Violence and Intrigue Threaten Afgan Stabilization Process

Afghanistan's stabilization process is in the midst of a critical phase. The recent violence in western Herat Province has exposed the central government's weakness, and threatens to disrupt the country's political transition. This is placing pressure on President Hamid Karzai to take quickly action to compel the loyalty of regional warlords. If Karzai succeeds, it will significantly enhance the government's ability to proceed with plans to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in June. Karzai's failure, on the other hand, would likely mean the postponement of elections, and potentially could lead to an upsurge in challenges to his authority.

Fighting began in Herat on March 21 between forces loyal to the regional warlord, Ismail Khan, and Afghan army units under the command of Gen. Abdul Zahir Nayebzadeh, who professes to be loyal to Karzai's administration. The clashes, which involved tanks and mortars, occurred after a reported unsuccessful assassination attempt against Khan. A few hours later, gunmen killed the warlord's son, Mirwais Sadeq, who held the post of civil aviation and tourism minister in Karzai's cabinet. Khan loyalists blamed Nayebzadeh for the incidents, charging the general with attempting to overthrow the regional leadership.

Casualty reports varied widely – from 10 to more than 150 – with no independent verification possible. On March 22, the central Afghan government dispatched a 1,500-strong force, headed by Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim, to restore order in the region.

Fahim's immediate challenge was to establish a cease-fire that would allow for a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding Sadeq's death. More broadly, Fahim's task was to secure Khan's support for the central government.

A central government spokesman announced March 23 that Karzai's administration would redouble efforts to disarm warlord militia units before elections are held. Disarmament efforts to date have proceeded at a snail's pace, with only an estimated 5,000 militia fighters entering a UN-sponsored demobilization program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In all, the government says it wants to disarm roughly 40,000 warlord militia fighters. If Karzai proves unable to back up his disarmament vow with tough action, his credibility will suffer a potentially crippling blow.

Khan is one of many regional warlords who have been acting beyond central government control since the US-led campaign against terrorism ousted the Islamic radical Taliban regime in late 2001. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In May 2003, Khan, along with other warlords, formally recognized the preeminence of the central government, and pledged to adhere to a governmental chain of command. Subsequently, however, Khan and others, including ethnic Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, have largely disregarded Kabul.

The lack of governmental cohesion has been cited as an underlying cause of instability, which continues to plague Afghanistan. Foreign governments and international experts have cited the high-degree of instability in calling for a postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Karzai, along with the US government, has strongly resisted the notion of postponing the vote. However, on March 17, the Afghan president indicated that he might accept pushing back the election date a few months.

A leading expert on Afghanistan, Barnett Rubin said earlier in March that it would be "impossible, or very difficult to hold parliamentary elections in June 2004." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A major concern is that warlords like Khan will exert undue influence over the electoral process, thus frustrating the ability to forge a viable representative assembly. Staging only a presidential election in June could simplify things, but many Afghan political leaders want presidential and parliamentary elections to occur in sync, figuring that any alteration in existing plans could upset Afghan politics' fragile ethnic balance. In addition to political concerns surrounding a June election, those advocating postponement also cite logistical barriers. In particular, only an estimated 1 million Afghans have been registered to vote. According to some estimates, upwards of 10.5 million Afghans are potentially eligible to cast ballots.

At present, Karzai is widely viewed the front-runner to secure the presidency whenever the election is held. However, this view could change, depending on a variety of circumstances, including how the disarmament campaign goes. Karzai's failure to hasten the pace of demobilization may be taken as a sign of weakness that invites stronger challenges to his authority, some political observers believe.

Already, a well informed source tells EurasiaNet, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, is seriously considering a bid for the presidency. Relations between Karzai and Abdullah have drastically deteriorated in recent months, the source said, adding that the two clashed during the constitutional Loya Jirga in early 2004. During a subsequent row over a diplomatic mission, Karzai reportedly called Abdullah a liar, the Afghan source said.

A presidential bid by Abdullah, an ethnic Tajik and a leader of the old Northern Alliance, could upset the tenuous ethnic coalition that has governed in Kabul since 2001. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Karzai emerged as a national leader in part because he is an ethnic Pashtun from the south. Pastuns are Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, comprising roughly 40 percent of the population. Yet, Karzai has relied heavily on the support of the Tajik faction in the central government, in large measure because Tajiks exert considerable influence over the national army.