EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Putin Faces Domestic Criticism Over Russia's Central Asia Policy

EURASIA INSIGHT

PUTIN FACES DOMESTIC CRITICISM OVER RUSSIA’S CENTRAL ASIA POLICY
Igor Torbakov 2/12/02

Russia’s policy-making elite is divided over how to respond to the sweeping geopolitical shift that has occurred in Central Asia - the region Russian strategists have portrayed since the end of the 19th century as the country’s soft underbelly. The sudden arrival of US forces in Central Asia has prompted unprecedented criticism of the Russian government’s handling of post-September 11 developments. President Vladimir Putin, however, provides no indication that he is feeling pressure to change Russian policy.

Several Russian media outlets portray the US presence in Central Asia as a significant threat to Russian national security. The establishment of US bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan "is comparable, in its geopolitical significance, with the unification of Germany," the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper said. Some Inside-the-Ring Road analysts in Moscow have accused the government of "losing" Central Asia. "In the result of the destruction of its old enemy [the Taliban in Afghanistan], Russia has lost its geopolitical bridgehead in Central Asia," one observer said.

All this criticism, notes Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of Politika Foundation, a Moscow-based think tank, "begins to create problems for President Putin, for it questions the rationale of his [foreign policy] course aimed at the support of the anti-terrorist operation and closer relations with the West in general, and the US in particular."

Publicly, Putin appears unaffected by the criticism. In a February 11 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Putin indicated that the domestic debate surrounding the anti-terrorism campaign was being blown out of proportion. The Russian president seems to believe that the benefits of deepened economic cooperation with the United States, driven by the two countries’ anti-terrorism alliance, outweigh the loss of geopolitical stature in Central Asia.

"Decisions are taken on the basis of what we need in reality, not on the moon," Putin said in the interview. "If we were to view the U[nited] S[ates] as an enemy, even within the anti-terrorist coalition, then we would have to behave differently. But if we believe that we can be partners, and, in the more distant future, even allies, then our behavior � should not be doubted."

If there is reason to doubt Russia’s intentions and future actions, it is found in the ongoing, hawkish statements coming from leading figures in the Russian defense and political establishments. For example, the director of Russia’s Federal Border Guard Service, Konstantin Totskii, demanded in a recent interview that US forces "go home" as soon as military operation in Afghanistan are wrapped up. "We cannot agree with the US’ and other countries’ permanent presence here [in Central Asia]," Totskii told the Trud newspaper. State Duma speaker Gennadii Seleznyov voiced similar dissatisfaction with American policies in what Moscow considers its legitimate zone of influence. "Russia will not endorse the emergence of permanent US military bases in Central Asia," he said during a recent tour of the region.

Regardless of whether or not US forces remain in Central Asia, Russian interests in the region have suffered considerable damage, analysts say. The US presence, for instance, will damage Russian efforts to promote regional economic integration and a collective security initiative.

"The most important lesson [of the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan] is that there is no Commonwealth of Independent States. There is only Russia instinctively trying to retain around itself the thoroughly corrupt chieftains of the impoverished imperial borderlands," bitterly writes Vladimir Voronov in the Sobesednik weekly. "I am not sure about ’economic unity’ but there is definitely nothing left of the military alliance - save the half-dead Dushanbe regime [in Tajikistan] that would not survive even one day without [the help of] our 201st division."

Military analysts say US bases in Central Asia threaten to render the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty (CST) redundant. [For background information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Three members of the CST - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - have established strategic partnerships with the United States that diminish the appeal of a military alliance under the CST.

In addition, Russian security officials claim there is a score of top secret Russian military facilities in Central Asia that US and NATO officials are keen to gather information on. In Kazakhstan, there is the Sary-Shagan anti-missile launching site and the radar station, which is part of Russia’s early-warning system. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a Russian navy long-distance communications center, and a testing site for the nuclear subs’ rockets on Lake Issyk-Kul. There is also a space surveillance station, located in Nurek in Tajikistan’s Pamir foothills.

Putin does have a legion of defenders. These analysts say the US-led campaign against terrorism significantly reduced the threat posed by Islamic radicals in Central Asia. As far as Russia is concerned, the stability offered by Central Asia’s autocratic regimes "is far better than chaos on our southern frontiers," notes Nikonov, the political scientist.

A few analysts say Putin put the best spin possible on events for Russia. They add that in the aftermath of September 11, Moscow could not have prevented Central Asian leaders, especially Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, from entering into new strategic partnerships with the United States. Thus, Russia did the best it possibly could to portray the geopolitical changes as having occurred with Russia’s consent. "We ceded Central Asia," admits one analyst, "as something that was impossible to retain - this is the major result of the [new] Afghan war for us."

In theory Russia could have pursued more robust and aggressive foreign policy in its former southern backyard, but only if it had been prepared to significantly expand the amount of military resources that it commits to Central Asia. At the moment, Russia, both economically and militarily, is not ready to do this. "The reason for this is not Putin’s policies, but our objective weakness," says Nikonov.

Editor�s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was a Regional Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1995; Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; and Kiev correspondent for the Paris-based weekly Russkaya mysl, 1998-2000.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.