EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - The CIS: A Vanishing Reality?

EURASIA INSIGHT

THE CIS: A VANISHING REALITY?
Igor Torbakov 3/07/08

With the "multi-vector" mindset taking hold in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia is feeling pressure to rethink how it can retain its dominating influence among formerly Soviet states.

At present, Russian political leaders exhibit a business-as-usual approach to regional multilateral organizations, in particular the CIS. At the most recent CIS summit in February, for example, outgoing Russian leader Vladimir Putin proclaimed the CIS to be "Russia’s obvious and constant priority." His political protégé and Kremlin successor, Dmitry Medvedev, seconded that idea, saying that Moscow had "no alternative to good-neighborly relations and the development of long-time cooperation."

Despite such official expressions of enduring loyalty to the concept of a post-Communist confederation of former Soviet states, Moscow policy wonks don’t view the CIS as a fixed asset. Just the opposite, many now believe that the old regional paradigm will not hold for much longer. Indeed, a recent report issued by Russia’s influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy described the CIS as a "vanishing reality."

As they develop economic and political relations with the broad range of partners, embodying what has come to be known as "multi-vector" diplomacy, Soviet successor states are feeling more emboldened to take independent diplomatic action. This is especially true of the energy heavyweights of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. And though lacking the abundant energy reserves of its neighbors, Uzbekistan is also regularly taking an independent geopolitical line.

While all three Central Asian states still profess to be closely aligned with Kremlin interests, they have taken frequent action in recent years that has vexed the Kremlin. In addition to a US regional presence, China’s rising economic influence in Central Asia is posing a challenge for Russian planners.

Given the geopolitical realities, some analysts persuasively argue that the CIS cannot be conceived today as a single uniform object of Russian foreign policy. Instead, the former Soviet lands, ever more diverse, are becoming an area of intense competition where Moscow’s strategic interests clash with those of Beijing, Brussels and Washington.

"It is clear that the CIS’ potential is practically exhausted and we’re indeed headed toward a �civilized divorce,’" the political analyst Andrei Fyodorov argued in a policy paper published recently by the Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Moscow’s main strategy, Fyodorov and other Russian pundits suggest, should not be the preservation of the CIS "at all costs," but rather the pragmatic and muscular protection of Russian national interests � primarily through the intensification of the bilateral ties.

To succeed, some Russian policy makers contend, Russia has to make some policy alterations. At present, Russia tends to rely on coercive tactics in order to achieve its policy goals within the CIS, underscored by Moscow’s routine use of energy exports as a lever of political pressure. To retain its regional influence down the road, some political analysts argue that Russia must transform itself into a regional proprietor, acquiring assets in the various CIS states themselves. Such acquisitions, undertaken on a sufficiently large scale, would give Russian companies, and therefore the Kremlin, de facto control over the economies of key CIS states.

Russia already has been moving in this direction, but experts want the scope and the depth of acquisitions to significantly expand. To hasten this process, a greater degree of coordination between relevant state agencies and the Russian business community will be needed, think-tank analysts are saying.

Looking beyond the CIS, some recent policy papers and strategic blueprints produced by Russia’s think tanks � and clearly reflecting Moscow’s growing geopolitical assertiveness � suggest Russia should pursue a more robust global policy. Labeled in one paper the "strategy of global penetration," it urges the Kremlin to continue the policy of "global presence" realized by the former Soviet Union.

Whether or not Russia can realize its economic and political ambitions, either within the former Soviet Union, or in the global arena, remains uncertain. Notwithstanding Russia’s energy riches and political resolve, several factors can prevent the Kremlin from retaining a desired level of control over formerly Soviet Eurasia. One such factor is whether or not Russia can come up with the cash needed to fund a massive buying spree of key economic assets in the region. In addition, as Moscow analysts themselves readily admit, Russia has a big image problem: the leaders of other CIS states tend to think of the Kremlin as a bully, not as a genuine friend.

Russia also must contend with factors largely beyond its control. For instance, the revival of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is raising concern about an increase in Islamic radical activity in Central Asia.

According to some experts, existing circumstances offer Russia its best odds for geopolitical success. At present, the European Union lacks a coherent energy policy and the United States is bogged down in Iraq. If Brussels and Washington were ever able to mobilize attention and resources to blocking and/or countering Russian moves, Moscow would likely not be able to realize its plans.

Editor�s Note: Igor Torbakov is a Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki specializing in Russian and Eurasian history and politics.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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