<>><<>><<>>_____TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER...ISSN:--1386-6265____<<>><<>><
<<>><<>><<>>________Volume 98-2:211-10-December-1998________<>><<>><
<<>>This issue is distributed to 2617 subscribers in 65 countries>><
<<<>Uze Tengri basmasar asra yer telinmeser, Turk bodun ilining<<>><
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<<>><<>><<>>_______Editor-in-Chief: Mehmet Tutuncu_________<<>><<>><
<<>><<>>___Co-Editors: H.M. Hubey, Yanki Pursun, Cengiz Turan__<<>><
<<>><<>>____Associate Editors: Ch. Bartholomew, S. Badretdin___<<>><
<<>submission and reactions: ><<
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#1. Is 90 Percent of Vote Suspicious? Kazakh Leader Is Puzzled
The New York Times December 6, 1998
#2. Kazakhstan: OSCE Urges Postponement Of Presidential Election
By Merhat Sharipzhan and Michael Gallant
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#1. Is 90 Percent of Vote Suspicious? Kazakh Leader Is Puzzled
The New York Times
December 6, 1998
By STEVE LeVINE
ALMATY, Kazakhstan -- With his open, unlined face, Nursultan Nazarbayev
talks like a man without a care, as might any entrenched ruler of a
resource-rich nation courted by powerful world leaders.
Yet one thing does plainly bother the dapper former Communist Party
leader, who has ruled since 1989 over this vast republic in the Caspian
Sea region, an area attracting the interest of Washington and some of the
world's biggest companies because of its huge oil and gas reserves.
While the 58-year-old president is firmly in control at home, where he is
expected soon to win a new seven-year term by the usual 90 percent margin,
he is puzzled by recent foreign accusations that he is a power-hungry
leader who terrorizes opponents.
"Fifteen hundred companies are working here and no one wants a different
president," he told a small group of journalists on a recent tour of the
northern industrial heartland of this country of 17 million. "Do you
understand this? Write about it."
Diplomats agree that Kazakhstan's politics are mild by regional standards.
Across the sea in Azerbaijan, for instance, the police have repeatedly
used violence to disperse opposition rallies. In November, Parliament set
three-year jail terms for taking part in such gatherings. The New
York-based group Human Rights Watch last week denounced Azerbaijan
President Heydar Aliyev's human rights record as "dismal," and said
his recent decrees ordering improvements "were merely window dressing."
Yet foreign criticism of Nazarbayev is rising. Last week, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which monitors voting in the region,
expressed "serious doubts that the principles for democratic elections"
would be met in Kazakhstan, and called on Nazarbayev to postpone the Jan. 10
election. Under the circumstances, the organization said in its statement,
it would not send a full team of election monitors. A week earlier, the
State Department spokesman, James Rubin, accused Kazakhstan of a "pattern
of harassment" of Nazarbayev's opponents.
Nazarbayev probably would easily win a free election, but Western experts
note that he still does not let anyone serious run against him and has a
habit of padding the vote to obtain Soviet-era victory margins.
"We now use the term 'the 90 percenters' to refer to the whole bunch" of
Caspian leaders, said Peter Sinnott, an expert on the region at Columbia
University.
On Nov. 24, Kazakhstan's Supreme Court excluded former Prime Minister
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, 46, from the elections because he met with a
political group not registered with the government.
Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister forced from office in October 1997,
is among the few Caspian opposition leaders seen as a credible alternative
to an incumbent president. The ruling against him came a day after Gore
telephoned President Nazarbayev voicing concern about treatment of opponents.
Kazhegeldin has hired Washington lawyers and public relations people to
try to shift the campaign abroad and make Nazarbayev appear illegitimate
to Washington. U.S. political support helps keep investors coming and hold
Russia at bay.
The president counters by contending that Kazhegeldin is tainted by
sweetheart oil and mineral deals he approved in his three years as prime
minister. In the interview, the president charged that his rival is a
"secret KGB employee, a secret agent." He also asserted that the former
prime minister organized the Sept. 26 firebombing of an opposition newspaper
and an Oct. 13 incident in which Kazhegeldin says he came under gunfire.
"Don't ask me about Kazhegeldin," the president said. "I very much wanted
that he would run and receive his 3 or 4 percent and be disgraced."
The president insists he is not a one-man ruler. He appoints officials,
but they work independently, he said in the interview with journalists.
Some university students may have been forced to sign petitions supporting
his candidacy or risk failing, he conceded, but that was the work of local
bureaucrats who were "obviously overdoing it."
On the streets of Almaty, there is no tangible fear or tension. Since the
rubber-stamp Parliament voted to hold presidential elections two years
early, however, the government has stepped up pressure on opponents, and
increased surveillance of journalists.
Diplomats and Western businessmen who meet him generally describe Nazarbayev
as charming and relaxed, yet serious, a strategic thinker with a sharp
sense of
regional politics. Foreigners and Kazakhstan's citizens seem resigned to
his maintaining control.
"He isn't a president anymore," said a middle-aged taxi driver in the
industrial city of Aktyube, a city of 300,000 peopled dominated by
Soviet-style concrete structures which Nazarbayev visited recently. "He's
some kind of a sultan. Nazarbayev is the only candidate and no one else
can win. I don't pay attention to politics anymore."
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#2. Kazakhstan: OSCE Urges Postponement Of Presidential Election
By Merhat Sharipzhan and Michael Gallant
Prague, 7 December 1998 (RFE/RL) -- The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has called on Kazakhstan to postpone
presidential elections set for next month to allow more time to prepare for
a democratic poll.
The group said in a statement issued late Thursday (Dec. 3) in Vienna that
it would not fully recognize results from the poll, which parliament in
October brought forward from 2000. The parliament also removed restrictions
on the number of terms a president can serve. Opposition candidates say the
early election has given them little time to prepare election campaigns to
challenge incumbent President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
The OSCE also said Kazakhstan's refusal to register two opposition
candidates because of what it called "minor administrative concerns" raises
"serious doubts whether a fairly contested election is possible." One of
the banned candidates, former prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, was
considered by many to be the most serious challenger to Nazarbayev.
The United States, Western human rights groups and Kazakh opposition
parties have criticized Nazarbayev for bringing the election forward, but
government officials have defended the election process.
Asylbeck Bisenbayev, Nazarbayev's press secretary, is quoted today by
Reuters saying that the election process "is a normal process resulting
from the decision by parliament (to bring the vote forward)." Bisenbayev
said that several candidates representing "different movements, from
communists to liberals, have been registered."
The Kazakh Central Election Commission says three candidates, Communist
Party First Secretary Serikbolsyn Abdildin, customs committee chief Gani
Kaymov, and parliamentary deputy Engels Gabbasov, are registered to run
against Nazarbayev. But early Kazakh opinion polls suggest they have little
support.
Earlier this week, Nazarbayev rejected criticism that the early poll will
favor him. He said Kazakhstan had created the proper conditions for fair
and open elections, and that he favored a more gradual transition to
complete democracy.
Kazakh Foreign Minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev told OSCE ministers in a
closed door session in Oslo yesterday (Dec. 3) that there had been what he
called "voluntary or involuntary confusion of the election legislation" and
how it is being carried out. He did not elaborate.
Tokaev also said that Kazakhstan plans to closely cooperate with the OSCE
and other international political institutions on the further
democratization of election legislation relating to the mass media, state
government and non-governmental organizations.
Kazhegeldin was banned from running in next month's poll after
participating in meeting of opposition figures held just days after
parliament decided to move the elections forward. He made a speech at the
meeting in which he called on Kazakhs to make the January elections truly
fair.
That same week, Kazakh authorities arrested a number of the gathering's
participants. A district Court tried them on October 7 and convicted them
of participating in a gathering of an unregistered organization.
Kazhegeldin also was charged, but he wasn't in the country when the court
summons was issued. He was tried and convicted in absentia.
Kazakh law forbids anyone convicted of violating laws or regulations from
running for president. Kazakhstan's Central Elections Committee announced
on November 13 that Kazhegeldin would be barred from running under that
provision.
Nazarbayev ordered the Supreme Court to review Kazhegeldin's
disqualification, but the court upheld the ruling on Nov. 24. A
presidential statement said Nazarbayev's order to review the ruling proved
his commitment to democracy. Kazhegeldin, in an interview with RFE/RL
before the court upheld his disqualification, disagreed:
"I do not think that it is good news. It means that our Supreme Court is
not independent and fully obeys only one person, who decides to, or not to,
judge.... Any court must obey laws only and be afraid only of God...."
The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) also
sent a mission to Kazakhstan last month to assess the campaign process.
Yesterday's OSCE statement said the ODIHR is not prepared to launch a full
election observation mission in Kazakhstan under what it called the
"present circumstances." The OSCE said it would send a "limited" mission to
observe the poll.
Rainer Hermann, the OSCE election project coordinator in Central Asia, said
OSCE officials had met government representatives, non-governmental groups
and the media during last month's trip. He said the overwhelming impression
was that people were being intimidated into supporting Nazarbayev.
RFE/RL correspondents reported earlier in the week from Almaty that one of
the former candidates, former dissident Karishal Assanov, announced last
Sunday that he was stepping down from the race. Assanov told RFE/RL he made
the decision in order not to be responsible for what he called the "farce"
being organized in the country. In a recent interview with RFE/RL, Assanov
said:
"I think that the parliament's decision to hold early presidential
elections wasn't based on any social necessity. It was scripted by the
government of Kazakhstan, which has to start repaying several years of
loans to international organizations beginning in mid-1999."
Assanov said the economic and social situation will be much worse in
Kazakhstan by that time. He said it is clear that if presidential elections
were held in December 2000, as was scheduled, the current leadership would
have much poorer chances of winning.
07-12-98
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#3. Pipeline Dreams In the Caspian
By David J. Kramer
Thursday, December 3, 1998; Page A23
The region around the Caspian Sea has assumed a large role in the
Clinton administration's strategy toward Russia and the other new
independent states in the area, as well as Iran and Turkey.
The key to this strategy is promotion by the administration of a
pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Ceyhan, Turkey. This route, in
bypassing both Russia and Iran, would accomplish three U.S. foreign
policy goals: strengthen the independence of the Caspian states by
reducing their dependence on Russia for energy exports; exclude Iran
from any possible windfalls; and solidify ties with Turkey, a NATO
member. (From Turkey's perspective, it also would cut down on traffic
through the crowded Bosporus Straits.)
All these would appear to be laudable goals. The trouble is that the
oil companies involved in the Caspian do not support construction of
the administration's favored pipeline (estimated cost between $2.5
billion and $4 billion, the most expensive option by far), preferring
instead a substantially less expensive route from Baku to Supsa,
Georgia, on the Black Sea. From there, oil would be shipped through
the Bosporus to the Mediterranean Sea.
The consortium of oil companies involved in the Caspian meets tomorrow
and is expected to postpone for a third time a decision on the
Baku-Ceyhan route. The depressed price of oil and indications that
Caspian energy reserves might not be all they were cracked up to be
leave American oil executives unconvinced that construction of the
pipeline is feasible or justified.
The fact that the oil companies have not caved in and agreed to
endorse this route, despite strong administration pressure, reflects
their unwillingness to become pawns in Caspian geopolitical games,
particularly given the possibility of an eventual change in
U.S. policy toward Iran. The clash between the companies and the
administration over the pipeline is ironic for a White House that
prides itself on the aggressive promotion of U.S. business interests
around the world. The Clinton administration's preoccupation with
promoting the route has made construction of that pipeline an end in
itself, leaving the administration seemingly oblivious to the tenuous
state of affairs in the Caspian.
U.S. policy toward these states is predicated on winning the personal
favor of each leader currently in power, which makes American policy
overly dependent on unstable and/or authoritarian regimes in the
region. When a change in leadership occurs in one or more of the
Caspian states, peacefully or otherwise, U.S. policy will be
adrift. Having failed sufficiently to emphasize political and economic
reform in the region, the United States has compromised its core
principles for the sake of a questionable geopolitical strategy.
Since October's presidential election in Azerbaijan, the government of
reelected President Haidar Aliev has cracked down on the opposition
and has unnecessarily resorted to violence to put down recent
demonstrations. The unrest stems from Aliev's conduct of the
elections. To avoid a second round of voting, which he might have
lost, Aliev went all-out to win the first round with the required
two-thirds vote -- a high threshold, which invited fraud and
abuse. Aliev delivered on both counts, and his victory was ensured by
a central election commission clearly stacked in his favor. Now a
reinvigorated and reunited opposition seeks to remove the "dictatorial
regime" of Aliev.
In Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose nation will have a
key role in the pipeline issue however it plays out, recently put down
an insurrection in his country, the fourth major challenge to his
leadership this year. Suspicions about Russian involvement in plots
against Shevardnadze abound. Instability in his country works to
Russia's advantage by dampening oil companies' interest in running a
pipeline through Georgia.
Across the Caspian in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev is
busy rigging his country's next presidential election, which the
nation's parliament agreed to schedule two years early. Kazakhstan's
electoral commission rejected, on the flimsiest of grounds, the
candidacy of Nazarbayev's most formidable challenger. Meanwhile,
presidents Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Islam Karimov of
Uzbekistan don't even go through the charade of holding elections, and
yet both leaders have been feted at the White House. So too have Aliev
and Nazarbayev.
The mild words of protest from the Clinton administration about the
recent problems in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan fall on deaf ears. Both
Aliev and Nazarbayev know that their countries' strategic importance
and energy assets mean more to the United States than does political
reform in their countries. The administration says next to nothing
anymore about the authoritarian rule in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
As an election observer in Azerbaijan, I was struck by the generally
warm response I received traveling around the country. A number of
people approached me and my colleagues and thanked us for coming to
observe their country's election. The United States must not let these
people down by whitewashing what is happening in their country or in
the other states in the region. U.S. policy toward the Caspian region
must be built on more than pipeline routes.
The writer is associate director of the Russian and Eurasian Program
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
(c) Copyright 1998 The Washington Post Company
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#4. Central Asia: Senior Officials Discuss Prospects Of Civil Societies
By Roland Eggleston
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; 8 December 1998 (RFE/RL) -- The five
Central Asian states have completed the first seven years of their movement
toward democracy and the creation of a civil society. But what happens now?
That is the theme of a seminar under way this week in the German mountain
resort of Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The seminar is organized by America's
Marshall Center for Security Studies. Senior political and military
officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan are discussing how their countries are developing.
The purpose of the seminar was expressed at Monday's opening session by
Central Asian specialist Shirin Akiner . She said "the new independent
states of Central Asia came into existence with little preparation for
democracy." Akiner said the five "were hurried into adopting this new
system," adding that "it is fair to ask how they have managed."
The overall answer from both Western moderators and Central Asian delegates
was that, on balance, the first seven years have gone far better than most
foreign observers predicted. But many also agreed with a Central Asian
delegate who said: "We have reached the end of the beginning. Now we have
to go further. Major problems remain to be resolved."
One of them is providing what is called a civil society -- genuinely free
elections, an orderly transfer of political power, a transparent political
society, freedom of activity by non-governmental organizations and respect
for the rule of law. In August, Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov told
parliament that a strong civil society is necessary for the functioning of
a civil state. Other regional leaders have said much the same.
Shirin Akiner suggested that one of the problems which had to be faced in
Central Asia was the institution of the presidency and the role of the
president. She argued that there were three possibilities -- the ceremonial
figurehead, a political president with powers limited by the constitution,
or an authoritarian president. She said that, on paper, most countries
opted for the second choice but in practice some were authoritarian.
Akiner said another issue to be faced was the transition from one leader to
another. One test of a stable society was a mechanism for the orderly
transfer of power from an outgoing - or dying - leader to another.
Bess Brown, a senior official at the Tashkent office of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), said creation of a civil
society is "one of the most important elements in ensuring that the
countries of Central Asia continue along the path of democratization." She
said it was also one of the most trustworthy ways in which to guarantee
that the rights of individual citizens will be respected and protected. In
Brown's view, some Central Asian administrations are some distance from
creating a civil society.
Some of Brown's comments provoked protests. For example, she identified
Turkmenistan as the country where the "understanding of the concept of a
civil society is weakest." A Turkmen delegate said Brown appeared unaware
that a civil code had been under discussion throughout the year and that
more than 2,000 amendments had been submitted. He said German and other
foreign experts were helping in the process. He also told the seminar that
around 200 non-government organizations had been registered.
Brown's argument was that Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov believed
that creation of a national consciousness must precede all else. She said
that "this is his justification for his authoritarian rule and cult of
personality," adding that "only now are (there) indications that (Niyazov)
may hand over some of his powers to the national legislature." Brown argued
that in Turkmenistan there is no question of tolerating political opposition.
But Brown said that some sections of the population, particularly
university students and academics, had demonstrated what she called "a
great eagerness" to learn about the basic principles of a civil society.
She said the OSCE was developing a packet of democracy projects which would
be introduced next year.
In a comment on Tajikistan, Brown said the emphasis was on implementing the
peace accord signed last year with the goal of ending the five-year civil
war. She argued that only the development of a civil society in Tajikistan
would overcome the divisions exacerbated by the civil war.
In Brown's view, the most understanding of the principles of a civil
society were shown in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. But she argued that even
here there were some "serious instances of backsliding in basic freedoms
such as assembly, the media and the holding of free and fair elections."
These comments also provoked protests.
Much of the debate on a civil society focused on the role of non-government
organizations (NGO). The question was whether they should be strictly
non-governmental and possibly hostile to the authorities or whether they
should work together with the authorities to resolve issues. One speaker
said that in his experience there was no point in working with an NGO
unless it had contacts with the authorities and could influence decisions.
He said that NGOs without contacts were "useless."
NGOs have wide-ranging interests. One may monitor the right to free speech
in a given country while another keeps an eye on the environment and a
third may examine the background of judges.
Some speakers recalled that in his address to the Uzbek parliament in
August, President Karimov said that NGOs were among the most important
vehicles for creating a civil society. But Bess Brown suggested that the
Uzbek president had a false concept of what an NGO should be. She said that
"as envisioned by the Uzbek president, non-governmental organizations
should be a means of mobilizing various interest groups within the
population to support and promote government objectives." Brown added that
in Karimov's understanding, "such organizations are supposed to help the
population understand that what the government does is in their best
interest -- rather than to help the government understand the needs and
desires of the population."
In the debate that followed, some argued that non-governmental
organizations which did not work with a government could be perceived as
being hostile to that government. But a Kazakh delegate and several others
took the floor to argue that the fact that an NGO was opposed to the
government on some particular issues did not mean that it wanted to
overthrow the government.
Later in the week, the Central Asian seminar in Germany will discuss
multi-party politics, security issues, and the problems of creating a
climate for foreign investments.
08-12-98
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#5. World: Scholar Explains Diversities Of Nationalism
By Charles Fenyvesi
Washington, 7 December 1998 (RFE/RL) -- There are almost as many
definitions of what a nation is as there are examples of nations around the
world, according to British academician Paul Gilbert. And consequently, he
argued, there are almost as many definitions of movements based on such
communities as there are nationalist movements.
Because of this enormous diversity of definitions, Gilbert says in his new
book, "The Philosophy of Nationalism," there is an enormous confusion about
just what nations and nationalism are. And his book represents an effort to
catalogue and classify the various definitions that have been offered by
scholars and political leaders up to now.
The University of Hull (in Great Britain) professor begins with the
eighteenth century German philosopher Johann von Herder, who argued that a
nation is "the most natural state" -- a kind of extended family -- and that
any political organization larger or smaller than that family is inherently
"unnatural."
While most modern definitions acknowledge Herder's view, Gilbert suggests
that this "naturalistic conception" of the nation is only one of the
possible definitions. More than that, Gilbert says, this definition suffers
from a fundamental flaw.
As he points out, "a nation as conceived by naturalists can exist even if
its members do not think that it exists," a situation that reeks of the
idea of false consciousness and allows political groups to manipulate
people toward their own ends.
Other theorists of nationhood, Gilbert points out, focus on the
consciousness of the people as a critical defining element. The French
writer Ernst Renan, for example, argued that "the existence of a nation is
a daily plebiscite," a continuing discussion as to whether the particular
community exists or not.
Renan's ideas contributed to an entire school of thought which Gilbert
labels "voluntarist." According to Gilbert, that school holds that nations
arise and remain in existence when this is "desired" by their members. And
as he notes, the reverse is also true: when that desire "evaporates," then
"the nation perishes."
Until recently, Gilbert notes, most theorists of the nation have focused on
the ethnic dimension, on the sense that the nation was an extended or
imagined community in much the sense that Herder originally defined it.
But recently, they have devoted ever more attention to another kind of
nation and another kind of nationalism: the civic nation and the civic
nationalism on which it is based.
A civic nation, Gilbert says, consists of people bound together not by
imaginary or real blood ties but because of a common commitment to certain
values. And civic nationalism is thus any set of ideas or a movement that
promotes such ties.
Because nations and nationalisms are so varied, Gilbert argues, many of the
debates about them are never really joined. Without recognizing the
situation, advocates of one kind talk past advocates of others, and
consequently, the understanding of each for the other is almost always weak.
Only by acknowledging just how diverse these things are, Gilbert concludes,
can both observers and participants hope to gain the understanding they
need to protect the human communities that form of the basis of most states
and movements today.
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#6. New Book about Tatars (Turk-Tatar National Assembly)
From: "ibrahim kalkan"
To:
Nadir Devlet, 1917 Ekim Ihtilali ve Turk-Tatar Millet Meclisi (1917 October
Revolution and Turk-Tatar National Assembly), Otuken Publishing, Istanbul
1998, 328 pp.
The subject of the book is the struggle of Turkic peoples in Idil
(Volga)-Ural region to gain social, cultural and political rights, by means
of establishing a parliamentary system, during the days of 1917 October
revolution in Russia. The National Assembly constitutes an example of
desires of Tatars and Bashkirs to reach their aims without use of violence,
in an environment full of blody struggles. Today this kind of an approach
is in the agenda of Tatars and Bashkirs. Author, while analyzing the
reasons of failure of that democratic struggle, tries to warn us about not
to repeat the same faults.(From the back cover of the book).
The book has a very detailed contents section. So, I think it would be
useful to give that section for a good review.
ICINDEKILER (CONTENTS)
I. BOLGENIN GENEL YAPISI (GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION)
Cografi ve Demografik Durum (Geographical and Demografical Situation)
Koyluler Sinifi (The Peasant Class)
Idil-Ural Bolgesinin Stratejik Ehemmiyeti (The Strategical Importance of
Idil-Ural Region)
Isciler Sinifi (The Worker Class)
Kazan'da Isci Hareketi ve Tatarlar (Worker Movement in Kazan and Tatars)
Tatar Baskurt Burjuvazisi (Tatar-Bashkir Bourgeoisie)
Egitim Duzeyi ve Egitim Kuruluslari (Level of Education and Educational
Institutions)
a. Islamiyet'in Rolu (Role of Islam)
b. Rus Isgalinin Sonuclari (The Conquences of Russian Invasion)
c. II: Katerina'nin Reformlari (Reforms of Katherine the Great)
Cedidcilik (Yenileþme) Hareketi (The Jadid Movement)
Medreseler (Madrasas)
Rusca Egitim Duzeyi (Level of Education in Russian)
Basin-Yayin Faaliyetleri (Press Activities)
II. SIYASI HAZIRLIK SAFHASI (THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL PREPARATION)
Muhtariyet Fikri ve Siyasi Faaliyetler (The Idea of Authonomy and Political
Activities)
1905 Rus Ihtilali (1905 Russian Revolution)
Musluman Temsilciler Rus Parlamentosunda (Muslim Representatives in Russian
Parliament)
Rusya Muslumanlarinin IV. Kurultayi (15-25 Haziran 1914) (The IVth Congress
of Russain Muslims June 15-25, 1914)
Subat 1917 Ihtilalinden Sonra Siyasi Faaliyetlerde Patlama (The Resurgence
of Political Activities after the October 1917 Revolution)
Kadet Partisi ile Iliskiler Kopuyor (Relations with Kadet Party are Cut Off)
1917 Nisan/Mayis Rusya Müslümanlari Toplantiya Doymuyor (April/May 1917
Russian Muslims Continue to Meetings)
Butun Rusya Muslumanlari Kurultayi 1-11 (14-25) Mayis 1917 (The All Russian
Muslims Congress May 1-11 (14-25), 1917)
Atesli Haziran/Temmuz Aylari-Iktidar Mucadelesi (Feverish
June/July-Struggle for Power)
Kurucu Meclis-Talepler (Constitutient Assembly-Requests)
Kurucu Meclis Secimlerine Ilk Hazirliklar (The Initial Preparations for the
Elections of Constitutient Assembly)
Milli Suranin Icraatlari (The Activities of Milli Shura)
Huzursuzluk-Aclik-Sefalet (Disorder-Hunger-Poverty)
III. OZERKLIK KARARI (DECISION OF AUTHORITY)
Kazan'da Uc Kurultay (Three Congress in Kazan)
a. Musluman askerler Kurultayi (17-22 Temmuz 1917) (The Muslim Soldiers
Congress, July 17-22, 1917)
b. Butun Rusya Muslumanlari Ulema Nedvesi (18-26 Temmuz 1917) (The All
Russian Muslim Learned Men [Ulema] Congress, July 18-26, 1917)
c. II. Butun Rusya Muslumanlari Kurultayi (21-31 Temmuz 1917) (The
Second All Russian Muslims Congress, July 21-31, 1917)
Milli-Medeni Muhtariyet Ilani (22 Temmuz 1917) (Declaration of
National-Cultural Authonomy, July 22, 1917)
d. II. Butun Rusya Muslumanlari Kurultayi Devami (Continuation of the
Second All Russian Muslims Congress)
Kurultayin Milli Medeniyet Hakkindaki Kararlari (31 Temmuz 1917) (Decisions
of the Congress about National Culture, July 31, 1917)
Milli Medeni Muhtariyet Esaslari (Principles of National Cultural Authonomy)
Milli Medeniyet Disindaki Siyasi Gelismeler (Political Developments other
than National Cultural Authonomy)
Idil-Ural'da Diger Uluslarin Faaliyetleri (Activities of other Nations in
Idil-Ural)
Rusya Capinda Azinlik Faaliyetleri ve Muslumanlar (Minority Activities in
Russia and Muslims)
Rus Kozaklari ve Muslumanlar (Russian Cossacks and Muslims)
Tatar-Baskurtlarda Sosyalist Faaliyetler (Socialist Activities among
Tatar-Bashkirs)
Baskurtculuk Hareketi (Bashkirism Movement)
Kurucu Meclise Adaylar (Candidates for the Constituent Assembly)
Kornilov Olayi (Kornilov Incident)
Kazan Kayniyor (Kazan Effervesces)
Iktidar Bolseviklerde (Bolsheviks in Power)
IV. MILLET MECLISININ FAALIYETLERI (ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY)
Muhtariyet Heyeti Ufa'da (Delegation of Authonomy is in Ufa)
Secimler (The Elections)
Millet Meclisi Acilmadan Onceki Faaliyetler (Activities before the Opening
of National Assembly)
Bagislar (Donations)
Acilis (20 Kasim 1917) (The Opening, November 20, 1917)
Millet Meclisine Baskurt Muhtariyeti Golgesi (The Shadow of Bashkir
Authonomy to the National Assembly)
Acilis Merasimi (The Opening Ceremony)
Siyasi Freaksiyonlar (Political Fractions)
Yeniden Baskurt Sorunu (Again the Bashkir Problem)
Yogun Calisma Programi (A Hard Working Program)
Toprakli Muhtariyet Konusu (Question of Territorial Authonomy)
I. Idil-Ural Devleti Projesi (The First Idil-Ural State Project )
II. Idil-Ural Devleti Projesi (The Second Idil-Ural State Project)
Toprakli Muhtariyet Komisyonunun Cabalari (Efforts of the Territorial
Authonomy Comission)
Idil-Ural Ulkesinin Ilani (6 Ocak 1918) (Declaration of Idil-Ural Country,
January 6, 1918)
Baskurtlarla Uzlasma Gayretleri (Reconciliation Efforts with Bashkirs)
Anayasa Ilani (16 Ocak 1918) (Declaration of the Constitution, January 16,
1918)
Ic Rusya ve Sibirya Muslumanlarinin Milli-Muhtariyet Esaslari (National
Authority Principles of Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia)
Diger Onemli Kanunlar (Other Important Laws)
Millet Meclisinde Secimler (Elections in National Assembly)
a. Milli Idareye Secim(Elections for National Administration)
b. Bakanlik Makamlari icin Secimler (Elections for Ministries)
c. Sulh Heyeti (Peace Delegation)
d. Elcilik Heyeti (Envoy Delegation)
e. Bakanlik Uyeleri Secimleri (Elections for the Members of Ministries)
Millet Meclisi ve Askerlerle Iliskiler (National Assembly and its Relations
with Soldiers)
Kapanmadan Once Yogun Faaliyetler (Hard Activities before Closing)
Millet Meclisi'nin 1918 Yili Butcesi (The Budget of National Assembly in 1918)
a. Din Isleri Bakanligi (Muftuluk) Butcesi (The Ministry of Religious
Affairs Budget)
b. Milli Egitim Bakanligi Butcesi (Ministry of Education Budget)
c. Maliye Bakanligi Butcesi (Ministry of Finance Budget)
e. Milli Idare Butcesi (National Administration Budget)
f. Toprakli Muhtariyet Heyet Butcesi (Council of Territorial Authonomy
Budget)
g. Millet Meclisi Butcesi (National assembly Budget)
h. Milli Idare'nin Gelirleri (Revenues of National Administration)
Son Kanunlar, Kararlar ve Tavsiyeler (The Last Laws, Decisions and
Recommendations)
Gorev Sona Eriyor (11 Ocak 1918) (The Mission comes to an End, January 1,
1918)
Baskurtlarla Ipler Kopuyor (Ozerk Baskurdistan) (Relations with Bashkirs
are Cut Down (Autonomous Bashkiria))
V. MILLI IDARE'NIN SORUMLULUK ANLAYISI (CONSCIOUSNESS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY)
II. Butun Rusya Musluman Askerleri Kurultayi (8 Ocak 1918) (The Second All
Russian Muslim Soldiers Congress, January 8, 1918)
Milletler Komiserligi ve Musluman Komiserligi (Narkomnats and Muskom)
Harbi Sura'nin Idil-Ural Projesi/Milli Idare'nin Protestosu (Idil-Ural
Project of Council of War/The Protests of National Assemly)
Milli Vilayetlerin Ilani (Declarations of National Provinces)
Milli Idare'nin Direnisi (Resistance of National Assembly)
Idil-Ural'a Karsi Tatar-Baskurt Sovyet Cumhuriyeti (Tatar-Bashkir Soviet
Republic v.s. Idil-Ural State)
Milli Idare'nin Son Talimati (The Last Instructions of National Assebly)
Bolsevikler Harbi Sura'ya Son Veriyor (Bolsheviks Terminate the Council of
War)
a. Bulak Ardi Cumhuriyeti (Trans-Bulak Republic)
b. Ozgur Basin Susturuluyor (Free Press is Repressed)
Milli Idare'nin Isgali (25 Nisan 1918) (Elimination of National Assembly,
April 25, 1918)
VI. SON CIRPINISLAR (THE LAST EFFORTS)
Mucadele Devam Ediyor (Struggle Continues)
a. Aklarla Kizillar arasidaki Siyasi Mucadele (Political Struggle
between White and Red Armies)
b. Faaliyetler Tekrar Canlaniyor (Resurgence of Activities)
c. Ufa'da Devlet Danisma Toplantisi (State Council Meeting in Ufa)
d. Milli Idare Surgunde (National Assembly in Exile)
e. Milli Idare'nin Sonu (End of National Assembly)
f. Sulh Heyeti Mucadeleyi Surduyor (Peace Delegation Continues Struggle)
Hatime (Conclusion) Hayallere Son-Baskurt ve Tatar MSSC'leri Gercegi Var
(An End to Dreams-There is a Reality of Bashkir and Tatar ASSRs)
Son Soz (Epilogue)
Bibliyografya (Bibliography; Archive sources (31 items); First hand sources
(85); Works in Tatar-Bashkir (106); Works in Russian (135); Works Turkish
(39); Works in English, German and French (26).)
ibrahim kalkan
<<>><<>><>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<><<
#7. Cypern. Orient und Okzident Ein Lesebuch.
Johannes Zeilinger
365 Seiten, 50 Abbildungen, gebunden mit Schutzumschlag, DM 48,-/sFr
46,-/öS 350,- (ISBN 3-88221-812-6)
Weltbühne Mittelmeer: Der Konflikt um die geteilte Mittelmeerinsel Cypern
ist wieder eine Meldung der Fernsehnacihrichten. Cypern gehoert zu den
schicksalsreichsten und daher merkwürdigsten Punkten unseres Planeten.
Dieses Buch ist kein simpler Reiseführer, sondern fast wie ein
zusammengewürfelter traum. Es ist eine kompakte Ergänzung zur bisherigen
Cypern-Literatur.
Der Herausgeberr und Autor Johannes Zeilinger hat ein ansprechendes und
auch ungewöhnliches Werk entstehen lassen über die Insel der Aphrodite, der
üppigsten und östlichsten unter den Mittelmeerinseln.
Wer auf' sich hielt, mußte in der Vergangenheit einmal Cypern besessen
haben. Die Ägypter waren da, die Achäer, die Phönizier, die Perser, die
Griechen, die Roemer, die Byzantiner, die Araber, die Kreuzritter, die
Venezianer, die Türken, die Engländer und last but not least: Reisende aus
allen Himmelsrichtungen.
Cyperns Geschichhte und Landschaften in einem Buch: über Völker, Imperien,
Politik, über Land, Himmel und Meer. In diesem Buch steht Literarisches
(von Rimbaud und Seferis bis Jünger) neben Anekdotenhaftem, lmpressionen
neben wichtigen Texten und Dokumenten, die hier zum erstenmal in deutscher
Sprache
erscheinen - eine farbenreiche Mischung mit differenziertem Standpunkt zur
aktuellen politischen Lage. Der 1)iegsame Stamm der Palme mit seinem
runden Busch von geschwungenen Zweigen als Symbol der Insel Cypern.
Vertreten sind in diesem Buch Griechen, Türken, Araber, Juden, Franzosen,
Engländer, Spanier, Schweden und natürlich Deutsche. In der Geshichte gibt
es oft mehrere Standpunkte, von denen aus man sie betrachten und auch
beschreiben kann.
Dieses Buch ist ein idealer Begleiter für interessierte Urlauber wie auch
für „armchair travellers«.
<<>><<>><>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<><<
#8. The Abkhazians.
A Handbook. Ed. by George Hewitt. Richmond: Curzon Caucasus
World, 1999.
Contents:
Introduction (George Hewitt), Geography and the environment (Roman Dbar),
Origin of the Abkhazian people (Viacheslav Chirikba), On the track of
Abkhazia's antiquity (Giorgij Shamba), History: first-18th centuries (Oleg
Bgazhba), History: 18th century-1917 (Stanislav Lakoba), History: 1917-1989
(Stanislav Lakoba), Soviet Abkhazia 1989: a personal account (Viktor
Popkov), History: the modern period (Jurij Anchabadze), Military aspects of
the war: the battle for Gagra (Dodge Billingsley), The economy: traditional
& modern (Daur Bargandzhia), Language (George Hewitt), Literature and
linguistic politics (Vasilij Avidzba), Art, handicrafts & architecture
(Oleg Bgazhba), Religion (Rachel Clogg), Demography (Daniel Muller), Ethnic
culture (Jurij Anchabadze). Appendix 1: Constitution of the Abkhazian
People's Soviet; Appendix 2: Draft Treaty; Appendix 3: Moscow Agreement;
Appendix 4: Quadripartite Agreement on Refugees; Appendix 5: Abkhaz
proverbs.
<<>><<>><>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<><<
#9. Georgians and Abkhazians.
The Search for a Peace Settlement. Ed. by Bruno
Coppieters, Ghia Nodia, Yuri Anchabadze. -Bundesinstitut fuer
ostwissenschaftlische und internationale Studien. Koeln.
Sonderveroeffentlichung. Oktober 1998.
Contents:
Bruno Coppieters (Introduction), Ghia Nodia (the Confllict in Abkhazia:
National Projects and Political Circumstances), Viacheslav A. Chirikba (The
Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict: In Search for Ways out), Revaz Gachechiladze
(Geographical Background to a Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia), Yuri
Anchabadze (Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement), Gia
Tarkhan-Mouravi (The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Context),
Stanislav Lakoba (Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Confederation),
Maarten Theo Jans (Theory and Experiences of Ethnonational Conflict
Regulation: Their Relevance to the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict), Bruno
Coppieters (Shades of Grey. Intentions, Motives and Moral Responsibility in
the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict). Conclusions by the Editors.
<<>><<>><>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<>><<><<
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