Eurasia Insight:
RUSSIA'S ORGANIZED CRIME: A TYPOLOGY PART II: THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW CHECHEN WAR
Roustam Kaliyev: 2/01/02
A EurasiaNet Commentary

Part II of a two-part series. Read Part I. Vladimir Putin, who established his credentials in the security services, cemented his hold on power on promises of establishing order and crushing Chechen separatism. Using the pretext of the war in Chechnya, the security services have been able to evade social and legislative oversight.

As was discussed in Part One, Russian organized criminal groups can be grouped into three main categories: classic, governmental, and national. From the start of the present Chechen war, government agencies have exerted increasing influence over business activity. Many entrepreneurs reportedly sought to obtain protection (or "krysha," in Russian) from the MVD (Interior Ministry), FSB and other security services.

The war in Chechnya thus had a very negative impact on those Chechens who made providing krysha their main business activity, pitting them against Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov. At the same time, unlike ordinary Chechens in Russia, leading Chechen businesses have not been severely effected by the ongoing fighting. Indeed, big businessmen are said to have worked closely with structures like the MVD, FSB, and Federal Tax Collection Service (FSNP).

Criminologists say that by the end of 1999, national criminal groups ceded up to 40 percent of the businesses they influenced to the security services. For their part, Chechen businessmen attempted to prevent ethnic Chechen Mafias from expanding their sphere of activities. In return, the security services supposedly promised immunity to the businessmen, and promised not to diminish the influence of Chechen groups in the capital and other major cities.

As a result, the classic criminal groups became virtually extinct and now only two strong categories remain, the "governmental" and the "national." The governmental groups compete against each other and try to squeeze out the national Mafias. Sometimes, representatives of the "government" Mafias bought out entire neighborhoods in cash. In 1995 the Yuzhnoportovyi neighborhood of Moscow was bought out from a "national" type Mafia by influential people connected to the capital's anti-organized crime unit of the MVD (GUBOP). The sum named was in eight digits in dollars.

In an August 2001 article published by Novaya Gazeta, titled "FSB Blows up Russia," former FSB and MVD officer Alexander Litvinenko described in detail how the FSB protected certain Mafias and thwarted efforts by the GUBOP to apprehend suspects. Litvinenko started his career in the FSB, but later switched to the MVD in 1998. The Novaya Gazeta article, along with Litvinenko's forthcoming book, focuses the spotlight on FSB criminal activities. Of course, the GUBOP - which was formed during the late Soviet era - was itself a notorious competitor in racketeering activities. Recently, the GUBOP was officially disbanded due to its "krysha" activities. However, neither the nature of its activities nor the scope of its power has changed much. As it turned out, it was impossible to "disband" this unit. The members of the unit simply continued their racketeering activities under other rubrics.

The security services combat the national groups with systematic arrests, by planting drugs or weapons and accusing suspects of belonging to the armed units fighting in Chechnya. While such sweeps may occasionally result in the arrest of real criminals, they more frequently amount to harassment and racketeering against Chechen nationals as a whole. In 1999, 5,000 Chechen males were arrested on dubious charges in Moscow city and Moscow oblast alone.

A recent incident captures this harassment's flavor. A household of four Chechen women in Moscow ran a legal, registered bakery business from their home. In December 2001, a group of masked men burst into their apartment at 4 a.m. Instead of presenting a warrant, the masked men showed them a plastic bag presumably with drugs, and said that they would be arrested for possession unless they handed over their jewelry and all the cash on the premises.

Similar incidents frequently occur in other regions of Russia. They are especially prevalent in Stavropol, Krasnodar and Volgograd. In Moscow, it is nearly impossible for Chechens to rent apartments because landlords know that Chechens are subject to intense scrutiny. Among other forms of blatant discrimination, Chechens continue to face bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining passports for international travel.

Some Russian leaders view the racketeering activities of security services as the most effective way of fighting organized criminal gangs. It seems that Russia's security services are not bringing about law and order so much as trying to become the biggest bully on the block. Their competition with various Mafias can be described by the American saying: "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em."

Editor’s Note: Roustam Kaliyev has traveled repeatedly in Chechnya during the present war, and has contributed articles to Moskovskiye Novosti and Obschaya Gazeta. Miriam Lanskoy translated this article from Russian into English. This is part two of a two-part series. Part one discussed the origins and evolution of the Russian Mafias.