In the Aftermath of Turkey's Elections: A Period of Uncertainty

Part IV of Igor Torbakov's The Turkish Factor in the Geopolitics of the Post-Soviet Space. Read part III.

At the present moment, it would seem that Turkey's relations with the EU have completely eclipsed whatever ambitions Ankara might still have in post-Soviet Eurasia. In a recent interview with The Turkish Daily News, Cagri Erhan, a political scientist from Ankara University, said "there are three axes in Turkish foreign policy: relations with the EU, relations with the US and relations with Israel," thus having completely ignored relations with Russia and other post-Soviet states. Turkey's relationship with the EU is given top priority.

Ankara pushed hard to obtain from Brussels – at the recent EU summit in Copenhagen – a precise date for the beginning of accession talks. The EU, whose members were split on the issue, offered a date of 2004, conditioned on Turkey's implementation of key reforms. Now, it seems that Turkey (and the United States and Europe, for that matter) is entering a potentially turbulent period fraught with many uncertainties. As was mentioned in part I of this series, despite the current, seemingly stable, consensus on the issue of the country's "European vocation," Turkey is a nation with a dual European/Asian identity. If Ankara encounters new obstacles and snubs "on the long and winding road to Europe," it might again experience an acute fit of inherent fear of being isolated and marginalized on the periphery of European system. This might well strengthen the "non-European" elements in the peculiar Turkish dichotomy and ultimately bring about changes in policy orientation.

This has happened in the past. For instance, in August-December 1994 then-Foreign Minister Mumtaz Soysal was stressing Third Worldism, nationalism and anti-Westernism in contrast to Turkey's traditional Western-oriented policy. Another example of an attempt to refocus Turkey's foreign policy is the efforts of then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1996-1997. Although he eventually dropped rhetoric about Turkey spearheading a new Islamic NATO or Common Market, Erbakan persistently promoted the establishment of an economic grouping called the D-8 (the D stands for development). This body would consist of Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Initially it was even labeled the M-8 (the M stands for Muslim).

The Turkish military, the staunch guardians of the Republic's secularism, took care of Erbakan in what was lately labeled the "post-modern coup" of 1997. However, in spring of 2002, a top Turkish commander, the National Security Council's Secretary General Tuncer Kilinc, apparently frustrated with the discriminatory attitude of what he called a "Christian Club," suggested that stronger relations with Russia and Iran could be considered a viable alternative to the European Union membership.

In the November 3 parliamentary elections in Turkey a conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) with an Islamist origin won a landslide victory and secured almost two thirds of the seats in the Grand National Assembly. The strong showing at the polls has given the AKP a rare opportunity to form a stable one-party government. The party's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the AKP top officials didn't waste time to confirm their pro-European choice and their eagerness to achieve Turkey's membership in the EU.

It would be fair to suggest, however, that at least part of the AKP constituency does not share the European aspirations of the party's leadership. It is yet unclear how the AKP administration will behave under pressure from its grass-roots in the event that their Europe-oriented policy is given a cold shoulder by the "arrogant Europeans." The first test has occurred just very recently. On November 8, Turkey's bid to join the European Union was condemned by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president who has been charged with drawing up a new EU constitution. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing bluntly said that Turkey "is not a European country," and that its membership would represent "the end of the European Union." Never mind that the European Commission has swiftly disassociated itself from Giscard's comments. The French politician was probably not too far from truth when he claimed that most EU members are privately against admitting Turkey but "they never say it to the Turks." Ali Tekin, Turkish parliamentary representative in Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's convention, branded the former French president's approach "Christian fundamentalism."

A number of Western analysts argue the EU is playing a potentially dangerous game treating Turkey in this way. They contend that Ankara is well aware that the EU is not Turkey's only option. Given its strong Muslim population and the fact that it is geographically 90 percent Asian, the country could look east, rather than west, analysts add. One such analyst, Simon Allison, claims the EU might regret its current stance vis-à-vis Ankara. Referring to General Kilinc's suggestion that Turkey should start looking for new allies, Allison says: "Just hypothetically, what kind of influence might a Turko-Russo-Iranian alliance have on the world? It could upset the status quo, with potential to become a counterbalance to the US. Warm water ports, vast resources, nuclear weapons, probably the support of the Arab world as well."

"Could we be looking at another Cold War?" asks Allison. Most commentators would agree that is the extreme and highly unlikely option. But it's undeniable that the position of the West with regard to the war on terror and Iraq would become a lot more difficult without Turkish support and cooperation.