EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Weighs Response to U.S. Missile Defense Proposal for Caucasus

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA WEIGHS RESPONSE TO U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE PROPOSAL FOR CAUCASUS
Sergei Blagov 3/06/07

Moscow has taken as a direct threat a recent statement by a senior United States Pentagon official that the Caucasus could prove an attractive location for an anti-missile defense station. The discussion of likely responses to such a move has served to highlight Moscow’s own uneasy relations with the former Soviet republics in the region.

Tensions between the Kremlin and the West had already long been building over plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to set up an anti-missile defense system in Eastern Europe. On February 10 at a security conference in Munich, Russian President Vladimir Putin charged that such a system could spark a fresh Cold War, charging that the US "has overstepped its borders in all spheres... and has imposed itself on other states."

A March 1 statement by US Lieutenant General Henry Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency, that a missile defense station in the Caucasus could prove "useful," though is "not essential," only further fueled the flames. Governments in the region have denied that they have discussed such a station with the US, and American officials have repeatedly reassured the Kremlin that any defenses in Eastern Europe against missile attacks from countries such as Iran would not be aimed at Russia.

But the assurances have done little to assuage Russian concerns. Air Force Commander General Vladimir Mikhailov has asserted that, while a U.S. anti-missile radar system in the Caucasus would not affect Russia’s defense capabilities, the country would have to respond in kind, news agencies reported him as saying on March 2. On March 5, his deputy, Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, who oversees the Commonwealth of Independent States’ united air defense system, argued that the presence of missile interceptors and radar stations in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus would effectively allow the U.S. military to control Russia’s airspace, Interfax news agency reported. In addition, Air Force Commander Mikhailov has stated that Russia would need strong defense systems by 2015 to counter possible aerial and space attacks.

While Western governments may view these comments as extreme, the Kremlin has complained that Washington is altogether ignoring Russian concerns on the topic. Russia has yet to receive comprehensible answers from the U.S. on most strategic security issues, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told journalists in Moscow on March 6.

Meanwhile, Russia has announced plans to update its strategic military doctrine, adopted in 2000. The Russian Security Council affirmed on March 5 that, in revising the document, it would bear in mind the tendency by "the world’s leading nations" to "increasingly rely on military force in their policies." The statement has been taken as a veiled reference to the US.

Military observers see Georgia or Azerbaijan, both eager to strengthen ties with NATO, as the most likely candidates to host such a system. Former Russian Air Force Commander General Anatoly Kornukov warned on March 2 that placing anti-missile stations in either of the two countries could make them potential targets for Iranian missiles, thereby threatening Russia’s own security, news agencies reported.

At the same time, certain efforts appear to be in the works to sweeten the Kremlin’s ties with both states. On March 5, Russian Ambassador to Baku Vasily Istratov stated that Russian officials have indicated they are prepared to consider potential Azerbaijani proposals that $7 million-per-year lease payments for Russia’s rent of the Gabala radar station in northern Azerbaijan be reviewed. The ten-year agreement expires in 2012. Istratov added, however, that Russia could refrain from extending the agreement, news agencies said. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A certain détente has also emerged recently in relations between Russia and Georgia, though no indication exists that this is directly linked with US consideration of anti-missile defense plans for the South Caucasus. On March 1-4, Georgian Orthodox Church Patriarch Iliya II visited Moscow, arriving on the first direct flight from Tbilisi in over five months. Russian Orthodox Church officials have indicated that Patriarch Alexei II could consider a reciprocal visit to Georgia.

In yet another symbolic gesture, on March 5 Russian and Georgian diplomats agreed to cooperate on the identification and reburial of Georgia’s first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose body was recently identified in a grave in the southern Russian republic of Chechnya.

Nonetheless, despite these overtures, some Russian experts have urged caution. Any missteps by Moscow in the South Caucasus now could eventually facilitate deployment of an American anti-missile defense system there, they say. The pressure put on Azerbaijan in late 2006 to join Russian efforts in isolating sparring partner Georgia over a gas price dispute only proved instrumental in alienating Baku, argued Sergei Markedonov, head of the international relations department at the Institute of Political and Military Studies, a Moscow-based think-tank. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian policies towards Georgia also adversely affected Armenia, thus pushing Yerevan towards the West, Markedonov said, Azerbaijan’s state-run Azertag news agency reported.

For now, though, it remains to be seen whether Moscow will prefer to rely on sabre-rattling to try and prevent deployment of any U.S. anti-missile system in the Caucasus, or whether the Kremlin will consider reviewing its own policies on the region. The stability concerns, however, are unlikely to subside soon. Commented Air Force Deputy Commander Bizhev: "No one likes to be in the cross-hairs."

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

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