Eurasia Insight:
UZBEK AUTHORITIES LAUNCH ROUND-UP OF ISLAMIC SUSPECTS IN UZBEKISTAN
Esmer Islamov: 3/31/04
Editor’s Note: Updating with news about a new blast in Tashkent 4:38 EST

After a relatively quiet day in Tashkent , an explosion in the Sabir-Rakhimov section of the capital late on March 31 prompted fresh concern about militant violence in Uzbekistan . In addition, there were a few unconfirmed reports of violence in Tashkent , the Uzbek capital, and in Andijan, a city in the Ferghana Valley , which is a bastion of Islamic conservatism.

Details concerning the Sabir-Rakhimov explosion were sketchy, as police prevented all civilians, except those able to prove they lived in the neighborhood, to get near the blast scene. One witness who heard the explosion said it occurred near a furniture store. Other reports said the blast was near a higher education institution. The Russian Interfax news agency reported that the blast caused an undetermined number of casualties. Early reports said a group of militants had taken hostages and barricaded themselves in a home. Subsequently, authorities denied that hostages had been taken, saying that a lone militant, surrounded by police, blew himself up. The blast marks the fourth straight day of anti-government violence in the capital.

Officially speaking, a sense of calm began to return to Uzbekistan on March 31 following three days of clashes between security forces and militants. However, there were a few unconfirmed reports of violence in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, and in Andijan, a city in the Ferghana Valley, which is a bastion of Islamic conservatism.

The roundup of usual Islamic radical suspects was in full swing on March 31, in "an operation aimed at neutralizing the people involved in terrorist acts," said an Uzbek Foreign Ministry press statement obtained by Interfax. "The city [Tashkent] is temporarily being isolated and is under special control." Officials said approximately 50 suspects had been detained. Predictably, all were described as "Wahhabis," which in the Uzbek understanding of the term is a synonym for Islamic radicals. President Islam Karimov’s government has claimed that the violence is the work of an international Islamic militant conspiracy. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Uzbek government has been systematically persecuting Muslims for more than five years, jailing roughly 7,000 believers for engaging in non-state-sanctioned forms of religious expression. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Some reports suggest the current Uzbek arrest spree is merely an extension of the ongoing crackdown on Islam, with Muslims being indiscriminately arrested. According to on British Broadcasting Corp. report March 31, one woman asserted that four of her sons were taken into custody because they share the same name as an militant who was captured March 30.

An undetermined number of students at the National University in Tashkent were also reportedly arrested. According to unverifiable information, some students had supposedly admitted to being part of a conspiracy, and were supplying names and information concerning the plot to security authorities.

The official death toll was fewer than 50. However, the actual figure could be much higher, as officials have neither confirmed nor denied many reported clashes. Tight state control over mass media and news gathering make independent verification of developments virtually impossible. State media has been circumspect in its reporting of the violence. For example, the top story on state television news broadcast on March 30 – the third straight day of violence – was the visit of former Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus to Tashkent.

There were several unconfirmed reports of explosions and shooting in Tashkent. At about 8:45 am, a sound resembling an explosion was heard in the Yunus-Abad District of Tashkent, not far from the capital’s ring road on the city outskirts. On March 30, several suicide car bombings reportedly occurred at police checkpoints established at the city limits. It could not be immediately verified that the March 31 incident was indeed a bombing. But this EurasiaNet correspondent witnessed several police vehicles, speeding with sirens blaring, in the direction of the disturbance.

At about 10 am, sounds resembling gunfire were heard outside a department store in central Tashkent. A EurasiaNet correspondent arrived in the vicinity about 15 minutes later, and witnessed two police minibuses driving up and down the street in front of the department store with sirens blaring. A uniformed police officer at the site said the vehicles were engaged in a "training exercise." When questioned whether they had seen anything unusual, several street venders near the department store denied anything out of the ordinary had occurred. However, one vendor, an elderly woman, then said furtively that security officers had instructed the vendors "to keep our mouths shut." The woman abruptly stopped a conversation when a man in plain clothes approached. She later indicated the man was a state security officer. Groups of about five plain-clothes police officers were seen standing at each department store entrance. After the start of the militant action March 28, many police officers were reportedly instructed to don civilian attire.

Outside of the capital, an explosion was reported in Andijan, a city of over 300,000. Uzbek officials attributed the cause of the blast to a faulty gas main in a private home. However, unconfirmed reports said that the house in question was utilized by members of the Uzbek military, fueling speculation that the explosion could have been caused by a bomb.

The United States has been Karimov’s strongest backer since the formation of a US-Uzbek strategic partnership in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On March 30, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a formal offer to Karimov to make US experts available to help in the investigation into the March 28-30 attacks.

The Uzbek government, judging by official statements, already has prime suspects: Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which advocates Karimov’s overthrow while disavowing violence; and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant group that mounted militant raids in Central Asia from 1999-2001. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A growing number of non-government-aligned political observers in Tashkent, however, believe the March 28-30 violence to be the work of a new force.

Information coming to light suggests the militants were Islamic radicals. Those involved in prolonged gun battles March 30 near the TTZ tractor plant – comprising both men and women – were seen wearing headbands and hijabs with Arabic inscriptions on them, according to witnesses. Yet, political experts in Tashkent doubt that the militants belonged to established organizations, such as Hizb of the IMU, because most of the weapons found on those militants killed in the clashes had been seized from police during the initial stages of the uprising March 28. It appears that the militants lacked the kind of infrastructure that is possessed by both Hizb and the IMU. Those groups have logistical capabilities that extend beyond Uzbek borders, and thus probably would not have had little trouble procuring weapons in advance of the uprising.

One Tashkent political scientist believes the militants comprised profoundly disgruntled Uzbeks, either those whose friends and relatives had previously been caught up in the government clampdown on Islam, or those exasperated by the lack of economic opportunity in the country, or perhaps a combination of the two. It would appear that the group’s center of operations was the ancient city of Bukhara. Identification found on dead militants reportedly indicated that most came from Bukhara.

The militant group, the expert added, may not have had a well-coordinated, long-term strategy. Instead, the militants appear to have realized that their actions would likely mean death for them all. At the same time, they may have hoped that their uprising would somehow tap into the widespread hatred for the state’s security apparatus, of which the massive police force is a main pillar, sparking a broad-based revolt against Karimov’s government. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

While many Uzbeks may have privately applauded what the militants were trying to accomplish, virtually no one was willing to do anything overt in support of the uprising. As the political scientist explained; "Uzbek citizens realized that if they helped the attackers, it could lead to a serious armed conflict and jeopardize the future of them and their children. A real [popular] revolt in Uzbekistan is unlikely, at least for the time being. However, the terrorist attacks are a serious reminder to the government that it is high time to carry out serious political, economic and social reforms."

Editor’s Note: Esmer Islamov is the pseudonym of a freelance journalist specializing in Uzbek political affairs.