EURASIA INSIGHT
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard
4/02/02
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The delayed return to Kabul of Afghanistans exiled former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, may change how the United States approaches the problem of Afghan security. For days before Zahirs scheduled March 25 arrival, Hamid Karzais interim Afghan government and the kings Pashtun kinsmen had laid out plans for an elaborate homecoming ceremony. But when United States president George W. Bush phoned Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi on March 21 to warn him of possible attempts on Zahir Shahs life, Italian officials postponed the flight until April 16. They had worried for weeks about the risks associated with sending the king home.
But they had apparently not communicated these worries to Zahir Shah or the current Afghan interim government. Karzai learned of the postponement from a reporter at a news conference. Predictably, these statements have fueled speculation in diplomatic circles and the press around the world. Some news reports mentioned Taliban and al Qaeda as the groups most likely to try to assassinate Zahir Shah. Some aides to the former king mentioned Iran and its proxies in Afghanistan as possible originators of the threats. The Washington Post, citing unnamed Western diplomats, claimed that threats to the ousted monarch actually came from his opponents in the Northern Alliance.
Margherita Boniver, an undersecretary at the Italian Foreign Ministry who was to have accompanied the former king, stoked speculation. She said in an interview that her government had received "credible reports pointing to a possible attempt to bring down the plane as it would enter the Afghan airspace." Finally a high-ranking official at the Italian Foreign Ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity, told EurasiaNet that Italian intelligence deemed the threats "too vocal to be ignored." They were also too severe.
According to the official, Italian intelligence obtained credible evidence on threats of rocket attacks on Zahir Shahs plane. Further, the Foreign Ministry official intimated that the rockets might be Stinger missiles, several of which went missing in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion and are still likely to work. On April 2, according to press reports, Afghan police arrested a confederate of former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on charges of conspiracy to overthrow Karzais government. Hekmatyar, a major warlord during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, has claimed to be in possession of a cache of Stinger missiles.
It is conceivable that someone would attack Zahir Shah simply to prevent him from regaining the throne. Since the middle of March, he has publicly discussed the idea of restoration of monarchy - subject to a popular referendum - as a viable option for Afghanistans future. Since the Soviet occupation and the miseries that followed it, Zahir Shah had consistently turned down all overtures to engage in politics. Even when it became clear that a role in the post-Taliban arrangement was assured for him, he seemed intent on being a ceremonial figure, something akin to a spiritual leader of the nation. All this abruptly changed just days before his scheduled departure. In a series of interviews he established that if the people ask him to serve as a monarch, he would "respect the peoples will."
Afghan political observers say a restoration stands little chance of becoming a reality, in part because of a general reluctance of royal family members to assume responsibility for leading the country. Despite his recent comments, Zahir Shah himself is old and in declining health. Of his four sons, none at present has demonstrated any political ambitions. As for grandsons, only Mostafa followed the king in all public appearances - and he is not scheduled to go to Kabul. Abdul Wali, the kings son-in-law and his ex-military commander, is able and charismatic, but he would have a difficult time leapfrogging the kings own sons in a succession. The same goes for Princess Homaira, a tough and independent-minded woman, who is the kings favorite grandchild, and is the only female slated to travel with the kings entourage later in April.
So while Zahir allies are eager to reclaim old privileges and sinecures, the former king himself seems like an odd target. Zahir Shah does have political enemies in Afghanistan. For example, some Northern Alliance leaders may be unhappy about the former kings high-profile comments. But it is quite unlikely that these players would endorse assassination. Even a threat to harm the monarch could easily backfire by destabilizing the entire government and infuriating a war-weary population.
That leaves only the usual suspects, including Taliban and al Qaeda zealots and Hekmatyar supporters. Among Afghanistans neighbors, Iran has the most to fear from a restoration - since Zahir Shahs return might embolden Iranian monarchists. However, it is unlikely, given the existing international scrutiny, that Tehran would take the risk of conspiring to kill Zahir Shah.
The speculation surrounding a possible assassination attempt highlights Afghanistans chronically poor security. And that exposure may prompt a shift in American policy. In recent weeks, many people -including leading members of the Karzai government and UN representatives - have pleaded with Western powers to expand the mandate and the size of the International Security Assistance Force. While the Pentagon has been reluctant to embrace the idea of bolstering the peacekeeping force, a rising chorus of voices around the world, including voices in the US State Department, is now endorsing it.
Editor’s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a freelance journalist who specializes in Afghan and Iranian affairs.
Posted April 2, 2002 © Eurasianet
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