EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Uzbekistan Sets Limits for Cooperation with Russia

EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN SETS LIMITS FOR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA
Sergei Blagov 2/24/06

Russia has sought in recent weeks to bring Uzbekistan fully into its geopolitical camp. While open to many of Russia’s overtures, Tashkent has let Moscow know that there are limits to cooperation � at least for now.

Following the Andijan events last May, Uzbekistan made a sharp diplomatic turn away from the United States and toward Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s administration has embraced closer economic and strategic ties with the Kremlin with the apparent expectation that Moscow will provide strong support for his regime’s efforts to contain Islamic radicalism and mounting domestic discontent. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The two countries signed a mutual security pact in late 2005 that appeared to open the way for the possible deployment of Russian troops on Uzbek soil. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In late January, Uzbekistan joined the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), a regional organization to promote free trade and development. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In recent months, Russia has offered a staunch defense of the Karimov administration, which in recent months has carried mass arrests of suspected Islamic radicals and a far-ranging crackdown on the country’s NGO sector. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. At a January 31 news conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized Uzbekistan as a country with a "very large number of problems, indicating that the maintenance of order should be considered the top priority. Accordingly, in Putin’s view, the Uzbek government was justified in using force against protesters in Andijan. "We don’t need a second Afghanistan in Central Asia and we will act very carefully there," Putin said. "We don’t need a revolution [in Central Asia], what we need is evolution."

Immediately following Uzbekistan’s EEC accession, Russian officials sought to bring Tashkent fully under Moscow’s security umbrella, pressing Uzbekistan to rejoin the Collective Security Treaty Organization. CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha visited Tashkent February 6-7 but could not secure a commitment from his Uzbek hosts to join the security group. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek officials made it clear that Tashkent was not prepared to join the CSTO, but left open the possibility of membership at some point in the future. Uzbekistan withdrew from the organization in 1999.

In Tashkent, Bordyuzha reportedly told Karimov that Moscow wanted to establish a CSTO Unified Command for Central Asia. The Command would be designed to respond to possible border conflicts and outside aggression. A formal document concerning the unified command’s creation, which could involve a small Russian military presence in Uzbekistan, could be ready for signing before the next CSTO summit scheduled for June.

Despite Uzbekistan’s evident firmness on CSTO membership, Russian officials don’t seem ready to accept "no" for an answer. Bordyuzha said at a February 13 news conference in Moscow that the CSTO viewed Uzbekistan as the key piece in Central Asia’s security puzzle. "We realize that Central Asian security problems can not be solved without Uzbekistan," he said.

Also on February 13, State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov traveled to Tashkent, where he reiterated Russia’s interest in forging closer economic and security ties. In an address in the Uzbek parliament on February 14, Gryzlov claimed that Russia’s moves were rooted in a desire to restore a historically close bilateral relationship. "It is not mere integration, it is a revival of all good things that used to exist between us," he said. Gryzlov also noted that Russia and Uzbekistan were charter members of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty. "We expect Uzbekistan will return to full-scale participation in the CSTO," he said. As with Bordyuzha’s visit, however, Gryzlov’s mission ended without any Uzbek announcement concerning the CSTO.

Meanwhile Uzbekistan’s economic integration within the EEC is proceeding. Karimov reportedly announced at a February 10 cabinet meeting that Uzbekistan had to amend the country’s trade laws and customs code to conform with EEC requirements. According to EEC chief Grigory Rapota, Uzbekistan is expected to join 20 of the pact’s treaties by June 2006, and the remaining 54 by the end of this year. "There should be no delays by the Uzbekistani side," Rapota said in an interview published by the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta on February 13. "For Russia, Uzbekistani accession was definitely a positive development, allowing [Moscow] to strengthen its positions in the Uzbek economy and in the region."

Other Russian officials are concerned that Uzbek accession to the EEC could create some logistical problems. At a Duma committee hearing on February 16, Viktor Spassky, a top official at the Economic Development Ministry, suggested that Tashkent may encounter difficulty in harmonizing national legislation with EEC requirements.

Although the EEC’s focus is primarily on economic development, Putin told the EEC summit in January that security remained an important consideration. He pledged Russia’s help in protecting member states from "threats of international terrorism, trans-border crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration."

Editor's Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

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