Eurasia Insight:
DOES MOSCOW'S REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA HERALD THE END OF EURASIA?
Igor Torbakov: 3/05/02

The Russian government's reaction to the US decision to send military advisors to Georgia highlights a dramatic shift in Russia's geopolitical role in Central Eurasia. President Vladimir Putin has acquiesced to the basing of US troops in Central Asia, and now in the Caucasus. Some analysts in Moscow speculate that these developments herald the "end of Eurasia" with Russia as the region's center of gravity.

While attending a March 1 CIS summit in Almaty, Putin clarified the Kremlin's policy on US advisors training and equipping Georgian soldiers for anti-terrorist missions. "Every country, in particular Georgia, has the right to act to protect its security," Putin said, adding that Tbilisi could certainly do what Central Asian governments have already done - accept US military assistance. Putin also said that Russia would support an anti-terrorist operation in Georgia "no matter who took part in it - American partners, European ones, or our Georgian colleagues."

These statements have prompted some commentators in Moscow to pose the question of how relevant the terms 'post-Soviet space' and the 'former Soviet Union' are nowadays. The most significant development arising out of Georgia's crisis, argues the political analyst Vitalii Portnikov, "is the disappearance of the post-Soviet space as a geopolitical factor."

"In the new [post-September 11] global configuration, Russia rather looks like a state that is being surrounded along the perimeter of its borders by the Western sphere of influence, and that is being incorporated into this sphere as an important actor, but not as the one that has the final say," Portnikov writes in the influential business daily Vedomosti.

Most neighboring Eurasian countries, regional analysts say, had been orienting themselves toward Russia in recent years not because of nostalgia, but because Russia was indeed a key power broker in Central Eurasia. In the new international environment created by the US-led global war on terror, the nations of Central Eurasia, especially those on Russia's southern rim, have suddenly found themselves in the spotlight - primarily as potential zones of terrorist activity.

This shift of global attention toward Central Eurasia has revealed a dramatic disparity in Russia's and the West's capabilities. America has been able to offer its new partners in Central Asia - and now in the Caucasus - security and generous financial aid. The only thing Russia can offer its former colonial borderlands, bitterly notes one Moscow commentator, is "eternal friendship." That is why, he adds, it is not hard to predict what kind of long-term foreign policy priorities Russia's southern neighbors are going to shape.

Some Kremlin advisors, especially those who favor a more radical change of Russia's international identity, contend that Moscow itself will benefit from the limited US military presence in Georgia. "With every American blow on our enemies we are increasing our security, saving the lives of our soldiers, and gaining time for our own rearmament," Gleb Pavlovskii, head of the Efficient Policy Foundation, said in an interview with Strana.ru internet journal. "This advantage should be used and instantly converted into adequate foreign and domestic policies," he added.

Pavlovskii also indicated that many of his fellow Russian experts were mistakenly interpreting the US announcement on military advisors as a demonstration of Washington's desire to establish a permanent presence in the region. "We have this strange idea here in Russia that the Americans are going to pay for all the incompetent regimes of Eurasia," the Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.

The awareness of the country's military and economic weakness as well as of its inability to follow the aggressive instincts of Russia's historical predecessor, the Soviet Union, appears to influence Putin's current policies. "As a pragmatic politician, Putin - unlike [former President Boris] Yeltsin - knows what's possible and what's not," says Deputy Director of the USA and Canada Institute Viktor Kremenyuk, commenting on the Russian president's calm response to the forthcoming US deployment in Georgia.

"He wouldn't like some vexing [political] episodes to cause any damage. For us, it's more important to retain good relations with the United States," adds Kremenyuk.

Indeed, so far Putin seems to be sticking to the pro-Western course that he adopted in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. It is his clear hope that Russia will eventually benefit more from improved relations with the West, than if Moscow engaged in geopolitical bickering with Washington over the US military's presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

However, there do seem to be limits to Putin's ability to accept the growth of US influence in Central Eurasia. Even Putin's supporters have started voicing concern over what they call Russia's "disinterested policies." Many in Russia's political establishment already complain that Moscow has received few strategic or economic benefits in return for its support of the American-led anti-terrorism campaign.

The frustration of Russia's political class seems destined to grow. In the Caucasus, the regional analysts say, Moscow is pursuing two interrelated strategic goals - securing the Caspian oil transit routes that would be advantageous to Russia, and suppressing the separatist revolt in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Both goals, some commentators argue, are now threatened by the imminent US deployment in Georgia. "The fact that Georgia has invited American Special Forces units to fight terrorists on its territory and ignored the analogous offers made by the Russian side only signifies that our country suffered a serious defeat in the [pipeline] battle," writes Sergei Chugaev in the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily.

"Not only will Russia lose billions of dollars. The war in Chechnya and all its victims will prove senseless," Chugaev added.

However, some Moscow strategists point out that Russia - even in its present, weakened state - still has "the means for rearguard action" in the Caucasus. In Georgia's case, Russia could opt to utilize its political allies in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to exert pressure on Tbilisi.

Putin is on record as unequivocally supporting Georgia's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, some political thinkers close to the Kremlin appear to be planning for a variety of scenarios. "The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia resembles the situation in Kosovo," director of the Institute for Political Studies Sergei Markov told the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper. "I think that in the process of building a de-facto independent Abkhazian state it would be worthwhile - in order to avoid international isolation - to use a tight linkage to the Kosovo status."

Meanwhile, State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev dismissed calls from some conservative MPs that the Russian legislature consider recognizing Abkhazia's independence. In a radio interview March 4, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze warned that if Moscow took any action that acknowledged Abkhazia's independence, it could "mark the start of the disintegration of Russia itself."

Shevardnadze, in a separate radio interview, suggested that Russian policies towards Georgia during the past decade often caused damage to Moscow's image. Shevardnadze specifically cited Russia's stance on the division of the former Soviet Union's military assets, saying Moscow's unilateral action contributed to the Georgian military's lack of preparedness concerning existing security challenges. "You left [us] just a few dilapidated tanks and took away everything else, including an air force squadron and navy boats, even without asking us," Shevardnadze said, referring to Russian leaders. "You simply made the most out of the turmoil in Georgia."

Editor’s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1995, and a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York, 2000. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.