EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Afghan Leader's Visit to Iran Hands Political Victory to Reformists in Tehran

EURASIA INSIGHT

AFGHAN LEADER’S VISIT TO IRAN HANDS POLITICAL VICTORY TO REFORMISTS IN TEHRAN
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard 2/26/02

During his recent visit to Tehran, interim Afghan leader Hamid Karzai received an important boost from Iranian leaders, who pledged to take measures to cut off assistance to unruly warlords inside Afghanistan. Less visible, yet just as significant was the fact that Karzai’s visit had important ramifications for Iranian domestic politics, marking a victory for reformist President Mohammed Khatami in his long-running struggle with conservative political forces inside Iran.

Karzai began his three-day visit to Iran on February 24. During a meeting with Iran’s supreme spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Karzai won a public endorsement for the interim government in Kabul. The expression of approval by Khamenei, who is widely perceived as being aligned with conservative forces, indicated that Iranian hard-liners would refrain from action that undermines the Kabul interim government’s authority. Karzai, in turn, thanked Iran for helping to end Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Conservative forces in Iran have reportedly provided aid to Afghan warlords - especially Ismail Khan, who controls the area around the western Afghan city of Herat. [For background information see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Khatami, like Karzai, had reason to be pleased with the visit. Iranian conservatives had vigorously opposed Karzai’s visit, saying that the Kabul government was little more than a US puppet. As late as February 23, two newspapers representing the conservative viewpoint claimed that the Karzai government was on the verge of collapse due to a "deep division" between secular and religious factions. The accounts implied that Karzai was a member of the secular faction, and therefore unfit to hold a leadership position.

In recent months, Iran’s actions toward Afghanistan have become increasingly enmeshed in the domestic political struggle between reformists and conservatives. This phenomenon is actually quite new, coming as a response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Prior to that, there was tacit agreement between the battling factions not to allow their conflicts to spill into the foreign policy arena.

The September 11 attacks ended up benefiting Iran’s reformist forces, helping them regain the offensive against conservatives. [For additional information on Iran’s domestic political struggles see the Eurasia Insight archives]. In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks, the Iranian leadership was clearly apprehensive of becoming a target of US reprisals. Conservatives became demoralized, and toned down anti-American rhetoric. To give an idea of how Iranian hard-liners felt besieged, an entire corps of Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley was hurriedly recalled back to Iran soon after September 11.

Khatami, sensing the weakness of his political opponents, outmaneuvered conservatives during sessions of the Supreme National Security Council. For example, the Iranian president secured conservative support for Iran’s pledge to rescue US airmen downed in Iranian territory. Acting on a request by Karzai, Khatami also managed to prevent renegade Afghan warlord Gulbuldin Hekmatyar, then living in Iran, from disrupting the Afghan stabilization process. According to the IRNA news agency, Hekmatyar, who has been under virtual house arrest since earlier this year, was expelled from Iran February 26.

In a related development, Khatami reportedly has gained approval for the dispatch of a special parliamentary commission to investigate claims that Taliban and al Qaeda loyalists found refuge on Iranian territory.

Khatami’s string of political successes stretch back to late 2001. At the Bonn meeting that led to the creation of the interim Afghan government in December, a diplomatic source said groundbreaking, direct talks between Iranian and American officials played a crucial role in promoting an overall agreement. For example, it was Iran that forced Mr. Rabbani to step down. Similarly, Khatami prevailed upon conservatives to forego their traditional attachment to the Shia-dominated Afghan militia - the Hezb-i-Wahdat - in favor of a broad-based government.

By early 2002, conservative leaders seemed to recover their balance and attempted to take steps to neutralize reformist moves. US President George W. Bush’s verbal attack on Iran, including it in the so-called "axis of evil" played an important role in reinvigorating conservative forces. Conservative elements, in addition to providing aid to some Afghan warlords, opened a media offensive against Karzai’s government. Conservatives also stepped up aid to Hizbullah radicals in Lebanon. However, the fact that Karzai’s visit went off largely as planned indicates that Khatami retains the political high ground in Iran.

Editor�s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a freelance journalist who specializes in Afghan and Iranian affairs.

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