EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Remains Wary of Georgia's Geopolitical Intentions

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA REMAINS WARY OF GEORGIA’S GEOPOLITICAL INTENTIONS
Igor Torbakov 2/18/04

For policy-makers in Moscow, Russia’s rapprochement with Georgia comes with a caveat: Tbilisi must eventually make an unequivocal choice about its geopolitical orientation. While Georgia’s new leadership, headed by President Mikheil Saakashvili, sorts out its policy priorities, the Kremlin seems prepared to be patient, Russian political analysts contend. But if Saakashvili’s government tries to shun Russia, Moscow may use all levers at its disposal to frustrate Georgia’s emergence as an outpost of Western influence in the Caucasus.

Saakashvili during his February 10-11 visit to Moscow made a favorable impression on Russian leaders, including President Vladimir Putin. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Accordingly, the Kremlin held out the possibility that lasting settlements could be reached on a variety of issues, in particular Abkhazia’s political status.

For his part, Saakashvili reciprocated with several goodwill gestures, including a pledge that Georgia would never sanction the establishment of a US military base on its territory. "I saw and discovered and elementary thing [during the Moscow visit] � that it is possible to do business with Russia," Saakashvili told Rustavi-2 television on February 12.

Since Saakashvili returned to Tbilisi, the thaw in Georgian-Russian relations, has continued. The Georgian parliament, for instance, announced February 17 that it was prepared to suspend a 2003 resolution expressing Tbilisi’s opposition to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization, Imedi TV reported in Tbilisi.

In Moscow, such action is welcomed, but underlying the Russian approach towards the thaw is lingering suspicion about Georgia’s future direction. The Putin administration remains intent on strengthening its control over the post-Soviet space, and thus is not completely satisfied with the results of the Russian-Georgian talks, some regional analysts say. The Kremlin’s concerns about Georgia’s geopolitical loyalty apparently will ease only when Tbilisi has provided a written guarantee of its fealty � in the form of a friendship treaty. While in Moscow, Saakashvili reportedly resisted signing what is effectively a loyalty oath.

According to a report published in the Kommersant daily, the Kremlin’s main objective during Saakashvili’s visit was to get the Georgian president to sign a "meaningful" declaration on strategic partnership. Citing the "well-informed sources" in the Russian government, the newspaper said the Kremlin had prepared an agreement that would have confirmed Russia’s "vital interests" in Georgia. The agreement also reportedly contained vague language concerning Russia’s military withdrawal from bases in Georgia, and had a provision in which Georgia recognized the "special interests" of Russian citizens and the Russian-speaking population residing in the country. In addition, the document called on Tbilisi to use "exclusively peaceful means" in its attempts to restore the country’s territorial integrity.

Despite considerable Kremlin pressure, Saakashvili resisted agreeing to the Russian-drafted document. As a face-saving measure, Russian officials prepared in advance a batch of the less important bilateral agreements that were ultimately signed in Moscow. Meanwhile, Saakashvili and Putin have indicated that a comprehensive pact should be ready for signing in the autumn, when the Russian leader is expected to make a state visit to Georgia. Given the history of antagonism between the two countries, it is impossible to say for sure whether a comprehensive pact that will actually be signed, or whether Putin’s visit will take place.

At this point, Moscow, while remaining hopeful, appears to be revising its expectations. These expectations are perhaps best summarized by recent comments made by Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov, who maintained the Kremlin’s primary goal during Saakashvili’s visit was to help "bring clarity into the new Georgian leadership’s foreign policy course � how they view their country in the context of the region and within a broader international picture." A commentary in the Izvestiya newspaper bluntly suggested that Trubnikov was, in effect, urging Tbilisi to sort out its strategic priorities and decide "who is more important for Georgia -- Russia or the West."

Russian analysts see no middle ground for Georgia on this issue: Tbilisi, sooner or later, will have to decide between the two. Saakashvili tried hard to soothe the Russian leadership’s fears. At the same time, he indicated that Georgia under his administration will consent to being no one’s vassal. "[Georgia] is a country for Georgians; it is not a battleground for Russia and the United States," Saakashvili stressed in his policy speech at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations.

Russian defense and security specialists consider two interconnected issues � Tbilisi’s geopolitical orientation and the military presence of the third countries in the Georgian territory � as the most problematic aspect of the Russian-Georgian relationship. While Russian policy makers are perhaps encouraged that Saakashvili proved to be a potentially more pragmatic negotiating partner than expected, they continue to wonder about what Georgia’s ultimate choice on the geopolitical alignment issue will be.

Some political observers believe the Kremlin is wasting its time in hoping for an outcome favorable to Russia’s national interests. One analyst, Vadim Dubnov, said Saakashvili is not merely a "pro-Western" politician, he is a "Westernized person" with the corresponding mindset and political preferences. "For Saakashvili, there exists absolutely no problem of choice," Dubnov argued in a commentary posted on the Gazeta.ru website.

Another regional expert, Sergei Biryukov, agrees, saying that Saakashvili will undoubtedly try to cooperate with the United States in reshaping the geopolitical landscape in the south Caucasus. In a commentary titled "Saakashvili’s Moscow Gambit" that was posted on the Russkii Zhurnal website, Biryukov contended that the main goal of Saakashvili’s visit was to establish a "negotiating platform," from which he would trade with Moscow "temporal and secondary concessions for maximum gains."

Many Russian analysts still feel that Saakashvili’s pledge concerning opposition to a US military presence in Georgia cannot be taken at face value. "If the Americans ask the new leadership of Georgia to deploy their military bases in the republic, it will be very difficult to refuse them," Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Politika Foundation think-tank, said in the interview with the Novye Izvestiya daily.

Some experts are already urging the Russian government to develop a contingency plan that could prevent Georgia’s shift into the US sphere of influence. These observers are quick to point out that the full-fledged restoration of Georgia’s statehood � namely solutions to the dilemmas surrounding the autonomous regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Ajaria -- is impossible without Russia’s benevolent participation.

If Saakashvili’s true ambition is to make his country stable and prosperous, the political analyst Vitaly Portnikov wrote, Georgia’s territorial integrity has to be restored. But this issue "has to be negotiated with Russia, not with the United States," Portnikov said in a commentary posted on the Politcom.ru website.

The Kremlin ought to openly offer Saakashvili a deal, Biryukov argued. "The Georgian elite should be promised [Russia’s] effective assistance in the restoration of the viable and sovereign state in exchange for [Georgia’s] loyalty on the key issue of strategic importance to Russia," Biryukov wrote.

Editor�s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.