Comparisons Between Iraq and Afghanistan Tell a Disheartening Story

Few contrasts in recent international diplomacy stand out as vividly as the difference between what the United States and Britain "did" in Afghanistan and what these nations are trying to "do" to Iraq. Whereas Washington and London forged a broad coalition to address the threat posed by Islamic radicals in Afghanistan, the two nations appear to embrace a go-it-alone approach in confronting Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Such a dramatic strategic shift could have serious consequences for global stability.

If the United States and Britain go to war in Iraq without broad international backing, especially from the United Nations, the post-Cold War order could come unglued. Most significantly, Washington may find that unilateral action could reduce the willingness of many nations to cooperate in the ongoing war against terrorism. Officials in many capitals around the globe already consider the pending US attack against Iraq as little more than an attempt by Washington to expand its economic and political influence.

The US approach in Afghanistan largely avoided generating such negative opinion. After al Qaeda terrorists struck the United States, the Bush administration succeeded in building a formidable coalition to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan. Military contingents from over 20 countries joined in the American-led anti-terrorism coalition, which acted with the endorsement of the UN Security Council. Since the Taliban's ouster, an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which the United States protected, has helped maintain stability in the Afghan capital Kabul. [For background information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Many European countries, including Britain, Germany and France, participated in both the fighting force and the peacemaking force. As the Iraq crisis unfolds, Germany and France have emerged as leading opponents of US policy.

Amid the discussion of how the Bush administration has ignored other nations in planning an Iraq invasion, it is easy to forget Washington's actions in the fall of 2001. At the time, diplomats believed Bush's team had moved decisively away from its pronounced unilateralism towards multilateralism. The end of the Afghan war encouraged this belief. At the Bonn conference, which established Afghanistan's political transition framework, US officials encouraged the UN to take the lead. The Bush administration's regional enemies in Iran got to join talks on rebuilding Afghanistan, as did every Afghan faction except the Taliban and other Islamic extremist groups. American and British diplomats strived to make sure that no deserving faction was left out of the reconstruction process.

Experience has shown that the peace-building challenges in Afghanistan remain formidable. Nevertheless, the hope generated by the success of the Bonn conference continues to buoy many Afghans during the difficult transition.

The prospects for an Iraqi reconstruction seem less encouraging. To date, the most likely scenario would have Iraqi exiles, working in conjunction with American entities like the Central Intelligence Agency, running a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. They would be supported by a US military occupation force.

Still, it is difficult to know for sure. The Bush administration has not produced a detailed plan for a post-invasion reconstruction. Iraq's neighbors – including Turkey and Iran – have been largely excluded from discussions on Iraqi peace-building priorities. Meanwhile, these countries all have "Iraqi proxies" that, in the event that Saddam is indeed ousted, they will try to insert into Baghdad, quite possibly undermining American efforts to produce post-invasion stability.

Quite apart from the question of building a coalition to fight an Iraq war, the United States and Britain have not addressed the need for an international coalition to endorse the next government in Baghdad. Such a coalition, to be effective, must include all of Iraq's neighbors. In January 2002, weeks after Kabul fell, the world's nations assembled in Tokyo to pool funds for Afghan reconstruction. At present, it is hard to envision who would attend such a gathering after an invasion of Iraq, or what commitments they might make.

Aside from a longer-term reconstruction agenda, the global community must think about immediate humanitarian needs in a post-war Iraq. Again, a comparison with the Afghan military campaign provides a lesson in contrasts.

During the fall of 2001, Americans provided key support to keep Afghans from starving. The UN World Food Program (WFP) pumped more wheat into Afghanistan amid ongoing fighting than it ever did during the Taliban era. The WFP's main provider of cash was Washington. Concerning Iraq, international aid agencies have complained that the United States is not conferring with them about the humanitarian needs of Iraqis, who are already largely dependent on UN handouts. UN officials say their humanitarian agencies have received just one consultation from the Pentagon.

Another distressing difference between Afghanistan and Iraq involves the role of Britain. During the Afghan anti-terrorism campaign the British Foreign Office, Ministry of Defense and Prime Minister's office were instrumental in holding American planners to the path of multilateralism and coalition building. With this check on American hubris seemingly gone, some regional analysts expect the war in Iraq to play out not as a vindication of the civilized world but as a brazen bid for American hegemony in the region.

Finally, because plans for rebuilding a post-Saddam Iraq are vague, there is no way of knowing whether or how the exquisitely sensitive issue of control over Iraq's energy resources is being addressed. Who will decide what Saddam-era oil contracts are honored and what are not? How will Iraq's oil income be used to help reconstruction efforts? Who will control the flow of oil? The answers to all these questions seem clear, but are unspoken.