Kyrgyzstan’s Politicians Pick Up in 2007 Where They Left Off Last Year

More political strife could be in store for Kyrgyzstan in 2007. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev's supporters in parliament have succeeded in undoing key aspects of last November's constitutional compromise, which significantly reduced the chief executive's prerogatives. Bakiyev's opponents are crying foul, and are pondering a new political-pressure campaign against the president.

Pro-presidential MPs pushed constitutional revisions through parliament on December 30, restoring many of the powers that Bakiyev gave up after street protests in early November. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Analysts say that the new amendments awaiting the president's signature, which were presented as corrections to the hastily adopted November constitution, have once again given Bakiyev the upper hand in his long-running struggle with the political opposition.

Bakiyev's opponents say that the amendments violate constitutional norms, since they were passed hastily, leaving the country's highest court inadequate time to review the changes. But pro-Bakiyev legislators contend that the high court does not currently have enough members to issue binding legal decisions. They add that the approval of the opposition-engineered constitution in November also was marred by procedural violations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

On January 9, opposition leader and former parliament speaker Omurbek Tekebayev called the new constitution "illegal," but said that "Kyrgyzstan's opposition has not yet worked out a single plan of action for the new year," according to news agency 24.kg.

The slow reaction from the opposition may be partly a matter of timing, since the president's counter-reforms were passed on the eve of the long New Year holiday, which ended this week. But there is also evidence of division within the opposition ranks.

On January 10, several members of Kyrgyzstan's main opposition group, For Reforms, announced the launch of a new movement called For the Salvation of Kyrgyzstan, according to news agency AKIpress. For Reforms coordinator Omurbek Abdrakhmanov said that the splinter group, although more "radically inclined" than the main opposition body, was not in conflict with it, the agency reported.

According to Tamerlan Ibraimov, Director of Kyrgyzstan's Center for Political and Legal Studies, the new group's purpose and its relations with For Reforms remain unclear, making it difficult to predict what effect the split would have. But in principle, he said, "for the opposition it would be best to seek out shared positions and unite, rather than seeking out differences."

Recent incidents involving two prominent opposition members have created additional pressure. Tekebayev was heckled during two meetings with voters in early January after being accused of writing to ousted President Askar Akayev in search of financial support. In addition, the Prosecutor General's office announced on January 10 that it had opened a criminal investigation against opposition legislator Temir Sariyev for allegedly failing to declare $100,000 before a flight to Turkey. Both deputies denied the accusations and accused Bakiyev's administration of conducting a smear campaign.

Despite its difficulties, the opposition has a number of options should it choose to continue the battle against the constitutional changes. According to Ibraimov, these include court challenges, a return to mass public protest, and acts of civil disobedience.

Both sides in the ongoing battle agree that the December 30 constitutional amendments do correct some flaws in the November version. However, a comparison of the two documents also indicates a partial return to the system of strong presidential authority established under former President Askar Akayev, who was pushed out by mass protests in March 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Under the new amendments, the president regains the power of appointment and oversight of the country's critical defense and security structures. He also regains the authority to appoint local government heads. The November constitutional version took all these powers away from the executive. Similarly, the prime minister's cabinet selections are again subject only to the president's approval, and not that of Kyrgyzstan's parliament, the Zhogorku Kenesh. Parliament retains the right to force the resignation of individual cabinet members, however.

Two additional concessions made by Bakiyev after November's protests remain in force. The president loses the right to dissolve parliament by referendum or when "insurmountable differences" arise between the two branches of power, as allowed by the Akayev-era constitution.

Perhaps most significantly, 45 members of the new 90-member parliament will be elected by party affiliation, and the majority party or coalition will gain the right to nominate the prime minister. (Until a new parliament is elected on a party basis, the president will propose a candidate for parliament's approval, as before.)

But although some of November's changes have endured, Bakiyev retains important, if less prominent, "levers of influence" over the government selection and management process, said Nurlan Sadykov, Chairman of the Institute for Constitutional Policy.

For example, although the majority party in parliament nominates the prime minister, the president has the ability to obstruct and even derail the formation of the government, he said. Theoretically, Sadykov said, Bakiyev could reject the prime minister's candidacy through procedural maneuvers while the government is in formation. If several attempts to appoint a prime minister and outline the government's structure fail, new parliamentary elections are called and the president wins the right to select an interim prime minister.

Moreover, Sadykov emphasized that the constitution permitted the president to nullify any acts taken by the prime minister or his subordinates. This, combined with the return of local government and security oversight functions to the president, reinstated an unwieldy "parallel structure of government," in which bureaucrats had to answer to both the presidential administration and the prime minister's office, Sadykov maintained.

Ibraimov agreed that the president's restored powers would not necessarily lead to greater efficiency in governance. "In the short term, this increase in authority is to the president's advantage," he said. However, he added, since it was hard to see how Bakiyev's reinstated powers might lead to meaningful improvements in Kyrgyzstan's political and economic situation, "in the end, these changes to the constitution might [come back and] hit him like a boomerang."