Officially, Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akayev's recent trip to Moscow was all about a party -- the celebration of Moscow State University's 250th anniversary. But Russian media detected a different motivation for the January 23-25 visit: a plea for help.
On February 27, Kyrgyzstan will hold parliamentary elections that are seen as a trial run for a presidential vote scheduled for October. Faced with a string of opposition protests, Akayev has repeatedly stated that he has no intention of allowing the parliamentary vote to turn into a Kyrgyzstani rendition of Ukraine's recent Orange Revolution or Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "Spontaneous processes possess a potential danger for society's stability and development," Akayev told an audience at Moscow State University on January 24, Izvestia reported.
In Russian President Vladimir Putin, local observers suggest, Akayev has found a sympathetic ear. After setbacks for Russian foreign policy In Ukraine, Georgia and, with the election of Sergei Bagapsh, in the breakaway region of Abkhazia, Putin has made clear his desire to maintain the status quo in Central Asia. Though few political analysts believe that the Kyrgyzstani opposition possesses the street presence to sustain a mass protest if the parliamentary vote is deemed not free and fair, recent demonstrations in Bishkek, staged by a coalition of opposition forces, have sparked Russian concerns about the stability of the Akayev administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Following the September 11 terrorist tragedy, Kyrgyzstan forged close strategic links with the United States. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. But over the last 18 months Kyrgyz leaders seem to have had second thoughts about the country's partnership with Washington. Over the same period, Bishkek has revived what were traditionally close political and military ties to Moscow. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Of late, Akayev has tended to support the Kremlin's policies in the region.
Given the strategic shift, Russia is understandably interested in preventing a possible transition of power in Kyrgyzstan.
"Akayev is our ally and Russia is interested in sustaining Kyrgyzstan's current foreign policy," the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta commented recently. "Fearing the opposition, which is getting stronger due to aid from Western NGOs, Akayev is now seeking assistance from Moscow," an analysis posted on the website Strana.ru claimed. "The Kyrgyzstani opposition forced Akayev to visit Moscow," the Kommersant daily added in a January 24 piece. "Akayev sought the protection and support of [its] Russian elder brother. . ."
In its role as "elder brother," Russia is offering a combination of the new and the old: expanded economic ties via the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and sizeable military cooperation centered on a base for rapid reaction ground forces opened in October 2003. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
For his part, Akayev appears eager to accept the partnership with open arms. Bilateral relations have scored "impressive results" of late, the Kyrgyzstani leader commented. In particular, Akayev cited an agreement recently signed by Putin that would allow members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a post-Soviet defense group, to purchase Russian weapons at domestic prices. "Kyrgyzstani servicemen have long been waiting for this decision," Akayev said
The Russian military base at Kant, 20 kilometers from the Kyrgyzstani capital Bishkek, lies at the center of that partnership. Currently, just over 20 Russian aircraft and 150 troops are stationed there, but the facility could accommodate more than 5,000 rapid reaction forces, with troops from Russia as well as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The Kant base, analysts say, significantly enhances Moscow's ability to project power in Central Asia, a region that in recent years has become an arena of geopolitical competition among Russia, the United States and China.
The Kant base, Akayev said in Moscow, stands to be "a key element of security In Central Asia." The Kyrgyzstani leader went on to urge "preventive measures" to combat international terrorism. Last year, Akayev suggested that he would back the Russian policy of pre-emptive anti-terrorist strikes, presumably including action from the Kant base against targets inside Afghanistan. That willingness is likely to win approval from Putin, who declared at the base's October 2003 opening that a Russian military presence in Kyrgyzstan would have prevented incursions by armed rebels in 1999 and 2000 known as the "Batken wars."
But, in keeping with recent policy pronouncements from the Kremlin on Central Asia, economics will play an important role as well in Moscow's relationship with Kyrgyzstan. Trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan increased by 70 percent in 2004, according to official figures cited by the Russian president. Bilateral trade has more than doubled since 2000 to reach $400 million, Akayev stated. The boost in trade volume comes on the heels of Russia's 2002 decision to write off some $40 million In Kyrgyzstani debt.
Some Russian observers question Akayev's chances for success ö an indication that many in Moscow remain suspicious about the Kyrgyzstani president's commitment to a pro-Russian political course. Akayev's efforts to "straddle the fence" and remain on good terms with the United States, wrote Kommersant Daily on January 24, has made the Kremlin's attempts to strengthen ties with Bishkek "somewhat more difficult." In November 2004, on a trip to Moscow, Akayev was reportedly told that the US air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan might violate Bishkek's commitments to the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Akayev paid an official visit to the base just six days before his most recent trip to Moscow.
Some Russian pundits suspect that in return for Russian support, the Kremlin will expect Akayev to significantly downgrade Bishkek's strategic links with Washington. Some see Russian Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov's reception of Kyrgyzstani opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev the week preceding Akayev's Moscow visit as an attempt to persuade Akayev that "his flirtation with the Americans is inappropriate," Kommersant Daily wrote. "[T]he possibility is not ruled out," the paper went on to say, "that a visit by a new head of Kyrgyzstan to Moscow will take place . . ."
Editor's note:
Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.
