The results of the Assembly of Experts vote December 15 provided a rebuke of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's neo-conservative movement. Only one radical-right candidate -- Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a close spiritual ally of Ahmadinejad -- won a seat in the 86-member assembly, an important and secretive institution that is responsible for oversight of the Supreme Leader. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The relatively high turnout of about 60 percent in the assembly vote, along with local elections held the same day, was generally seen as a reflection of the growing popular unease with Ahmadinejad's radical-conservative policy course. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Roughly three-quarters of the seats in the new Assembly of Experts will be held by members of the so-called traditionalist faction, comprising older clerics who normally shun radical change in favor of the maintenance of the status quo. The powerful Seminary Teachers' Association is among the core groups comprising the traditionalist faction, which also counts among its members some of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's special representatives in Iran's provinces.
The next largest faction in the next assembly is the pragmatists, led by former president Aliakbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The pragmatists enjoy the support of some elements within Iran's vast security establishment. Many of the faction's assembly members belong to an entity known as the Leader's Representatives in Universities. Despite their professed allegiance to Ayatollah Khamenei's policies, several pragmatists are said to be open to new policy directions.
The last faction in the assembly is the reformists, who hold only a few seats, largely because most reform-minded candidates were disqualified from participating in the election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. While having a negligible presence in the Assembly of Experts, the reformists did well in local elections. A pragmatist-reformist coalition gained control of Tehran's City Council, which is generally viewed as a springboard for national power. In general, the tactical alliance between Rafsanjani and reformist leader (and former president) Mohammad Khatami received most of the credit for producing the neo-conservatives' thumping at the polls.
Since the December elections, pragmatists and reformists have unleashed verbal broadsides against Ahmadinejad, aiming to erode the president's prestige and authority. On January 6, reformists in the Iranian parliament blamed the presidential administration's confrontational nuclear policy for prompting the United Nations Security Council to unanimously adopt sanctions aimed at stalling Iran's atomic ambitions. Even conservative-oriented MPs appear to be turning on the president. Iranian media outlets reported January 8 that Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar lashed out at the president, accusing the administration of stoking run-away inflation.
Some Iran news websites reported January 9 that reformists were launching an initiative in parliament to impeach Ahmadinejad. Even if the reformists could muster the 72 MP signatures needed to formally open impeachment proceedings, it is unlikely that parliament would ultimately decide to remove Ahmadinejad, given that neo-conservatives wield considerable power in the legislature.
While recent events showed Ahmadinejad to be the big loser in the assembly election, the largest beneficiary was Rafsanjani, whose political career had seemed at an end in 2005 after losing the presidential election.
Many political observers believe Rafsanjani is now well positioned to become the chairman of the Assembly of Experts a position that would place important political prerogatives at his disposal. Having received 1.6 million votes in Tehran over 30 percent more than the next highest vote-getter Rafsanjani can claim a popular mandate for his pragmatic, moderately conservative policy positions.
Rafsanjani has made no secret of his desire to significantly revise existing government policy in a wide variety of areas, including the manner in which Tehran deals with the West on the nuclear issue. Rafsanjani also wants to diminish the influence of the Revolutionary Guards in politics, as well as reverse the effects of the Ahmadinejad administration's purge of the Iranian bureaucracy.
His popular mandate is buttressed by his rising stature among high-ranking clerics, whose support for Rafsanjani is interpreted as a possible challenge to aspects of the Supreme Leader's current thinking.
While most political observers in Tehran don't expect a Rafsanjani-led assembly to directly challenge Ayatollah Khamenei, who has generally gone along with the Ahmadinejad administration's neo-conservative lurch to the right, some believe the body may try to exert stronger oversight over the Supreme Leader, and perhaps seek to reduce his powers.
In a major revelation, Rafsanjani on December 8, prior to the assembly election, revealed details of discussions held by members of the first Assembly of Experts back in the late 1980s, following the death of the Islamic Republic's founding force, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. According to Rafsanjani, several assembly members back then, including Ayatollah Khamenei, expressed misgivings about a single individual swerving as a Supreme Leader, and proposed instead the creation of a multiple-member leadership council.
The Iranian press has been filled in recent weeks with interviews with various clerics voicing a desire to expand oversight over several institutions including the Revolutionary Guards, national television and radio, the Imam Relief Committee and large foundations, known as Bonyads over which the Supreme Leader currently exercises unchecked authority.
In addition, Rafsanjani reportedly wants to form oversight committees in the Assembly of Experts that would monitor the policy moves and financial dealings of government ministries and state agencies.
Editor's note:
Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.
