Turkmenistan: Berdymukhamedov Marks First Year as President

It's been a year since Gurbanguly Berdymukhamdov's pro forma election as president of Turkmenistan, and it's clear that despite a lot of talk about reforms, the Central Asian nation is arguably no more open now than it was under the deceased despot Saparmurat Niyazov. In the foreign policy sphere, however, Berdymukhamedov's efforts to end Turkmenistan's isolationist habits have the potential to overhaul the geopolitical status quo in Central Asia.

In what by Turkmen standards qualified as a startlingly competitive election, Berdymukhamedov gained the presidency on February 11, 2007, with 89 percent of the vote. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Both before the election and after, Berdymukhamedov spoke often about a desire to open up Turkmenistan to the outside world, and to repair the country's social infrastructure, which had been dismantled by Niyazov during his final years in power. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Berdymukhamedov quickly cast the beginning of his administration as the start of what he called "an era of great revival."

Even so, many of the totalitarian pillars set up Niyazov remain in place. Freedom of movement is non-existent in Turkmenistan, as security services closely monitor the activities of citizens. Those wishing to leave Turkmenistan continue to need de facto official permission. Although an exit-visa requirement is no longer technically on the books, the government continues to maintain a "suspects" list, and anyone on it is not permitted to leave.

In addition, the state continues to stifle freedom of speech and access to information. No independent mass media outlets, either broadcast or print, exist in the country. Those journalists wishing to write from an independent viewpoint do not feel free to do so openly. They continue to have to either leave the country, or go deep underground. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Berdymukhamedov has instituted some changes, but in most cases they are superficial in nature, more of a PR move than a genuine expression of change. For example, Berdymukhamedov's move to restore a 10-year education system, as well as to expand university education to five years instead of two, has done little to address severe problems connected with the quality of instruction. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Authorities have done nothing to overhaul the curriculum, improve teacher qualifications or expand access to Russian-language instruction. As a result, students are merely exposed for an additional year to the anachronistic methods of the old authoritarian ways. Little knowledge gained during this additional time in school can be practically applied to career-building. Perhaps most tellingly, the spiritual guide purportedly penned by Niyazov, the Ruhnama, remains the chief textbook at all levels of Turkmenistan's education system. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Meanwhile, the much ballyhooed move to open Internet cafes has not appreciably widened the access of Turkmen citizens to outside information. Roughly a dozen Internet cafés are now operating in towns across Turkmenistan, all of them operating under the auspices of Turkmentelecom - the state company that is only Internet service provider in Turkmenistan. Given the official affiliation, most Turkmen are reluctant to enter one of these Internet cafes, due to fears that doing so would invite official scrutiny into their activities. And for those not daunted by possible government observation, high costs for using the Internet are another deterrent.

Inconsistency marks many aspects of Berdymukhamedov's domestic reforms. While he did authorize the opening of Internet cafes, for instance, the Turkmen leader also issued a decree to ban individual satellite dishes in the capital, a move that could greatly restrict access to foreign news broadcasts. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In a similar manner, Berdymukhamedov restored such forms of entertainment as the circus and opera, which were shut down by Niyazov in the early 2000s, and declared "art forms alien to the Turkmen." Yet in early 2008, authorities in Ashgabat issued new regulations banning dance troupes from performing in restaurants or at weddings without a government license. At the same time, a prohibition on ballet, imposed by Niyazov, appears to remain in force.

Pensions are another area where Berdymukhamedov has sent mixed signals. While he restored benefits to tens of thousands of elderly Turkmen citizens, the monthly payments average about 500,000 manats (roughly $20) and do not even come close to meeting costs for basic foodstuffs and other essentials.

Berdymukhamedov has made the biggest break with the past in foreign policy. Whereas Niyazov was reclusive, and the state reflected the former leader's attitude by embracing the status of a "neutral" nation, Berdymukhamedov has been a veritable globetrotter during his first year in power, visiting a wide array of destinations, including China, Russia and the United States. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Turkmen leader remains nominally aligned with Russia, bound to Moscow primarily by a 25-year gas export deal. However, Berdymukhamedov is pursuing an export deal with China, and appears interested in joining a US-backed energy project, known as the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. He is not content with Turkmenistan operating as a satellite of Russia, and is striving to enhance the Central Asian nation's ability to act as an independent player in the regional competition over energy exports. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. If Turkmenistan has the reserves to match Berdymukhamedov's export plans, the Turkmen leader could end up with the ability to revolutionize the existing Caspian Basin energy-export framework, and to terminate Russia's access to far-below market energy sources in Central Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].