EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgian President Unveils South Ossetia Peace Plan

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIAN PRESIDENT UNVEILS SOUTH OSSETIA PEACE PLAN
Molly Corso 1/27/05

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has unveiled his much-touted peace plan for South Ossetia, but analysts in Tbilisi say that expectations are low that the proposal will reverse more than 13 years of hostilities between Georgia and the breakaway region.

Under the terms of the peace plan outlined by Saakashvili on January 26 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg, France, South Ossetia would retain its autonomy and have the right to elect its own government, with an executive branch and parliament. The government in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, would have authority over local economic, cultural, education, environmental and law enforcement policy. Tbilisi, meanwhile, would be responsible for defense, foreign and human rights policies. At the same time, the Georgian constitution would be amended to guarantee that South Ossetian "voices will be present" in Georgia’s judicial system, Constitutional Court and parliament.

In a move to win popular support among South Ossetians, the plan would also pay pension arrears, provide compensation for property damaged in the 1991-1992 war with Georgia, rebuild infrastructure and "leverag[e] the generosity of the international community" for a series of economic development projects. South Ossetians, Saakashvili said, "deserve to share in the economic prosperity and stability that is now characteristic of the rest of Georgia."

The South Ossetian language would also be granted official status and central government funds would be committed for as yet unspecified use in preserving South Ossetian culture.

The transition, however, would not be immediate. Saakashvili proposed a three-year "conflict-resolution period" during which mixed South Ossetian and Georgian police forces would uphold public order in South Ossetia. During this period, South Ossetian armed forces would be incorporated into the Georgian military. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe would act as the plan’s "peace monitor," while the European Union would serve as its "peace guarantor," Saakashvili said.

"The road to peace will not be immediate. It will not be easy as well," Saakashvili told PACE delegates. "Peace is not in everybody’s interest� So we must be prepared for challenges."

Speaking at a January 26 press conference in Moscow, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoiti rejected all notions of peace negotiations with Georgia. "South Ossetia already determined its own status. South Ossetia is an independent state, and this status is not going to be discussed," the Russian news service Interfax quoted Kokoiti as saying. "All our history dictates that autonomy within Georgia does not guarantee the security of the South Ossetian people."

The United States and European Union have both expressed support for the plan as a way to jump-start negotiations. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, an advisory body, has begun work with the Georgian government and NGO representatives on how to draft a document to define South Ossetia’s constitutional status.

The focus on Europe, observers say, is designed to play to the Saakashvili administration’s advantage. "It is important for Saakashvili to have some kind of help from the European side to show them that Georgia is willing to change this status; to make more changes in . . . cultural relations, economic relations and so on," Levan Avalishvili, an expert on national security and foreign policy for the Center for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia, said.

The use of both non-governmental organizations and governmental experts to craft the plan for South Ossetian autonomy could be designed to address PACE criticism that Georgian civil society has weakened since the 2003 Rose Revolution. Experts also believe the new autonomy program for South Ossetia was meant to deflect earlier PACE criticism of a framework plan outlining the relationship between Tbilisi and the autonomous region of Ajaria. That framework came under criticism for not granting Ajaria sufficient self-governing authority. "It is very important for them to show there will be some differences between Ajaria and South Ossetia and Abkhazia," Avalishvili commented.

By presenting the plan before a European organization � and in a European city � the government is attempting to tie the European Union more closely to the peace process, as a potential counterweight to Russia. Nonetheless, Avalishvili added, Georgia’s northern neighbor remains the key to peace with South Ossetia. "Russia plays the main role in the peace process," he said. "Without Russia there cannot be any solutions."

While Avalishvili expressed optimism that Russia would prove more willing to assist negotiations with South Ossetia, Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, had a cautious view of peace prospects. "Kokoiti is saying the train has already left [the station]," Rondeli said. "This is part of a bigger game with Russia and Georgia, between Russia and the West�Saakashvili comes up with this new plan [and] whatever it is, this plan has to fit the Kremlin’s interests."

So far, Saakashvili has shown little willingness to accommodate those interests. Speaking at PACE, the Georgian president took issue with the appointment of several Russian officials to posts within the breakaway region’s government. "When the chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) for [the Russian republic of] Mordovia is appointed as head of the South Ossetian ministry of security, and when the deputy chief of the Siberian military district is named as the South Ossetian government’s chief military aide, then we’re not talking about regular personnel changes," the Russian news agency RIA-Novosti quoted Saakashvili as saying. "Any compromise is a two-way street."

Most South Ossetian citizens hold Russian passports and Russian laws provide the breakaway region with its legal code. The region’s ties with Russia provide it with what little economic activity exists in the area. Georgian experts, however, say that South Ossetia’s continued dependence on Russia is a serious hindrance to the peace process.

Tbilisi has no one with whom to negotiate so long as Kokoiti’s government remains in Tskhinvali, Alexander Rondeli said. "[The plan] has to be [the] basis for future compromises, but it is very difficult to imagine it will work after Russia’s decision to keep these territories under their control," he said. "They put their puppets there and they [Russians] do whatever they want there."

But Avalishvili thinks South Ossetia’s continuing economic woes could work in the Georgian government’s favor. "The most important [thing to consider] is why they [the Saakashvili administration] decided to begin with South Ossetia. What is the difference [between South Ossetia and Abkhazia]? The difference is the economy of South Ossetia is not as strong as in Abkhazia. They have a very weak economy and few resources," he said.

"The most important [things] will be the economic cooperation and economic benefits that they will have with integration with Georgia," Avalishvili continued.

Kokoiti does not appear to see much advantage in boosting economic cooperation with Tbilisi. Speaking in Moscow, the South Ossetian leader mentioned plans for "socio-economic cooperation" with Abkhazia, the agency Regnum.ru reported, and dismissed Georgia’s offer of property compensation as inadequate.

Such reactions, however, are not likely to change views in Tbilisi. "I would like to say that these proposals are not made for Kokoiti," Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania said in a January 23 interview with Rustavi-2, a Georgian television station. "The aim of these proposals is to convince every ethnic Ossetian who is our citizen that in this country, Georgia, their free development, security and normal living conditions will be guaranteed."

Building on the everyday contact between South Ossetians and local Georgians is the best tactic for peace, commented Marina Meshvildishvili, president of Tskhinvali House, a collective of 15 different Georgian and South Ossetian non-governmental organizations. "[You have to start with] regular people. They have a good relationship together. They are together for weddings, together for funerals and they never have conflicts," she said

That relationship, however, is far from straightforward, as a recent hostage-taking crisis showed. On January 20, Lado Chalauri, a Georgian police chief from the village of Eredvi, not far from Tskhinvali, was kidnapped, reportedly by the relatives of an Ossetian man, Oleg Pukhaev, who had been arrested by the Georgian authorities for two murders. Relatives of Chalauri staged protests for several days in Ergneti. The villagers were accused of kidnapping an unspecified number of Ossetians in retaliation for Chalauri’s detention. Chalauri has since been released, and Pukhaev returned to Tskhinvali to await a joint Georgian-South Ossetian investigation into the charges against him. Villagers claimed that local Georgians have no sense of animosity toward their South Ossetian neighbors. "If we want to take Ossetians, they live here and we could take as many as we want right now," said Vanu Javakheli. Rather, Javakheli said, another culprit is to blame for ongoing hostilities. "Russians help the Ossetians and because of the Russians the Ossetians are going crazy."

Editor�s Note: Corso is a freelance journalist and photographer based in Tbilisi.

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