The anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan and its aftermath pose a major test for Islamic Iran's foreign policy makers. The geopolitical contest that surrounds Afghan reconstruction is forcing Islamic Iran to clarify its national interests. That, in turn, is helping to fuel competition between conservative and reformist forces in Iran.
To outside observers, unfamiliar with the nuances of Iranian factional politics, Iran's actions concerning Afghanistan since September 11 may seem erratic and unpredictable at best, and deceitful and duplicitous at worst. One day the Foreign Ministry plays a pivotal role in creating a broad-based government in Kabul. Another day, elements of the Iranian government provide support to Afghan warlords and local commanders bent on resisting the authority of Hamid Karzai's interim government.
Far from being the work of a coordinated and unified foreign policy, the divergent actions of Iranian factions are mainly a product of the domestic political scene in the Islamic Republic. These factions have very different notions of what constitutes Iran's national interest, due in part to the fact that the concept itself is not well developed within Iran.
Indeed, the concept of having national interests guide the shaping of foreign policy has relatively recent origins in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It essentially goes back to the election of Mohamad Khatami in the summer of 1997. Before that, most political actors in Islamic Iran's political arena avoided speaking in those terms. The very idea of nationhood was believed to be secular and Western-imported, and therefore anathema to a Muslim mentality.
Before 1997, the Islamic Republic's foreign policy went through two distinct phases. The first period, stretching from 1979 until Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1989, can best be described as the ideological phase. During this period, Iran's political, economic and diplomatic policies were aimed at fomenting revolution abroad. The results at the end of this period were far from rosy. Not only did the Iranian revolution fail to spread abroad, the country found itself in near-total isolation.
The second phase coincides with the accession of Hashemi Rafsanjani to Iran's presidency in 1989. A decade of war with Iraq had so badly battered the country that a policy of retrenchment was necessary. Rafsanjani attempted to stimulate economic activity. In foreign policy, pragmatism became an important and operative strand. While never abandoning the policy of the export of the revolution, Rafsanjani initiated a limited dialogue with some of Iran's neighbors and ideological foes, with the exception of the United States.
The start of the Khatami era introduced new dimensions to the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. Upon entering office, Khatami announced a policy of engagement and normalization with all the countries of the world, except Israel. In a landmark interview with the CNN network, Khatami half-apologized to the American people for the hostage-taking incident in 1979 and regretted the excesses done in the name of the revolution. In a number of major policy statements, Khatami called for the establishment of an international order based on the international law and aimed at avoidance of war and conflict.
Central to his attempts at reorienting foreign policy, Khatami revamped the Supreme National Security Council, and changed key personnel in the Foreign Ministry. However, despite some important successes, such as restoration of ties with the European Union and a general improvement of relations with Arab countries, the balance sheet of his foreign policy remains mixed.
Khatami's conservative domestic rivals have played a significant role in frustrating the president's foreign policy plans. The existence of parallel or extra-legal organs - which tend to be dominated by conservatives with their own priorities - hinders Islamic Iran's ability to forge a cohesive foreign policy.
Many organs like the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader's Office operate independent of the executive branch, while those like the foreign section of the Intelligence Ministry are answerable to the president in name only. Even in the Supreme National Security Council - which Khatami chairs and the reformists hold the majority in - Hassan Rowhani, the Supreme Leader's representative casts two votes as the general secretary.
In the case of Afghanistan, the confluence of economic, religious and political interests has created a heady mix that directly conflicts with the Foreign Ministry's stated goals. For example, in recent weeks, circumventing the Khatami government, certain religious-economic institutions such as the powerful Ghods Razavi Endowment have quietly shaped much of what goes for Iran's foreign policy in Western Afghanistan.
These institutions include various independent or quasi-governmental foundations with vast financial interests in the lucrative "re-export" business in Afghanistan. A case in point is one such foundation that sold huge amounts of government-subsidized gasoline at below the market rate to Taliban.
Complicating Iran's challenge at the present is the sudden downturn in US-Iranian relations. In the weeks immediately following the September 11 tragedy, it appeared that the United States and Iran would achieve a breakthrough in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, but US President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in the so-called "axis of evil" put all hopes for a thaw on hold. In fact, the intensity of rhetoric coming out of Tehran and Washington has reached levels not seen since the hostage crisis almost two decades ago.
Editor's note:
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard and Idi Verani are both freelance journalists specializing in Iranian affairs.
