CIVIL SOCIETY
3/28/05
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Relative calm returned to the streets of Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek. In the corridors of power, meanwhile, the country’s provisional government struggled to restore a sense of order in the country’s political life.
Since March 24, when protesters drove President Askar Akayev from power, the actions of Kyrgyzstan’s new leaders have often been contradictory, as they have probed for ways to infuse the provisional government with an air of legitimacy. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Much of the confusion can be traced to the lack of clarity in the legislative branch. Indeed, for the past several days, two national law-making bodies have functioned, each claiming to be the country’s rightful legislature. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
On March 28, the country’s new unicameral legislature secured recognition from the new political elite as the country’s legitimate parliament, even though accusations of widespread voting fraud during the recent election served as the catalyst for the protest movement that brought about Akayev’s sudden downfall. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The unicameral legislature confirmed Kurmanbek Bakiyev as the provisional prime minister, and then sought to resolve uncertainty in the executive branch, generated mainly by the fact that Akayev refused to formally resign before fleeing.
Omurbek Tekebayev -- the new parliament speaker, who, like Bakiyev, was a prominent figure in the former political opposition –said that a new presidential election should be held only after consultations were held with Akayev. The old bicameral legislature, which continues to function, had set a presidential election date for June 26, but the decision came under immediate fire from both inside and outside the country. The head of the Bishkek office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Markus Mueller, suggested that the electoral timeframe, given the lack of political consensus in the country, was "unrealistic," the AKIpress news agency reported. Mueller warned that an attempt to press ahead with an early election date could deepen Kyrgyzstan’s political instability.
Tekebayev indicated that Akayev needed to make a formal renunciation of authority to get Kyrgyzstan back on a constitutional course. "I don’t know whether this task is accomplishable," Tekebayev said during a March 28 news conference, discussing the possibility that provisional leaders could coax Akayev into resigning.
"The appointment of acting President Bakiyev and the holding of a pre-term presidential election in the event that Akayev refuses to resign are deliberately unconstitutional steps, though necessary," Tekebayev said.
Akayev is reportedly in Russia, and shows no signs of relinquishing his claim to the presidency. On March 28, he distributed a statement via the Kabar news agency haranguing the provisional leadership for reckless behavior. The statement appeared to be an attempt by Akayev to set himself up for a potential political comeback. In it, Akayev cast himself as a "convinced democrat." He went on to suggest that the new leaders had severely damaged the country’s international image. "We were all proud that the international community once called Kyrgyzstan ‘an island of democracy.’ Now, a dirty wave has come crashing down on this island, washing away all the good things that we did before." Akayev added that his administration had "multi-billion-dollar" deals in place with foreign investors in such areas as hydro-power, aluminum production and tourism, adding that these plans would now likely fall through because of the "continuing wave of anarchy."
The same day, reports circulated that Akayev’s "secret archive" had been recovered from his office, AKIpress reported. Among the documents found were those that detailed government financial support for pro-presidential candidates during the two rounds of parliamentary voting February 27 and March 13. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Beating back a political challenge from Akayev is only one of many problems facing the provisional government. Perhaps the most daunting task involves the restoration of economic equilibrium in the country. The frenzy of looting and vandalism that followed Akayev’s ouster has severely shaken the confidence of Kyrgyzstan’s nascent entrepreneurial class. Street life is slowly returning to normal. But estimates of the damage and losses caused by the rioting range up to $100 million, a significant sum in a country like Kyrgyzstan which had an estimated GDP in 2003 of $7.8 billion.
On March 28, Ulan Sarbanov, the head of the Central Bank, sought to reassure the Kyrgyz business community and foreign investors alike, saying that "to ensure the stable and steady functioning of the banking system the Central Bank had taken all measures to promote sufficient liquidity for commercial banks."
Also, acting state secretary Dastan Sarygulov courted entrepreneurial support for the provisional government, saying that their tax burden would be reduced. To compensate for tax breaks, the government would seek to expand the tax rolls. Dooronbek Sadyrbayev, a prominent politician and ally of Tekebayev, suggested that some of Akayev’s personal property, particularly real estate, could be nationalized and auctioned to help create an economic stabilization fund aimed specifically at repairing the damage done by looting.
Meanwhile, personal appointments made by the provisional government were meeting resistance from inside the governing establishment. For example, staffers at the State Television and Radio Company issued a statement complaining about the leadership team appointed by a Bakiyev decree on March 28. It characterized several members of the new management team as "nationalists." It also said that state television should be subordinate to parliament, and not to the executive branch.
Posted March 28, 2005 © Eurasianet
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