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EURASIA INSIGHT

POWER STRUGGLE BREWS IN AFGHANISTAN PITTING PRESIDENT AGAINST PARLIAMENT
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard 4/13/06

Amid the long list of daunting challenges to Afghanistan’s stabilization efforts, headed by an intensifying Islamic radical guerilla campaign, there are signs that a debilitating power struggle is brewing between President Hamid Karzai and parliament.

Several sources familiar with behind-the-scenes political maneuvering say that parliamentary opposition is solidifying against Karzai’s proposed cabinet reorganization, which would oust one of his main rivals, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. Some observers suggest that there exists a strong possibility that parliament will reject Karzai’s nominee to replace Abdullah, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta. The legislature, they add, also intends to insist that Abdullah, the lone remaining representative of the Tajik triumvirate still in the government, retain his present portfolio.

Spanta, who has served as a Karzai policy advisor, attended a parliamentary confirmation hearing on April 13. In answering questions from legislators, Spanta steered well clear of controversy, speaking broadly of the need for Afghanistan to maintain good working relationships with all major partners, including the United States, India, Iran and Pakistan.

The president proposed his new cabinet in March and the parliament began confirmation hearings on April 4. Karzai pushed for a single yes-or-no vote on the cabinet’s collective composition, but parliament dealt the president a setback by deciding to confirm each cabinet candidate individually. The confirmation votes are expected to be taken later this month.

The confirmation process is a major test of strength for the legislative branch. The parliament, which was elected in September 2005, is headed by Speaker Yunus Qanooni, a Tajik ally of Abdullah’s and who also was Karzai’s main challenger in the 2004 presidential election. To date, opposition to Karzai has been disorganized, but, sources suggest, that Qanooni has been effective in bringing disparate anti-Karzai elements together.

Almost immediately after Karzai revealed his new cabinet choices, Qanooni let it be known that he would scrutinize the selections and would resist a fast-track confirmation process. "We are not going to start reviewing and voting for these people until the president provides us with more information about these nominees’ background," he said. The longer the parliamentary hearings are drawn out, the more time Qanooni has had to mobilize support for Abdullah and against Spanta. Qanooni, for example, has reportedly enlisted the backing of many female MPs, who are disgruntled by the fact that Karzai nominated only one woman for a cabinet post. In addition, the speaker has successfully reached out to tribal leaders who hold parliamentary seats.

Karzai’s personnel decisions in recent years have alienated Tajiks. The Tajik-dominated militia formed the backbone of the so-called Northern Alliance, which played a leading role in driving out Soviet forces in 1989 following a decade-long occupation, and in preventing the radical Taliban movement from establishing total control over Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Given their important military role in recent Afghan history, Tajik leaders feel they deserve a greater share of the political power, including patronage possibilities, than has been accorded them under Karzai’s administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

When Afghanistan’s interim government was formed in late 2001, in the aftermath of the US-led campaign to oust the Taliban from Kabul, a Tajik triumvirate, comprising Abdullah, Qanooni and Marshal Mohammad Fahim, held the three most important governmental posts � foreign affairs, interior and defense ministers. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Over time, Karzai managed to ease both Qanooni and Fahim out of government, leaving Abdullah isolated within the cabinet. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In an early April interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Karzai disclaimed any "regional or ethnic bias" in making his cabinet choices. He called on the Qanooni-led parliament to "accept or reject these choices according to professional standards ... and that no other criteria should determine their [legislators’] decisions." Karzai also claimed that he offered Abdullah a different cabinet post -- that of trade and industry minister -- adding that the sitting foreign minister rejected the idea of a portfolio switch. The president went on to indicate that he had a backup plan in case parliament rejected some of his cabinet choices.

If it is up to Qanooni, however, Karzai will have to accept the speaker’s choice for foreign minister, and not the other way around. Tajik leaders say they are finally finding their political footing, and are now in position to lead organized resistance to what they view as Karzai’s efforts to enhance his personal authority. In the coming months, parliament could well emerge as a solid platform from which presidential opponents can launch political attacks against Karzai.

An expert with detailed knowledge of the inner workings of Afghan politics asserted that the president would prefer to surround himself with cronies. "Karzai is cutting off any independently minded opinion-makers from his government. He is very independent and doesn’t like having famous or controversial ministers," the expert said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"He [Karzai] cut off [former Interior Minister] Ali Jalali from the ministry because he, like Karzai, had American support and could therefore tap into the networks the president has and run for the presidency in the next election," the expert continued. "He did the same with [former Finance Minister] Ashraf Ghani who is a celebrity in the World Bank and is now a nominee for the post of Secretary General of the United Nations. They were not Northern Alliance or warlords. They were simply people that Karzai didn’t like."

Editor�s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard has reported from Afghanistan and Iran for EurasiaNe

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