EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Kyrgyzstan: Parliament Confirms a New Prime Minister

EURASIA INSIGHT

KYRGYZSTAN: PARLIAMENT CONFIRMS A NEW PRIME MINISTER
Daniel Sershen 1/29/07

Kyrgyzstan’s parliament confirmed Azim Isabekov as the country’s new prime minister on January 29. The endorsement, which came after MPs twice denied Feliks Kulov reappointment to the post, ended the latest in a series of political skirmishes between the executive and legislative branches. But many analysts believe the existing balance of power could prove tenuous.

Isabekov, an ally of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, served as agriculture minister in the previous cabinet. He is expected to take a more technocratic approach to the premier’s role than his predecessor. His background is largely bureaucratic rather than political, encompassing a number of administrative positions in regional and national government.

"The prime minister must not be involved in big politics. The prime minister must focus on finding solutions to economic issues and carrying out economic programs," Isabekov told the news agency 24.kg in an interview prior to his confirmation.

Kulov’s departure signals the end of a political coupling born after protests forced the resignation of former president Askar Akayev in March 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. With special presidential elections looming, Bakiyev, a southerner, joined forces with his main rival, the northerner Kulov. The move secured an easy electoral victory for the duo. Political analysts also believe the political alliance prevented further unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which is divided along regional lines.

Isabekov is from the North and therefore meets the same basic criteria that Kulov did as a representative of northern interests. But according to analyst Sheradil Baktygulov, the new prime minister’s closeness to Bakiyev and lower profile indicates that he won’t be an independent actor. "He will be a technical prime minister," Baktygulov said, "carefully carry[ing] out the president’s strategy."

Bakiyev and the main parties in parliament reached tentative agreement on Isabekov’s candidacy at a meeting on January 26, called after the rejection of Kulov’s repeat nomination. Bakiyev praised the outgoing prime minister, but also laid partial blame for the political deadlock at his feet. "[Kulov’s] government and the Zhogorku Kenesh [parliament] could not find common language and arrange businesslike, working relations between themselves," Bakiyev told the group, according to a press release from the president’s office.

The new prime minister may have smoother relations with parliament, at least initially. The final vote for confirmation was 57-4, meaning Isabekov received near-unanimous support from all elements of the fractious legislature, which is divided among Bakiyev supporters, the opposition, and an amorphous group of more centrist legislators. The threat of parliament’s dissolution if it rejected Bakiyev’s candidacy a third time may have motivated some to make a deal with the president. But it is likely that frustration at the prolonged confrontation with the executive branch also led the various parliamentary factions to the bargaining table.

"There seems to be some understanding" between the president’s office and political forces in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, said Baktygulov. However, he added, fundamental disagreements remained, and Isabekov’s honeymoon period could be brief.

In particular, Baktygulov highlighted the ongoing controversy regarding Kyrgyzstan’s potential entry into a World Bank- and IMF-sponsored program to write off the debt of poor countries. Some Kyrgyz civic actors and much of the political opposition feel Kyrgyzstan should avoid expanding contacts with international financial organizations, fearing that such action might undermine the country’s sovereignty. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The issue is so sensitive that one of Kulov’s first moves upon hearing that he would not be nominated a third time was to write a letter to the World Bank and IMF putting the government’s tentative commitment to the program on hold until a new prime minister took office. Tamerlan Ibraimov, Director of the Center for Political and Legal Studies, suggested that Kulov sought to distance himself from the unpopular program as soon as he became a political free agent.

Still an influential politician leading a relatively well-established party, Kulov’s future plans remain the subject of speculation in Bishkek. His well-documented public reserve has left pundits grasping at straws to try to divine his next step. In a brief interview with the newspaper Agym, Kulov expressed a sense of disillusionment with Bakiyev, at least on a personal level. Speaking of what he said was the president’s vow to continue submitting his candidacy until it was approved, Kulov said "what can one say about a person who breaks his word?" He went on to announce a press conference for January 29, sparking speculation that he might take a dramatic turn toward the opposition. The event was subsequently canceled, however, and Kulov’s plans remain a mystery.

"Most likely Kulov will remain in politics and will actively work on getting [his party] as many seats as possible in the new parliament," said Ibraimov. "Kulov is a prudent and pragmatic politician, and his decision will be dictated by a deeply pragmatic approach."

Kulov’s departure would hardly mean an end to Kyrgyzstan’s political battles, Ibraimov added. "The main source of the conflicts is not the figure of the prime minister, but the president and the opposition � the clashes between them. The prime minister has always played the role of the scapegoat," he said.

Editor�s Note: Daniel Sershen is a freelance journalist based in Bishkek.

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