EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Kazakhstan Looks to Russia Amid Hail of Western Criticism

EURASIA INSIGHT

KAZAKHSTAN LOOKS TO RUSSIA AMID HAIL OF WESTERN CRITICISM
Sergei Blagov 2/19/02

Annoyed by Western criticism over the democratization process in Kazakhstan, as well as by an ongoing investigation into possible top-level corruption, President Nursultan Nazarbayev appears intent on fostering better ties with Russia. The Kazakhstani president’s visit to Russia on February 18-19 underscored the shift in his orientation.

Nazarbayev’s Moscow visit, during which he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and attended a Eurasian Economic Community summit, comes at a time when the Kazakhstani government is under fire from the European Union, the United States and international human rights organizations.

On February 12, for example, a European Parliament resolution rebuked Kazakhstan for various rights abuses, including recent action to restrict opposition political activity and to muzzle independent journalists. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The resolution focused attention on the January conviction of journalist Sergei Duvanov. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Duvanov maintains his arrest and sentencing were politically motivated.

The European Parliament called for Duvanov’s "immediate release," citing "great concern over the investigation, trial and sentencing." The resolution also "urges Kazakhstan to bring its national human rights institution’s legal framework into conformity with international standards."

On February 18, a Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry statement voiced "bewilderment" over the European Parliament resolution, dismissing its conclusions as based on biased information. The European assessment of Kazakhstani political developments "does not correspond to reality," the Foreign Ministry statement said.

In addition to the criticism over Nazarbayev’s crackdown on his domestic political opponents, the Kazakhstani leader has been grappling with a corruption scandal known as Kazakhgate. Separate investigations in Switzerland and the United States are ongoing, probing possible illicit payments made by oil companies into private bank accounts controlled by top government officials.

In Moscow, Nazarbayev did not encounter any criticism of his domestic policies. Instead, Putin and Nazarbayev focused on promoting economic and political cooperation. The Kazakhstani leader offered unqualified praise when discussing the state of Astana’s relationship with Moscow. "There are no problems between the two nations," the RIA news agency quoted Nazarbayev as saying. "We have neither mutual debts nor contradictions."

A bilateral pact reached in May on the division of the Caspian Sea played a pivotal role in improving economic cooperation between Astana and Moscow. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Discussions on a comprehensive Caspian Sea treaty covering all five littoral states remain stalemated. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russia is eager to maintain its influence over energy transit routes in the Caspian Basin. Russian officials pressed Nazarbayev to agree to a 15-year deal, under which Kazakhstan would commit to exporting at least 15 million tons of crude oil per year via the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline. In 2002, Kazakhstan pumped 17.5 million tons via this route. The total is projected to climb to 19 million tons this year.

Nazarbayev seems intent on trying to hedge Kazakhstan’s bets concerning foreign investment in the country’s oil and gas sector. The Russian oil giant LUKoil has invested at least $500 million in Kazakhstani energy development since 1996. Astana may now be interested in increasing Russian investment, given recent signs of tension between Kazakhstan and Western oil conglomerates. In late 2002, for example, Tengizchevroil, a consortium led by ChevronTexaco, became embroiled in a dispute with Kazakhstani authorities over alleged ecological safety violations and taxation issues. The dispute was a factor in the consortium’s decision in November to balk over continuing a $3 billion development project in the Tengiz field. The two sides in early 2003 eventually patched up their differences, agreeing that the project would proceed as planned.

During bilateral discussions February 18, Putin also reportedly offered to help revive plans to construct a nuclear power plant at Balkhash. Kazakhstani officials suspended the estimated $2 billion project, citing financial and ecological concerns. No details on possible Russian assistance for the project were immediately available.

In addition, the Moscow talks indicated that Nazarbayev’s views on the Iraq question largely coincide with the Russian government’s stance. On February 18, top Kazakhstani and Russian diplomats, holding separate talks in Astana, noted that both countries believe that a rapid strike against Saddam Hussein is unwarranted at present, saying more time is needed for international weapons inspectors to complete their work in Iraq. At the same time, Kazakhstan and Russia called for Iraq’s full compliance with inspections.

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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