EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russian Leaders Mull Geopolitical Moves in 2005

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIAN LEADERS MULL GEOPOLITICAL MOVES IN 2005
Sergei Blagov 1/04/05

Hoping to prevent the further erosion of its traditional sphere of influence, Russia aims in 2005 to speed the development of multilateral organizations involving former Soviet republics. Many policy experts in Moscow are concerned, however, that President Vladimir Putin’s haste in trying to forge tighter bonds among CIS states could force Russia into propping up authoritarian regimes, especially in Central Asia. Such support could ultimately prove counterproductive to Russia’s interests, as analysts wonder whether the authoritarian systems in Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan’s, are sustainable.

Over the past 14 months, Russian officials have witnessed Georgia and Ukraine make radical turns towards the West after prolonged popular protests in both countries forced the old regimes from power. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. These geopolitical setbacks, Ukraine in particular, have sparked anxiety and recrimination inside Moscow’s Ring Road, as politicians and experts try to assign blame for what are generally viewed as policy debacles. Russia "lost a crucial battle for Ukraine," the Kommersant daily asserted in a recent editorial, adding that the damage to Russia’s prestige across the CIS is likely to be extensive.

The Putin administration’s strategy to arrest Russia’s geopolitical slide appears based on promoting regional multilateralism. To do so, Russia seeks to utilize an array of organizations � including the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth and the Collective Security Treaty Organization � to bolster Moscow’s influence in neighboring states. To date, these regional groupings have existed mainly on paper, as numerous agreements and declarations have not been implemented. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement December 28 the emphasized Moscow’s desire to develop stronger bonds with its CIS neighbors, on both the bilateral and multilateral levels. Russia has long been suspected by its neighbors of trying to use regional groupings to reestablish a dominating interest across what was once the Soviet empire. In recent weeks, though, top Russian officials have tried to reassure CIS states about Moscow’s intentions. For example, Putin, speaking at a year-end news conference on December 23, pledged that Russia did not seek to exploit multilateral groups to mask its own geopolitical maneuverings. "For us," Putin said, "it is more important to have good relations with the peoples of CIS countries." Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, meanwhile, stated that a single country should not be allowed to dictate the direction of regional multilateral groups.

In at least one case, that of the four-nation the Common Economic Space (CES), recent developments in Ukraine have put the future of the grouping in doubt. The creation of the CES -- comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine � was announced in early 2003. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Since then, the organization has been slow to take shape. Putin at his December 23 news conference said CES development efforts would proceed, but the desire of Ukraine’s new leadership to cast Kyiv’s economic lot with Russia appears limited. Representatives of Ukrainian President-elect Viktor Yushchenko have expressed a desire to continue discussions on the CES, without sounding enthusiastic about the economic possibilities.

Some Central Asian leaders, clearly concerned that the popular forces unleashed by the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine could potentially spread to their own nations, have become increasingly receptive to Russia’s overtures. The Islamic radical threat is another major influence prompting Central Asian leaders, most notably Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, to explore regional multilateral options.

Russian and Uzbek officials held talks January 2 on ways to improve the capabilities of the CIS. According to a report posted on the Uzland.uz web site, the talks "demonstrated the closeness and similarity of the two countries’ stances on most issues." Officials agreed that the CIS needed to become "more efficient and effective" in order to respond to "new threats and challenges in the world,’ the report added.

Russian-Uzbek bilateral relations have strengthened significantly since March 2004, when Islamic insurgent attacks resulted in at least 47 deaths. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Last June, Putin and Karimov signed a partnership agreement and a $1 billion, 35-year production-sharing agreement (PSA) to develop Uzbek natural gas deposits. In November, Russia’s oil major LUKoil announced plans to strike new strategic deals with Gazprom on joint projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Moscow has also encountered geopolitical success in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps Russia’s most significant foreign policy highlight in 2004 came in June, when Putin and Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov agreed on terms for the creation of a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russian policy toward Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, focusing mainly on the energy issue, has achieved mixed results. Moscow has pushed for the creation of a "Eurasian Alliance of Natural Gas Producers," including Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The ability to develop the energy grouping has been hampered by the mercurial behavior of the Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On December 31, Turkmenistan cut off natural gas supplies to Russia and Ukraine, with Niyazov describing the move as in "Turkmenistan’s national interests." Gas deliveries to Russia were suspended for a week for "maintenance operations." At the same time, Turkmen authorities expressed a desire to renegotiate an agreement in January covering gas sales to Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A number of policy analysts are questioning the wisdom of Putin’s policies, suggesting that Moscow risks becoming over-reliant on regional strongmen whose regimes are becoming increasingly brittle. Far from preventing another "Ukraine scenario," Putin’s policies could expose Russia to new geopolitical disasters down the road, some analysts argue.

A commentary published in the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper on December 28 was particularly scathing in assessing Putin’s policies. The analysis maintained that "Russian authorities have become lost in a �geopolitical forest,’" adding that since the Beslan hostage tragedy in early September, Putin has come unhinged.

The newspaper asserted that an increasing number of policy analysts worry that Putin’s policies could end up leaving Russia internationally isolated. It went on to lament that many key developments, especially the souring of Russian-Ukrainian relations, were preventable. "We did not have any reason to get involved in Ukraine’s internal quarrel," the newspaper said in criticizing Moscow’s heavy support for the losing presidential candidate, Viktor Yanukovich.

"Since Beslan and Ukraine, Putin has patently undergone an abrupt psychological change. The steps he takes are no longer carefully calculated. Emotions have triumphed," the commentary said. "In virtually every one of his speeches, the president accuses the West of a lack of probity and of playing a double game.

"You can understand the president on a human level," the commentary continued. "But the leader of such a country as Russia is simply not entitled to build policy on emotion."

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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