Eurasia Insight:
SADDAM'S FALL MAY PROMPT CONCILIATORY MEASURES IN IRAN
Ardeshir Moaveni: 4/17/03

While members of US President George W. Bush’s administration have hinted that they may ratchet up pressure on Iran, American military officials acknowledged on April 16 that their warplanes had bombed Iraqi positions of the Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), Iran’s premier armed opposition force. Iranian leaders have come to realize that, barring a serious re-examination of their relationship toward the United States, a confrontation between the two countries may be inevitable. Aside from the most radical elements, most Iranian leaders appear ready to open long-deferred dialogue with the Bush administration – fully aware that they may have to make major concessions.

Despite Washington’s decades-old trade sanctions against Iran and even as Bush labeled the country part of an "axis of evil," there have been many informal contacts between representatives of the two countries since the fall of 2001. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Because the Iranian participants feared that word of such talks might hurt them politically, dialogue has gone on in complete secrecy. Such fears have precedents. After reformists made a few muted comments in the summer of 2002 on the virtues of re-engaging the United States diplomatically, members of the theocratic judiciary dubbed such ideas treasonous and promised severe punishment to anyone expressing them.

In this context, a statement by one of Iran’s most powerful figures started a political earthquake in Tehran shortly after American-led soldiers began occupying Iraq. On April 12, ex-president Hashemi Rafsanjani, a conservative who may be second only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in his influence over policymakers, made a carefully-worded statement during an interview which advocated open official dialogue with the United States. He even went so far as suggesting that a referendum – long a favorite weapon of the reformists – might be the best vehicle for achieving this goal.

These comments appeared in Rahbord, a conservative journal published by a think tank connected to the organization that Rafsanjani chairs. They appeared a day after the Supreme Leader had made one of his customary verbal attacks on the United States, leading to speculation that Rafsanjani had acted on his own. However, in the view of longtime observers, the shrewd and mercurial ex-president would probably have never countenanced making such a bold proposal unless the Supreme Leader himself had endorsed it. Therefore the question before the Iranian conservatives is not whether they are finally ready to open dialogue with the country they call the "Great Satan," but how and on whose terms.

Hardliners would very much like to conduct the talks – assuming that the Bush administration is ready to reciprocate – while bypassing reformists in the legislature and the president’s office. In the Rahbord interview, Rafsanjani made a veiled criticism of President Mohammed Khatami’s Foreign Ministry. On April 16, the Iranian Republic News Agency quoted the president as saying that a referendum would be an inappropriate vehicle for a foreign-policy decision. At the same time, Khatami positioned himself for a role in any talks that might materialize. "If the United States adopts a peaceful approach, respecting [world] nations, it will serve its long-term interests. The United States’ capabilities can contribute to peace and progress of the human society," he said, describing his country as "never in favor of tension."

Both conservatives and reformists want to minimize concessions to the Americans while protecting the country from a devastating invasion or a destabilization campaign. At present the Bush team attaches several prerequisites to the resumption of ties. These include demands that Iran renounce all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, end support for Hezbollah and other armed groups abroad, and affirm an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. All these issues contain many complexities and potential snarls.

Even if the Iranian government can speak with one voice and American officials enter good-faith dialogue, fanatical groupings in and out of the Islamic Republic’s government may try to torpedo any diplomatic progress. In a little-publicized incident on March 29, a man identified later as Mohammad Hassan Hakimi drove a van carrying inflammable material towards the British Embassy in Tehran, ostensibly to protest allied conduct in Iraq. Hakimi died before he could meaningfully damage the Embassy, and authorities in Tehran and London have tried to hush reporting of the episode. But it illustrates some of the dangers that Iranian leaders will have to face if they offer to commence dialogue with the Bush administration.

In this connection, the role of Great Britain is quite telling. British officials have made efforts to assuage the Iranians since Baghdad fell. Mike O’Brien, a high ranking Foreign Ministry official, visited Iran on April 13 and, according to a source from Iran’s parliament, praised his host’s "forbearance" and promised that the US role in Iraq would be limited and not detrimental to "Iranian interests."

The American attack on Mujaheddin e-Khalq illustrates both the promise and the pitfalls of a possible rapprochement. The Iranian government has long sought to close and disband the group’s Iraqi bases, which MEK fighters set up in the early 1980s with Saddam Hussein’s blessing. The group of roughly 12,000 fighters has conducted sabotage and assassination attempts on Iranian territory against the government. The American air attack came after Iran threatened to attack the group’s Iraqi bases on its own.

However, sources say the attacks had come a few hours after fighters had left their bases, destroying only a few abandoned armored vehicles. This led some Iranian officials to accuse the Americans of colluding in a staged attack with the MEK, which despite being on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations is considered by many an important source of pressure on the Iranian regime. On April 10, as Iraqi defenses were crumbling in the northeast, Kurdish and Shia forces loyal to Iran mounted a concerted attack, leaving dozens of Mujaheddin dead or injured.

On April 17, American Brigadier General Vincent Brooks expressed hope for a ceasefire between the coalition and the MEK. It is unclear what will become of the group, which is now crammed into a much smaller position in eastern Iraq. It is equally unclear how this element in the big jigsaw puzzle of American-Iranian relations will affect the final outcome. The only thing that seems clear is that the new phase of Iran-US relations will take shape much more quickly than politicians in Tehran expected before the war in Iraq began.

Editor’s Note: Ardeshir Moaveni is the pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian political affairs.