Holding Back in Iraq, Turkey Seeks Regional Influence

Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul told reporters in the halls of parliament on April 17 that American officials had made informal inquiries about the Turkish government's disposition toward possible military and civilian involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq. Such discussions could vindicate Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's policy of keeping soldiers out of post-Saddam Iraq, even while ethnic Kurds appeared to violently target Turkish-speaking Iraqis. Having shown military restraint, Turkey hopes for political influence on the future of Iraq and its neighbors, especially Syria. Such influence could pay off in Washington and in Brussels, where Turkey's application for European Union membership is due for consideration in 2004.

Gonul – stressing that communications remained unofficial and exploratory – said the Bush administration appeared ready to at least audition Turkey as a contributor to the American-led occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. "They are asking us: 'How many troops can you send here? Can you send medical aid, explosives experts? Can you send nuclear experts who speak Arabic? Can you send information technology experts, experts on public infrastructure construction and restoration, communication experts and material?'" he said to reporters. These questions came to the Foreign Ministry rather than to the cabinet, said Gonul, implying that any commitment that arose from them would probably be modest. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, upon returning from European Union ceremonies in Athens, stressed that nobody had demanded a Turkish military commitment.

The difference between discussion and demand is critical. Turkey compromised billions in aid from the Bush administration when its parliament voted on March 1 to deny its bases to American-led coalition forces. After some jockeying, Turkey granted overflight rights to the coalition, and US President George W. Bush requested $1 billion in aid to Turkey that could leverage billions more in loan guarantees. Erdogan critically needs such aid as he seeks to reform Turkey's finances and revitalize its economy. Given the state of that economy, he cannot afford to accept an open-ended military commitment in Iraq. Gonul said his government's response would depend heavily on how allies allocated costs.

Erdogan may be hoping to remind Americans that he risked significant political capital by promising not to dispatch troops to prevent Kurds there from occupying the economically critical cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Turkish troops along the border went on their highest alert on April 6, after Kurds entered Mosul. A flurry of phone conversations among Erdogan's team, the Bush administration and Kurdish faction leaders in northern Iraq led to a promise: Kurds would withdraw once extra American airborne troops arrived. During the withdrawal, Turkish media seized on reports that Kurdish forces were selectively setting certain public buildings on fire, to eliminate registries showing land and other claims of ethnic Turkomans. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Announcing the deal on April 7, Erdogan hinted at its fragility, saying: "I do not believe that [Bush administration officials] will not keep their word."

Three teams of five Turkish military officers who speak both Kurdish and English went to Mosul, Kirkuk and the northern Iraq command of Major-General Henry Osman of the US Marines. Their presence kept Turkey apprised of developments, while averting what could have been a disastrous intervention. By fighting in northern Iraq, Turkey would have compromised relations with the international community. Erdogan seems to believe that his forbearance will register with the Bush administration, which can jolt Turkey's economy with aid. It may also influence thinking in the European Union, which can reinvent Turkey's economy by accepting the country as a member.

Whatever role Turkey plays as an intermediary in the Middle East may raise questions about its policy toward Turkish-speaking people in other countries. Turkish officials have reportedly been retrieving documents from the State Archives Office that document Turkish-speaking, or Turkoman, heritage in what is now Iraq. This research may fuel proposals for a civilian role in restructuring the nation. Such a role might help Erdogan politically, by refuting claims that Turkey does not protect Turkomans beyond its borders. A 1937 treaty among Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan known as the Sadabad Pact pledged each signatory to keep out of the others' internal affairs. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. American soldiers, reportedly with help from Kurdish irregular fighters, killed at least 10 people in Mosul on April 15 and 16. Such episodes make Turkey vulnerable to questions about its tolerance of American partnership with nationalist Kurds.

By monitoring such events with prudence, Turkey could be seeking a more muscular role in long-term diplomatic wrangles. Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom visited Turkey on April 14, making him the first senior Israeli official to visit Erdogan's government. "We attach great importance to the dialogue that we have with Turkey," Shalom told the Jerusalem Post. Turkey and Israel trade roughly $1.2 billion each year, and Turkey may be positioning itself as a voice of reason among Muslim nations. Gul used Shalom's visit to urge the Bush administration against indulging suspicions that it will soon attack Syria or Iran. "It is necessary to demonstrate as false the speculation that after Iraq, Syria and Iran are next," said Gul. "We need to help ease tensions in the region."

Turkey clearly wants American and British policymakers to follow its cues with regard to Syria. By presenting himself as a brake on American overtures, Gul may also be positioning his government for greater favor with the European Union, key members of which bitterly opposed the invasion of Iraq. The European Union-Turkey Association met in Luxembourg on April 15, as rioters were rampaging in Mosul. After the Luxembourg meeting, EU Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen prodded Erdogan's government to meet the Union's political criteria by the end of 2003, so that commissioners could consider its candidacy in 2004. Gul responded that the government was "doing its homework." By shaping itself as an advocate for peace and restraint, Turkey may be seeking equal status as well.