EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Iran's Presidential Election Shapes Up as Battle Among Conservatives

EURASIA INSIGHT

IRAN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SHAPES UP AS BATTLE AMONG CONSERVATIVES
Ardeshir Moaveni 1/31/05

Iran’s presidential election is more than five months away, but it is already shaping up as one of the most contentious votes in the Islamic Republic’s history. Much of the jockeying involves a politician, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who has yet to formally declare his candidacy.

The consensus among political analysts in Tehran is that a conservative candidate will win the June 17 vote, replacing the two-term reformist Mohammad Khatami. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Just which of the five declared conservative candidates will emerge as the winner is far from certain, however. Many observers believe none of them would be able to beat Rafsanjani, a conservative-leaning pragmatist, should he decide to enter the race, as most believe he will. Rafsanjani served as president from 1989-97, but in recent years he has remained in the political shadows as head of the Expediency Council, an unelected advisory body.

At present, various conservative factions are engaged in a bruising battle for the political high ground. The maneuvering has revealed that the conservative bloc, currently in control of the legislative branch and judiciary, is far from united. Young radical-conservatives -- who have coalesced into a group called Abadgaran, or the Developers of Islamic Iran � are vying to supplant the Islamic Old Guard, which comprises politicians who led the revolution against the Shah in 1979.

The radical-conservatives, many of them with close ties to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and security apparatus, have been in the ascendancy since local elections in February 2003, an event that marked the start of the conservative political comeback after Khatami’s reformists had gained control of the executive and legislative branches on the national level. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Since the conservative victory in the 2004 parliamentary election, the Old Guard has struggled in its search for a way to blunt Abadgaran’s momentum. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Old Guard leaders tend to be wary of Rafsanjani. Yet many, but not all would be willing to support Rafsanjani’s candidacy as a way to block the young radicals from establishing a stranglehold on the conservative movement. Some Old Guard members also believe that early support for Rafsanjani could translate into added political influence in the event that he won the election. In a sign that some influential members of the Old Guard are ready to throw their support behind Rafsanjani, the leading Old-Guard presidential candidate, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister, recently announced that he would withdraw from the race if Rafsanjani decided to run.

At the same time, radical-conservatives have gone to great lengths to discourage a Rafsanjani run, fearing that a pragmatic president would prevent them from implementing a radical-conservative legislative agenda. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In late 2004, radical-conservatives pushed legislation that would have would have barred anyone over 70 from running for the presidency. (Rafsanjani turned 70 last August). When that effort failed in the face of broad opposition, radical-conservatives engaged is a whisper campaign, designed to fan allegations that Rafsanjani’s friends and family members were heavily engaged in corrupt practices during his presidential term.

Elias Naderan a leading radical-conservative MP, recently made an incendiary speech criticizing "past presidents" who had pursued "failed" policies. He said pointedly: "The consensus among this country’s luminaries is that Mr. Rafsanjani should not make himself a candidate."

In keeping with his pragmatist profile, Rafsanjani has not formally aligned himself with any particular faction. Instead, he has kept his political enemies, namely the radical-conservative, off balance, repeatedly indicating that he will not run unless "called upon" to do so by Iranian citizens.

"I see so many capable and qualified individuals who are fully competent to occupy the [executive] office," Rafsanjani said in a January 11 speech to Iranian seminarians. "However, if the nation calls upon me to take this mantle, I’ll not for a moment shirk from this sacred duty."

Such a call could come not only from the Old Guard, but also from reformists. The reform movement has lost much of its popular support over the past two years, as many Iranians have become disillusioned by the reformists’ inability to shake-up the political system. Although reformist leaders have put forward presidential candidates of their own, they themselves recognize that their candidates � Motafa Moein and Mehdi Karrubi � stand virtually no chance of winning. Accordingly, some reformists seem inclined to reluctantly support Rafsanjani, an old nemesis, as the best available option to prevent a full radical-conservative take-over of the country’s political institutions.

For now, Rafsanjani appears content to keep Iranians guessing over his candidacy. But pundits believe a formal declaration of Rafsanjani’s candidacy could come some time in February.

Editor�s Note: Ardeshir Moaveni is a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian politics.

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