commission or to the courts, which are obliged to make a decision within five days. The problems with complaints over registration demonstrated that this was not an easy task.
Etibar Mamedov told EIM that his party complained to the CEC about the newspaper Azerbaycan, which had accused the PNIA of being "anti-statist" and working against its own country. The CEC refused to deal with the complaint, as did the court of appeal. At the time of discussion the matter was in the hands of the territorial court. Up to this point it had already taken two weeks and not the supposed five days.
Representatives of parties tended not to make official complaints regarding media behaviour, but some spoke to the EIM of inequitable treatment. Isa Gambar of the Musavat Party complained of the devalued effect of his 16 minutes on air when sandwiched between TV items praising President Aliev. He also complained of the handicap to opposition parties that have been denied television coverage over the previous years. Apart from recently, Space TV, he said, had not interviewed him live for three years.
Conclusion
In general, election coverage in Azerbaijan still tends to be hampered by the lack of alternative national broadcasters to the state-controlled AzTV, the lack of transparency in the licensing system for independent media and the limited development of the print media. The EIM recommends that the authorities in Azerbaijan turn their attention to these issues, in order to effectively create the fair and open conditions for free media development which are necessary in a democratic society. The closures and law suits levelled against the independent media which appear to have political motivations are a barrier to the democratic develpment of free speech. This is a circumstance which the authorities, in cooperation with Azerbaijani journalistic associations, media representatives and civil organisations, should seek to remedy at the earliest possible opportunity.