EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Looks to Build a New Security System in Central Asia

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA LOOKS TO BUILD A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Stephen Blank 1/04/06

Russia is seeking to rapidly consolidate the strategic gains it made in Central Asia during 2005.

The last 12-to-18 months have witnessed a stunning geopolitical reversal in Central Asia, with Russia’s influence reviving at the expense of the United States. Central Asian states, Uzbekistan in particular, soured on cooperation with Washington amid the so-called "color revolution" phenomenon, which produced regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Many regional officials perceived Washington to be the catalyst for revolutionary developments, even though US leaders denied direct involvement in events. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russia has rushed to fill the strategic vacuum, highlighted by Moscow’s rapid expansion of defense cooperation with Uzbekistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Despite the dramatic decline in its influence, the United States remains a powerful geopolitical force in Central Asia, underscored by the continuing presence of US forces at the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan. To keep the United States on the defensive, Russian planners have developed a multi-faceted blueprint to significantly expand Moscow’s strategic reach in Central Asia, as well as tighten tactical coordination with other regional players, especially China and India.

Underlying Russia’s regional plans for 2006 is a desire to significantly raise the profile of both the Russian military and the country’s defense industry. For example, Moscow revealed in December that it had sealed a deal with Uzbekistan to jointly produce 40 Il-76 transport planes for sale to China. Around the same time, Russia announced an agreement under which Russian and Indian troops would share an air base in Tajikistan.

The base, located at Aini (sometimes written as Ayni) outside the capital Dushanbe, gives Russia a second military facility in Tajikistan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Moscow announced that it is establishing a supply facility to make sure that its weapons sales to China are quickly serviced. Beyond these already announced plans, many regional observers expect Moscow to explore building a military base in Uzbekistan. The establishment of such a base is provided for under terms of a Russian-Uzbek strategic cooperation pact signed in late 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Another key aspect of Russia’s blueprint concerns the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is rapidly evolving into one of Moscow’s primary tools for improving multi-lateral cooperation in the region. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Moscow is pushing the idea that the CSTO should become the primary point of contact in the region for NATO. At present, the Atlantic alliance interacts with regional states on a bilateral basis. Insinuating the CSTO between NATO and individual Central Asian states would give Moscow considerably more say over the Atlantic alliance’s activities in the region, effectively forestalling the ability of regional leaders to forge independent relationships with Brussels.

Realizing Russia’s vision concerning the CSTO’s Central Asia role will be difficult, experts say. Certainly NATO will not readily accept that it has to deal with Bishkek or Dushanbe through Moscow, or on the basis of Moscow’s preconditions. Nor is it likely that Central Asian governments will welcome such an arrangement, although Uzbekistan is so alienated from the West that it may have little choice but to go along with Russia’s wishes.

If Russia, as widely expected, moves to open a military base in Uzbekistan, it is likely to do so under the auspices of the CSTO. This would help shield Russia from allegations that its actions are motivated by imperial intentions. To help make Uzbekistan more amenable to a possible Russian presence, Moscow is transferring military weapons at subsidized prices. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In connection with the already considerable expansion of its strategic presence in Central Asia, Russia has either begun to conduct, or has announced a series of exercises designed to unite its own forces with those of Central Asian allies under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), another multi-lateral organization that Moscow wants to enhance. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Observers note that Russia and perhaps India are seeking to transform the SCO into a true strategic and military alliance, whereas China has openly advocated that it concentrate on trade and economics.

On Central Asia’s Western flank, Russia is striving to develop a multilateral Caspian Sea flotilla that excludes the United States and assures Moscow’s primacy in the Caspian Basin’s security system. Russia’s own Caspian flotilla is Moscow’s only naval group that has expanded since the Soviet collapse in 1991.

Taken collectively, Russia’s moves signify a further militarization of the geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia. Russian planners appear to believe that Moscow can and must challenge the West, even if that means displays of force. In addition, Russian policies would seem to enhance the likelihood that domestic and possibly foreign forces might someday be used against domestic insurgencies in a Central Asian state.

Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.

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