Moscow Seeks to Take Advantage of Iraq Conflict to Reassert its Leadership in CIS

As American-led troops take control in Iraq, the Turkish government that declined to host them is pursuing alliances elsewhere in the region. Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi paid a sudden visit to Turkey on April 6, following US Secretary of State Colin Powell by four days. Citing "common interests" and "legitimate concerns" with its secular neighbor, Kharrazi met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodgan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. The visit left some observers wondering how friendly Turkey intends to become with neighboring Islamic regimes – and how conciliatory it wishes to be toward the United States.

While it is unclear how meaningfully Powell's visit affected Kharrazi's timing, mutual insecurities probably spurred both sides. Concerns about upheaval and disintegrating borders are also apparently prodding Erdogan's government toward conversations with a range of regional players – some of whom, like Iran, lie explicitly out of Washington's favor. "The riches of the region are being wasted. From that viewpoint, it is very natural and right to hold consultations and to exchange views," Gul told a press conference on April 7. "We have held bilateral talks with Iran within this framework. Naturally, we will be holding talks with Syria. It will be very beneficial to hold bilateral talks with the other neighboring countries. These activities will continue."

Gul announced that he would fly to Damascus on April 13 to have talks with Syrian leaders. Turkey, however, is playing its diplomacy with delicacy. It declined Kharrazi's offer to set up a tripartite consultation mechanism among Ankara, Damascus and Tehran, an analogue to which operated briefly after the first Gulf War.

In the immediate term, Turkey and Iran both see more to fear than to exploit in an unstable Iraq. Ankara and Tehran worry about the possibility that ethnic Kurdish communities in their respective countries could stage insurgencies if their fellow Kurds become aggressive in a post-Saddam Iraq. Both countries may fear that ethnic claims on land in Iraq, or insurgencies by the Kurds of northern Iraq, could fuel separatist movements elsewhere in the region. Kharrazi said in Ankara that "Iran, like Turkey, favored Iraq's continued territorial integrity." While Iran does not countenance Turkey's retaining the right to enter northern Iraq if it perceives a threat from Kurds, the two countries appear more concerned about preserving their own borders than gaining advantage over the other.

The talks also seem parallel to one of Erdogan's major goals, which involves hastening Turkey's entry into the European Union. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw are expected to visit Turkey in the coming weeks, while Polish Prime Minister Lezcek Miller visited Erdogan on April 7. Miller announced that Poland would dispatch 50 chemical and biological warfare experts to Turkey under the auspices of NATO, which has set up a program for Turkish defense. Miller, however, reportedly took the occasion to assert his country's support for Turkey's application to the European Union. Gul and Erdogan left the next day for Belgrade to attend a conference of parties to the Southeast European Cooperation Process, which first met in 2001.

Erdogan's boldest initiative may be his effort to hitch his Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its Islamist roots, to Iran and other Islamic countries, particularly in trade. Turkish exports to Iran were basically flat in January 2003 compared to the same period in 2002, and exports to other Islamic countries had fallen. Since Erdogan has stated a desire to increase trade with neighbors and other Islamic countries by 50 percent, some of his government's openness may serve as a means to boost his country's weak export revenue. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

This initiative risks irritating the United States without any guarantee of easy progress in the target countries. Tehran opposes any Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq, and Gul noted this opposition with Kharrazi. But Turkey continues to say that it will send soldiers across the border if it faces a flood of refugees or if Kurds try to seize Turkish oil assets. Kharrazi implicitly reminded the Turks that Tehran could claim grounds for doing the same. "There are not only Turkmen in northern Iraq, but also Shiites," with whom Iran has religious sectoral ties, he said in Ankara.

Moreover, Ankara and Tehran compete over ways to export Caspian energy – so acutely that Erdogan, during a press conference with Polish Prime Minister Miller, reportedly made an inaccurate reference to "Caspian oilfields" as an area Turkish troops would protect from Kurds – and Turkey remains a buyer of Iranian oil with relatively weak economic leverage.

Despite some demarches and rhetoric about increased cooperation between Ankara and Tehran, a smooth road to partnership is unlikely. And if Turkey's diplomatic dealings are sensitive with Iran, they will be more sensitive with Syria and other Middle East nations. Meanwhile, the country's effort to join the European Union, which would give it deeper reserves of security and economic opportunity, may proceed more quickly than any ties with the Islamic world. Turkey's rapprochement with Iran will probably cleave for the time being to economic issues and certain elements of Kurdish policy. But the changes sweeping across Iraq may complicate even these areas of agreement.