EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Anti-Terrorism Campaign Bring Dushanbe and Tashkent Together

EURASIA INSIGHT

ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN BRING DUSHANBE AND TASHKENT TOGETHER
Umed Babakhanov 1/11/02

Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are experiencing a thaw, brought on in large part by the US anti-terrorism campaign in neighboring Afghanistan. The security threat posed by Islamic radicalism helped smooth over strategic differences that fueled a "Cold War" between the two Central Asian states. The thaw, in turn, may boost broader regional cooperation, which is seen by many local analysts as a key to containing Islamic radicalism in Central Asia.

Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov’s recent visit to Uzbekistan, the first such official visit by a Tajik leader in a decade, underscores the rapid improvement in the Dushanbe-Tashkent relationship. On January 10, a Tajik delegation, led by Energy Minister Abdullo Yorov, departed for talks in Tashkent on power supplies and water usage. Tajik and Uzbek officials will also try to resolve the thorny issue of mutual payments for energy supplies.

The Tajik-Uzbek relationship is arguably the most complicated and the most important for Central Asian security. A major complicating factor is the significant Tajik minority in Uzbekistan, especially in historically significant regions such as Samarkand. Uzbekistan is the region’s largest military power and most populous country, while Tajikistan is the poorest country in the former Soviet Union and continues to struggle to recover from a 1992-97 civil war.

The latest thaw is an unexpected development for many regional analysts. At the same time, they note that the US-led anti-terrorism campaign has, virtually overnight, produced a geopolitical overhaul in Central Asia.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan followed different political paths that often led to bilateral diplomatic conflict. When the Tajik civil war began in 1992, Uzbekistan, along with Russia, provided strong backing for Rahmonov’s Popular Front as it battled an opposition coalition dominated by the Islamic Renaissance Party. However, Uzbek President Islam Karimov quickly became disillusioned with Rahmonov after the Tajik leader’s forces established control in Dushanbe.

Tajikistan’s decision to rely on Russia’s political and economic support was a source of chagrin for Uzbek leaders, who sought to diminish Moscow’s influence in Central Asia and establish an independent political profile. Over time, Uzbek support for Rahmonov waned. Tashkent eventually opened a channel of communication with the United Tajik Opposition and supported a negotiated solution to the ongoing civil war.

The fighting stopped in Tajikistan at about the same time in the late 1990s that an insurgency by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) began to vex Karimov’s government in Tashkent. Since then, Uzbek displeasure over Tajikistan’s inability to prevent the free movement of Uzbek insurgents over Tajik territory was a major source of bilateral tension. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. IMU fighters reportedly used Tajikistan as a transit country to launch raids against Uzbekistan from their bases in Afghanistan.

Tension escalated in 2000 when Tashkent unilaterally decided to mine areas of the Tajik-Uzbek frontier. Since the minefields were established, 37 Tajik civilians have been killed by the devices and 41 seriously wounded. No IMU insurgent has been counted as a mine casualty. Another contributing factor in Tajik-Uzbek friction has been Uzbekistan’s claim as Central Asia’s dominant power. Dushanbe has been reluctant to treat Uzbekistan with the deference that Tashkent feels it deserves.

The geopolitical upheaval, precipitated by the September 11 attacks, provided Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with strong incentives to settle their differences. Washington’s sudden and intense focus on Central Asian stabilization opened a conduit for rapprochement between Rahmonov and Karimov. During Rahmonov’s visit, Karimov stressed that "under the new conditions we are fated to be together and [strive to] overcome by common efforts those difficulties that have faced our peoples."

Uzbekistan, in particular, is ready to restructure Tajikistan’s debt and reduce it by 10 percent (US $12 million) as well as cut prices and tariffs on transportation of cargoes and gas. Both sides are also eager to improve trade turnover and to settle long-standing border delineation questions. Settlement of all these issues would pave the way for increased cooperation on anti-terrorism and anti-drug trafficking measures.

A recent US senate delegation tour through Central Asia, led by Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) and John McCain (R-Arizona), emphasized that the United States will remain interested in Central Asia’s stabilization for the foreseeable future. Washington’s continuing high-profile presence in the region should ensure that the renewed spirit of Tajik-Uzbek cooperation endures over at least the medium term. It also means that Tajikistan’s political orientation will have to tilt away from Russian and more towards the West, political observers in Dushanbe say.

Editor�s Note: Umed Babakhanov is director and editor-in-chief of the Asia-Plus Information Agency.

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