EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - The Kyrgyz Revolution: Neighboring Leaders Try to Make Best of Difficult Situation

EURASIA INSIGHT

THE KYRGYZ REVOLUTION: NEIGHBORING LEADERS TRY TO MAKE BEST OF DIFFICULT SITUATION
Ibragim Alibekov, Kamron Kambarov and Esmer Islamov 4/01/05

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The leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been clearly unnerved by the revolution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. However, both Uzbek leader Islam Karimov and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev are trying to make the best of a difficult situation by expressing a readiness to engage Kyrgyzstan’s provisional government, albeit grudgingly.

The forces that drove protesters to topple Askar Akayev’s administration in Bishkek on March 24 � persistent poverty, pervasive corruption and unresponsive government � are prevalent in every Central Asian nation. Thus, Kyrgyzstan’s revolution is widely seen by regional analysts as having the potential touch off similar anti-government mass movements in neighboring states. The suddenness of the Akayev administration’s implosion seemed to catch neighboring heads of state by surprise, and they did not have an immediate response to events.

Nazarbayev waited a week before formally commenting on the Kyrgyz revolution. At a news conference, held jointly with visiting Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Nazarbayev’s disdain for and disapproval of the upheaval next door was palpable. "It is impossible to describe what happened [in Kyrgyzstan as a revolution," Nazarbayev stated. "The current Kyrgyz leaders themselves say that it is banditry and marauding. We are very sad and sorry for the Kyrgyz people who are close and fraternal to us."

The Kazakhstani leader subtly questioned the legitimacy of the Kyrgyz provisional government, even as he said he would work with the new leaders in Bishkek. "Everything needs to be returned to a constitutional course and resolved in a legal manner," he said. "We will cooperate with the president who is legally elected by the Krygyz people." The same day Nazarbayev spoke, Kazakhstani authorities re-opened border crossings between the two states, although officials stressed the frontier would remain closed to entry by Kyrgyz nationals from 9pm until 7am until further notice.

While Nazarbayev’s acceptance of Kyrgyz provisional government may be grudging, his administration certainly seems to be studying the lessons of Akayev’s experience in Bishkek, aiming to prevent the spread of revolutionary fervor to Astana. The president appears to have developed a multi-pronged strategy to preserve his political preeminence, involving a revision of the country’s electoral code and a dramatic increase in public spending.

On March 28, the Kazakhstani parliament adopted several election code amendments in their first reading, including one that imposes a ban on any form of politically related public gathering until official voting results are released. The rally ban amendment, if implemented, would make it difficult for opposition parties to resort to a mass-protest strategy in challenging potential voting irregularities. Opposition-led protests over rigged elections in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan all resulted in the ouster of incumbent regimes over the past 18 months. Nazarbayev is planning to run for re-election in a presidential vote scheduled to be held next year.

Nazarbayev is also seeking to ease discontent associated with poverty. In his February 18 state-of-the-nation address, the president expressed concern about the build-up of revolutionary pressure in Central Asia, saying "reckless [political] changes will only lead to chaos." To relieve such pressure he advocated "accelerated economic and social modernization," and targeted two influential demographic groups � pensioners and students � for increased state assistance. He announced that state pensions would be increased up to 33 percent starting in July, while financial aid to students would be doubled. The Nazarbayev administration should have little difficulty in paying for programs, as the country’s National Fund, generated by profits from Kazakhstan’s abundant natural resources, now stands at over $5 billion.

There would appear to be some basis for Nazarbayev’s concerns about political reverberations in Kazakhstan. Prominent Kazakhstani opposition politicians, including Bulat Abilov, traveled to Kyrgyzstan soon after Akayev’s ouster on March 24 to observe events first hand. Clearly Kazakhstani opposition leaders have been energized by developments in Bishkek, and some issued stark challenges to Nazarbayev.

Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a leader of the new opposition bloc For Fair Kazakhstan, said the best guarantee against upheaval in Kazakhstan would be for Nazarbayev not to run for re-election, and to facilitate a free presidential election. "I have always said that if the wave of the people’s anger arises, then it will immediately smash any regime and tyranny," Nurkadilov told the opposition-oriented Respublika newspaper. "I do not call for a repeat of the Kyrgyz events, but one should not test the people’s patience for long! That is why I would advise Nazarbayev to start the process of peaceful transfer of power."

On March 29, For Fair Kazakhstan issued an appeal to Nazarbayev to engage in political dialogue. The president has not responded. In recent months, Nazarbayev has kept the pressure on opposition parties and media outlets. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On March 25, a court in Almaty ordered the liquidation of the ownership group that operates the opposition weekly Respublika. Representatives of the ownership group � Bastau Ltd. -- say they will appeal the ruling.

Leaders of a pro-presidential bloc, known as AIST, called for the creation of a "people’s democratic front" to defend the establish order against political turmoil. The AIST heads, Roman Madinov and Azat Peruashev, sparked controversy by hinting that any means, including the use of arms, could be justified in preventing the spread of public disorder.

In Uzbekistan, Karimov appears wary of the new Kyrgyz leadership, but evidently feels he has no choice but to engage it. According to a tersely worded report distributed by the Uzbek National News Agency, Karimov held phone talks March 29 with Kyrgyz interim President Kurmanbek Bakiyev about recent events in Bishkek. "The two stressed the necessity of maximal mobilization and use of all available opportunities to solve existing problems within a legal framework and constitutional requirements, as well as to prevent possible actions of destructive forces," the news agency report stated.

A source of special concern for Uzbek authorities is that southern Kyrgyzstan proved to be the epicenter of the explosion of popular discontent. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Southern Kyrgyzstan has a large ethnic Uzbek minority, and the region straddles the Uzbek portion of the Ferghana Valley, which is widely view as a hotbed of opposition to Karimov’s administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Karimov’s domestic response to developments in Kyrgyzstan followed a familiar pattern; authorities sought to clampdown on citizens’ ability to obtain information and hamper their ability to assemble. At first, state-controlled broadcast media and newspaper carried little information about developments in Bishkek, and officials closed the borders. In the Ferghana Valley, all public entertainment events, including films and theater, were cancelled, and farmers’ markets were ordered temporarily closed in several cities, including Andizhan, Kokand and Margilan.

In Tashkent, it proved difficult for authorities to enforce an information blackout. Many Tashkent residents had access to Russian television news. In addition, some people, in a revival of the Soviet-era samizdat tradition, printed, copied and distributed by hand articles from the Internet concerning the Kyrgyz revolution. After several days, state-controlled television broadened its coverage of Bishkek events, emphasizing incidents of looting and lawlessness that engulfed the Kyrgyz capital after Akayev fled.

Despite the government’s efforts to control information, residents of the Ferghana Valley appeared relatively well informed about developments in Kyrgyzstan. And many expressed a desire to for Karimov to experience a political fate similar to Akayev’s. Noting that there are many Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, Malokhat, a teacher in Margilan voiced the hope that "they [Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan] will help us some day. We cannot suffer [for government repression] much longer."

Editor�s Note: Ibragim Alibekov, Kamron Kambarov and Esmer Islamov are all pseudonyms for regional journalists.

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