Eurasia Insight:
SPY CASE REVEALS TENSION IN UZBEK-RUSSIAN TIES
Anna Skalova: 4/09/07

The case of an Uzbek officer serving a 20-year prison term after being convicted as a Russian spy suggests that the official “close friendship” between Tashkent and Moscow has its limits.

An Uzbek military court rejected an appeal by Lt. Col. Sanjar Ismailov, the 37-year-old former acting head of Uzbek army intelligence. Ismailov was originally arrested in mid-2005 on charges of treason, abuse of power and the illegal arms possession. According to prosecutors, Ismailov in 2003 handed over information on Afghan militant groups to Russia’s military attaché in Tashkent. In his appeal, Ismailov insisted his actions were consistent with his official duties, explaining that the information he handed over to the Russian diplomat was encrypted and needed to be deciphered by Russian experts. To support his version of events, he noted that the transfer occurred in the Defense Ministry’s protocol room.

“Russia is our ally and strategic partner. I do not understand why the court came to the conclusion that the [information] passed [to the Russian side] could have been used against Uzbekistan’s national security and defensive potential,” Ismailov wrote in his appeal to the Uzbek military court, which issued its decision in late February.

Natalia Bondar, Ismailov’s wife, claims that the accusations brought against her husband were in retaliation for his criticism of a high-ranking Defense Ministry official, who supposedly obtained information that Islamic militants were preparing to stage an armed uprising in Andijan in May 2005, but did not notify appropriate government officials of the intelligence findings. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Since the Andijan events of 2005, Uzbekistan has significantly strengthened strategic ties with Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In late 2005, Uzbekistan and Russia signed a mutual security pact that called on the two countries to come to each other’s defense if either was the victim of an attack by a third state. The agreement also contained a provision that could enable Russia to station troops on Uzbek territory. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In 2006, Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s administration appeared to solidify its relationship with the Kremlin by joining the Eurasian Economic Community, and re-entering the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Both organizations are dominated by Russia. In addition, Uzbekistan is a participant in another security grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in which Russia is a leading player. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Despite its willingness to sign treaties with Moscow, and to participate in Russian-dominated security organizations, Uzbek leaders continue to regard the Kremlin with extreme wariness, according to some prominent political scientists and human rights activists. “Karimov’s friendship with Russia never has been firm, but rather forced,” commented Vitaly Ponomaryev, head of the Moscow-based Memorial Human Rights Center’s Program for Monitoring Human Rights in Central Asia. “It is difficult to find a Central Asian leader who would be more anti-Russian than Uzbekistan’s current president.”

Andrei Soldatov, head of the Moscow-based Agentura.ru think tank, which monitors secret services and terrorist organizations, shares Ponomaryev’s view about Karimov’s attitude towards Russia. “The strengthening friendship [between Russia and Uzbekistan] was illusory,” he told EurasiaNet. “Russia’s activity in the region -- primarily stirring up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [for regional security] -- does not suit Uzbekistan.”

According to Soldatov, Uzbekistan feels uncomfortable because the SCO’s anti-terrorist structure is “fully under the control of Moscow.”

For much of Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet existence, the Karimov administration has pursued de-Russification policies that have, for instance, de-emphasized the teaching of Russian language and cultural traditions in schools. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The number of ethnic Russians in the country has steadily decreased since Uzbekistan gained independence -- from roughly 1.65 million in 1989 to about 620,000 in 2005.

By imprisoning Ismailov, Uzbek leaders have sent a signal to Moscow that Tashkent does not consider itself geopolitically dependent on the Kremlin. While tension may be lingering beneath the surface, both countries don’t appear anxious to have their differences become the subject of public scrutiny. Neither Uzbek nor Russian officials have commented on the Ismailov case. Bondar, Ismailov’s wife, says that Russian officials have ignored her pleas to take action on her husband’s behalf, explaining that the case was an internal affair for Uzbek authorities. She now is contemplating approaching Western governments in an attempt to raise awareness about Ismailov’s fate.

Editor’s Note: Anna Skalova is the pseudonym of a journalist who specializes in Uzbek-related developments.