RUSSIA'S STRATEGY AFTER GROZNY

The Russian army has scored a significant victory by capturing Grozny and by inflicting heavy casualties on the rebels. Encouraged by this victory, and excited by the prospect of achieving a decisive victory, the Russian military is pressing on with its campaign in mountainous southern Chechnya.

This strategy is misguided. The Russian military should do everything possible to avoid fighting a war in the mountains. The risks for the Russian army are great. Indeed, fighting in the mountains will only create higher casualty totals, and could ultimately threaten the gains made so far, namely by undermining Russian control over the part of Chechnya that it now governs.

The tactics that have succeeded in the past for the Russian army will not necessarily produce desired results during the new phase of the campaign. So far, the war in Chechnya has been more or less a conventional clash. Battles have taken place on a well-defined front, on terrain relatively friendly to extensive use of heavy weapons and airpower. Russia's superiority both in manpower and in armaments has played a decisive role. Not only do federal forces possess an overwhelming superiority in numbers, but they also enjoy a level of popular and political support that they did not have from 1994-96, during the first Chechen war.

All of this, however, may prove insufficient to win in the mountains. There, the clash will be between a conventional army and rebels employing guerrilla tactics, operating from easily defensible positions. Mountain warfare offers defenders significant tactical and logistical advantages, which can neutralize the numerical superiority of the Russian army. If the Russian army continues its advance, federal forces could find themselves caught up in a cycle of diminishing returns with tactical gains coming only with a significant increase in costs, as measured by casualties.

What should the Russian strategy be then? Russia should abandon the hope of inflicting a decisive defeat on the rebels, and jettison plans of fighting in the southern mountains. The most pragmatic course for President Vladimir Putin would be to declare victory, and start the process of rebuilding the part of Chechnya under the Kremlin's control, working with the portion of the Chechen population that is willing to cooperate with Moscow. Thanks to the half-decade of chaos, in large part created by the Chechen leaders themselves, many Chechens may be willing to accept Moscow's rule in exchange for a chance to build a minimally acceptable and secure life in Chechnya.

As for the military component, Russia should adopt a defensive strategy by sealing off the mountainous area controlled by the rebels, and simply strive to protect the area under its control. It sounds much less attractive as a military option than a complete and decisive victory, but the latter is likely to prove elusive.

The available evidence indicates that Russia's political-military leadership will not follow the most pragmatic course of action, however. Instead, the army appears posed to continue with its offensive at all costs, hoping that the momentum of past performance will bring new victories. The Kremlin seems unshakable in its aim of annihilating the Chechen rebels, and thus stamping out separatist sentiment completely. The consensus among top generals likewise seems to be that victory will be easier to achieve now than in the 1994 war.

But Moscow may very well be miscalculating the level of popular support that it enjoys. The political-military leadership is now intoxicated with victory. The high number of casualties that the army is likely to suffer in a protracted mountain guerrilla war could very well prove a sobering experience. At some point, the costs will outweigh the benefits as the Russian troops find themselves in a quagmire for which they are hardly prepared, and from which it will not be easy to withdraw.

By gambling for the maximum result Russia is risking not only failing to attain that maximum, but also losing what it has already gained. It is doubtful whether the Russian army, or even the state can endure another defeat, and President Putin should think twice before taking that risk.