The Iraqi uprising against US occupying forces is fueling a strategic dilemma not only for the Bush administration, but also for Iran's leadership. Though guided by markedly different geopolitical considerations, both Washington and Tehran are probing for ways to defuse the uprising. Iran has sought to take advantage of its religious connection to Iraqi Shi'as. So far, however, Iran's efforts have proven no more successful in settling the situation than have measures undertaken by the United States.
Some Bush administration critics, led by Sen. Edward Kennedy, a Massachusetts Democratic, have compared the Iraqi uprising to the American military experience in Vietnam. On April 17, the European Union's external relations commissioner, Chris Patten, disputed the Vietnam analogy, arguing that Iraq had the potential to become "much more serious" than the ill-fated US experience in Indo-China. "If things go wrong in Iraq, we will be living with the consequences for a very, very long time," Patten said at a news conference.
Iranian leaders appear to share Patten's opinion, and are anxiously trying to keep developments in Iraq from spinning out of control. Iran's top priority is to maintain influence over the Iraqi Shi'a community. Doing so, Iranian policy-makers believe, will assure Iran of significant influence over Iraq's reconstruction process, potentially enabling Tehran to significantly enhance its regional political position.
The uprising has opened up a rift among Iraqi Shi'as, separating moderates led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from the radical followers of firebrand cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Militants under Sadr's control comprise a key element of the uprising against the US military. The division of Iraqi Shi'as forms the heart of Iran's strategic dilemma: the Iranian leadership is keen to promote unity among Shi'as and wants to avoid being forced to make a choice between the moderates and the radicals.
At the moment, the preference of many in Tehran is to continue supporting Sistani, who has urged Iraqi Shi'as to adopt a patient stance towards the US military presence. Although Sadr and his radicals have created large problems for US forces in recent weeks, many Iranian policy-makers remain unconvinced that the young cleric possesses the resources and the ability to be a long-term force in Iraq's political development. At the same time, Iranian leaders have sought to keep their options open. For example, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- a former Iranian president, and one of the country's most influential conservative politicians in early April praised members of Sadr's militia, the so-called Mahdi army, as "young, heroic and brave."
Part of Tehran's preference may be connected to the fact that Sistani was born in Iran and retains links to the Iranian clerical establishment. His relatives, for instance, run an internet service provider that maintains the web site for the powerful Iranian's conservative-dominated religious body, the Guardian Council. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Sadr's ties to Iran, in contrast, are tenuous. The young cleric's relationship with Sistani and other moderate Shi'a clerics is tense, and he has been implicated in the murder of Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei in April 2003 in the Shi'a holy city of Najaf.
Some Iranian political observers worry that if Sadr manages to defy expectations and develop into a lasting political force, Tehran will be unable to exert much influence over him. Recent developments in Iraq have only served to heighten such concerns. Iran's mid-April attempt to mediate an end to the confrontation between Sadr and US military forces was a conspicuous failure amid the assassination of a top Iranian diplomat in Baghdad. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. During a five-day mission to Iraq that concluded April 18, an Iranian delegation failed to meet with Sadr, who publicly announced his opposition to any Iranian mediation initiative.
Some political observers interpreted the murder of the diplomat, Khalil Naimi, as a signal sent by Iraqi radicals they do not welcome Iranian intervention. The charge d'affaires at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad, Hasan Kazemi Qomi, blamed the assassination on "terrorists who want to prevent the establishment of stability and security in Iraq," the English-language Tehran Times reported April 18.
Iranian officials blamed the United States for undermining the Iranian mission. On April 18, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi indicated that Tehran would be unwilling to cooperate with the United States on Iraq-related issues until the Bush administration formally ended the US occupation by transferring political authority to an interim Iraqi government, or to the United Nations.
While Iran no longer appears willing to engage the United States, Tehran seems eager to keep trying to reach out to Sadr. On April 17, Vaghaye Etefgheye, a new reformist newspaper in Iran, cited Iraqi media sources in reporting that Ayatollah Kazam al-Haeri an Iraqi exile who has reportedly served as Sadr's spiritual mentor recently departed the Iranian holy city of Qom for Najaf, Sadr's current base of operations. Haeri, like Sistani, has urged Iraqis to show restraint towards the American occupation. Iranian officials evidently are hoping that Haeri can convince Sadr to moderate his confrontational stance towards American occupation forces.
Editor's note:
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a journalist specializing in Afghan and Iranian affairs.
