EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Probes to Bolster its Authority in Central Asia

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA PROBES TO BOLSTER ITS AUTHORITY IN CENTRAL ASIA
Sergei Blagov 3/27/02

After being thrown on the geopolitical defensive by post September 11 developments in Central Asia, including the establishment of US bases, Russia is now probing for ways to reassert its regional influence. As Russian strategic planners consider their options, they appear to be more concerned by the potential for growth of Chinese influence in Central Asia than by the US military and economic presence.

The US-led anti-terrorism campaign produced upheaval in Central Asia’s geopolitical equation. The sudden rise of United States’ profile led to a drastic reduction of China’s role in regional political and economic developments, said Alexei Voskressenski, head of Chinese Studies Center at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. The arrival of US forces also eroded Russia’s long-standing ties to Central Asian states. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russia’s diminished Central Asia role initially prompted bitter complaints from Moscow’s political establishment. Many critics believed President Vladimir Putin’s policies towards Washington were overly conciliatory. However, such criticism appears to be abating, and Russian planners now seem to be focusing on the future.

Currently, Russian officials are keen to sound optimistic as concerns subside that Central Asia’s geopolitical balance has been permanently altered. Some regional analysts had suggested that the arrival of US troops would render a Russian-led initiative � the Collective Security Treaty � irrelevant. Now, fears of a US permanent military presence in Central Asia "are not exactly justified," according to Valery Nikolayenko, a Russian general and the secretary-general of the Collective Security Treaty (CST).

On March 20, Nikolayenko told the journalists in Moscow that the CST viewed itself as an "integral part of European and Asian security" system. He claimed that China’s and India’s policies are more or less in line with the CST’s course of action.

The CST includes six post-Soviet nations -- Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia. Prior to September 11, CST member states were gearing up to assume a leading role for Central Asian security. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Many Russian officials viewed the rapid deployment of the US-led anti-terrorism coalition forces in Central Asian states as a snub of the CST. In his talk with journalists, Nikolayenko conceded that there had been no multilateral consultations prior to the arrival of US troops in Central Asia, even though Putin had had telephone talks with Central Asian leaders.

Nikolayenko and others are now working to reestablish the CST’s stature. In an effort to boost post-Soviet military ties, Nikolayenko announced that in 2002 the CST plans a series of military maneuvers. In April, the CST will hold exercises dubbed "South-Anti-Terror" involving Kyrgyz and Tajik security forces. Also in April, eight CIS states � including all six CST states along with Ukraine and Uzbekistan - will hold a joint training of air defense commanders. In May, military maneuvers are schedule to be held near Moscow.

Helping to soothe Russian strategic concerns, the Kremlin has received reassurances from US officials about Washington’s regional intentions. On March 20 General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, held talks with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in Moscow and hailed Russia for its cooperation in the anti-terrorist campaign. Franks stressed that the United States was not competing with Russia in Central Asia. After his talks with Franks, Ivanov noted "positive development of relations" between Russian and US defense ministries.

For Russian planners, the Chinese factor is now the most important unknown in the continuing great game. "It remains to be seen what China’s response is going to be," argues Voskressenski. "China has unique tools of influence in Central Asia."

Russia continues to engage China. On March 20, Putin held telephone talks with Chinese President Jiang Zemin to discuss regional ties and institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In addition, March 21 Russia’s deputy foreign minister Georgy Mamedov met up with Chinese envoy Hu Xiaodi in Geneva on March 21 to brief the latter on talks between Russia and the US on strategic arms cuts. According to RIA, Russian and Chinese diplomats exchanged views on "unsatisfactory non-proliferation and disarmament situation following unilateral moves, such as US withdrawal from ABM treaty."

The CST’s Nikolayenko traveled to China earlier in March for meetings with high-ranking Chinese officials, including first deputy foreign minister Li Zhaxin and China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization coordinator Liu Guchang. According to Nikolayenko, the Chinese officials "voiced concern over the Western military presence" in Central Asia and expressed interest in boosting ties with the CST.

Also in early March, the Chinese army’s deputy chief of staff, Sun Guankai, visited Kazakhstan to meet Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev. On March 18, the Chinese envoy announced a $3 million military aid package for the Kazakhstani army. Beijing evidently remains interested in raising its regional strategic profile.

Against the backdrop of Chinese efforts to encroach on what Moscow perceives as its traditional sphere of influence, Russian officials are intent on remaining on good terms with those Central Asian nations where Western forces are now stationed. On March 20, Putin congratulated Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kyrgyz leader Askar Akayev on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations with these Central Asian nations. There is a "great potential of cooperation" between Russia and Uzbekistan, Putin wrote to Karimov.

However, some Russian politicians continue to oppose Putin’s policies. On March 21, the State Duma’s International Relations Committee said it would not recommend ratification of a debt deal between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, signed on July 6, 2001. The committee was disinclined to write off Kyrgyz debt, and some members opposed wording in the agreement that described Kyrgyzstan as "one of the CIS’s poorest nations," deputy chairman Sergei Shishkarev said March 21.

Kyrgyzstan stands to receive plentiful income from its US basing agreements, Shishkarev pointed out, adding that Bishkek should use some of the windfall to repay the $133 million debt owed to Moscow. Kyrgyzstan, which is recovering from unprecedented violent riots in mid March [For background see the Eurasianet’s human rights archive] has yet to respond to Shishkarev’s comments.

Meanwhile, Russia’s trusted ally in Central Asia, Tajikistan, has indicated an intention to distance itself from Moscow. For instance, on March 20 Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov stated that Tajik remained the country’s official language, while "studies of foreign languages such as Russian and English" should be encouraged. He also lashed out at "continued attempts by foreign media and researchers to sustain Tajikistan’s image as an unstable state."

Some experts suggest that Russian policy makers may now try to counter a perceived US strategic "overstretch" by exploiting contradictions in US-Chinese relations. "Moscow now can play on differences between Washington and Beijing - in Central Asia or elsewhere," Voskressenski said.

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