EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Strives to Boost Political, Military Presence in Azerbaijan

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA STRIVES TO BOOST POLITICAL, MILITARY PRESENCE IN AZERBAIJAN
Fariz Ismailzade 3/03/03

Azerbaijan in recent weeks has strengthened relations with Russia, an opponent of armed intervention against Iraq, while, at the same time, expressing support for the aggressive US stance against Baghdad. Critics of President Heidar Aliyev characterize the government’s policy as "paradoxical" and say it could ultimately harm Azerbaijan’s national security interests.

Geopolitical developments are forcing many states in the Caucasus and Central Asia to finesse their foreign policy, largely because Russia and the United States � the two main regional powers � have diverging opinions on how best to deal with Saddam Hussein. Nowhere is this trend more evident than in Azerbaijan, a country in need of US support for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline [for additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive] that also cannot ignore Russia’s regional strategic presence.

With Russia and the United States at odds over Iraq, pressure is growing on Azerbaijan to choose sides. Aliyev thus far has tried to please both Moscow and Washington. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The Azerbaijani president is in the midst of a US visit. On March 3, he was reportedly receiving medical treatment at a Cleveland, Ohio, clinic where he underwent prostate surgery in 2002. Earlier, he held talks in Washington with top US officials on a variety of issues, including energy development and Iraq. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Over roughly the same period, Azerbaijan has seen a series of visits by top-level Russian officials � all aimed at strengthening cooperation between the two countries. The most recent visitor to Baku was Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who on February 27 signed a military cooperation agreement with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Safar Abiyev. The pact establishes a framework for arms sales by Russia to Azerbaijan, including heavy weapons and spare parts, along with the training of military personnel.

"We [Russia and Azerbaijan] have reached new level of relations in the military sphere in the past twelve years that will allow us to firmly pave the way for mutually beneficial cooperation on a long-term basis," Ivanov stated at a news conference. Referring to a similar agreement that Russia has with Armenia, as well as to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ivanov said Moscow would not "supply any destabilizing samples of weapons" to countries in the region, according to a report broadcast by Lider television.

In addition to Ivanov’s visit, the chief of Russia’s National Security Council, Vladimir Rushailo, and Dmitri Rogozin, the chairman of the Russian parliament’s International Relations Committee, have traveled to Azerbaijan in recent weeks. Rushailo’s visit sparked the most domestic political controversy.

In Baku, Rushailo and Azerbaijani National Security Council Secretary Ramiz Mehdiyev signed a protocol under which the two countries will boost intelligence exchanges and expand anti-terrorism cooperation. During a February 20 news conference, Rushailo said "there are no disagreements" on the Iraq issue between Baku and Moscow.

Rushailo’s comments, hinting that Aliyev supported Moscow’s preference for inspections and diplomacy rather than the US preference for armed action against Baghdad, prompted some opposition leaders to denounce the government. Musavat Party Deputy Chairman Arif Hacili, for example, warned in a February 24 interview published by the Hurriyyat newspaper that the government was playing a dangerous diplomatic game in trying to satisfy both Russian and US security concerns.

Hacili called on the Aliyev administration to adopt an unequivocal position on Iraq. "If Azerbaijan joined the anti-terror coalition, it should maintain a single position on the prevailing situation, Hacili said. "This issue is not only linked to Azerbaijan’s interests. There is also a principle of justice. And accepting this principle, Azerbaijan should support the USA."

The current two-track policy risks damaging Azerbaijan’s interests, Hacili said, adding that Baku could end up disappointing both Russia and the United States. "Azerbaijan might acquire the image of a frivolous partner," Hacili continued. "This can create serious obstacles to solving this country’s global problems, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict."

Azerbaijan’s geopolitical calculus, however, will make it difficult for Aliyev to modify his Iraq position. Baku needs both Russia and the United States to accomplish its development goals. In particular, the development of Caspian Basin energy will require US investment and influence to make the BTC pipeline a reality. However, Russia’s diplomat and strategic leverage is needed to resolve the Caspian boundary dispute, [for background see the Eurasia Insight archives] as well as to promote regional stability.

Azerbaijani-Russian relations have markedly improved since the 2000 visit of President Vladimir Putin to Azerbaijan and numerous subsequent visits of Aliyev to Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The recent visits by Russian officials, though important for the normalization of bilateral relations, did not resolve some bilateral differences, particularly on the Karabakh question.

Moscow is a close strategic ally of Armenia. Russia is also a co-chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which is managing the search for a Karabakh settlement. During his late February talks with the Russian defense minister, Abiyev accused Armenians of building up Karabakh’s military arsenal, and claimed that the region was being used as a terrorist training center. Ivanov brushed aside both accusations. Nevertheless, political analysts in Baku expect Aliyev to press on with efforts to moderate Moscow’s strong support for Armenia with the aim of improving Baku’s negotiating position on Karabakh.

Editor�s Note: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance writer on Caucasus geo-politics and economics based in Baku. He holds a master’s degree from Washington University in St. Louis and has previously published at Caucasus-Central Asia Analyst, East-West Institute, Transitions on Line, Institute for War and Peace Reporting and Baku Sun.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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