EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - NATO: Bush's Support for Georgia, Ukraine is No Pose

EURASIA INSIGHT

NATO: BUSH’S SUPPORT FOR GEORGIA, UKRAINE IS NO POSE
Joshua Kucera 4/02/08

As NATO’s summit opened April 2 in Bucharest, the United States remained dedicated to moving Georgia and Ukraine to the next level of NATO participation, despite signs of inflexible European opposition.

Before the official opening of the Atlantic alliance gathering, US President George W. Bush kept up his drumbeat of support for Georgia and Ukraine, offering a strong endorsement for the two countries’ accession hopes. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "We must make clear that NATO welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for membership in NATO, and offers them a clear path forward toward that goal," Bush said.

Georgia has struggled mightily to convince NATO members that it should be offered a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the summit, and the Americans have been their strongest backers. A MAP is the last qualifying step for NATO aspirants before an offer of membership.

NATO members are divided on the issue. Several European countries, led by Germany and France, are firmly against giving Georgia a MAP at this time. Other countries that reportedly oppose awarding MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine include the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Norway, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg and Portugal. In addition to the United States and Great Britain, Canada, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic have all come out in public support of Ukraine and Georgia.

In Bucharest, US officials will focus their lobbying efforts on German leaders. The consensus belief among American policymakers is that if they can convince the Germans to change their position, then the rest of the opposition will collapse, according to one US government official who spoke to EurasiaNet on condition of anonymity. The official also insisted that Bush’s public advocacy on behalf of Georgia and Ukraine is genuine, and not a pose.

"The president, both privately and publicly, he is 100 percent behind this effort for Georgia and Ukraine and he’ll give it his best shot," the official said. "The fact that he went to Kyiv is important; he met with [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili two weeks ago here [in Washington]. He’s wholeheartedly behind this endeavor."

The United States is worried that the Georgian government, in particular, which has invested so much energy in joining NATO, may be fatally wounded by a failure this week to get a MAP. "I think the Ukrainians could withstand a �no’ vote better than the Georgians could," the official said. "The Georgians have signed themselves up lock, stock and barrel to the Euro-Atlantic project and this will be a severe blow to Saakashvili and his supporters."

Russia strongly opposes any movement of NATO into what the Kremlin calls the former-Soviet space. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Many current NATO members worry that it is not worth antagonizing the alliance’s giant neighbor to the East over Ukraine, where a minority of the population supports NATO membership, or Georgia, which has been buffeted by political instability in recent months. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"France will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia," said French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, speaking on French radio April 1. "We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think it is not the right response to the balance of power in Europe and between Europe and Russia, and we want to have a dialogue on this subject with Russia."

There is growing frustration among American policymakers that Russia is exercising a de facto veto over expansion into its backyard. That frustration is directed in particular at Germany, which has been increasingly cooperating with Russia on energy issues. Germany also gets about 40 percent of its natural gas from the Russia state company Gazprom, and is Gazprom’s largest export customer. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"I don’t know about the French, but for the Germans, I don’t know there’s much that can change their minds," the US official said. "What you see here, to a certain extent, is the success of the Gazprom foreign policy."

Ultimately, American leaders -- who have an ambitious wish list for Bucharest, even though they lack political capital -- may have to make some tradeoffs. In addition to the Georgia-Ukraine MAP question, Washington is also intent on cajoling skeptical allies into stepping up their commitments in Afghanistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Given the general European distaste for the Bush administration tactics and strategy on numerous issues, US officials may have to sacrifice one of their summit goals in order to salvage the other. If that’s the case, Georgia-Ukraine matter would seem more likely to be jettisoned in favor of bolstering the NATO commitment in Afghanistan.

In any event, it appears to some experts that the two NATO factions that are divided on the Georgia-Ukraine issue have already maneuvered themselves into corners. "I’m just quite struck by the how much of this is playing out so publicly," said James Goldgeier, senior fellow for transatlantic relations at the Council on Foreign Relations. "[This] is not what you want to see in advance of a summit like this because it just makes it harder to reach agreement if countries have made very public the positions that they have."

Editor�s Note: Joshua Kucera is a Washington, DC,-based freelance writer who specializes in security issues in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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