Business & Economics:
ENERGY PROFITS PROVIDE KAZAKHSTAN WITH FOREIGN-POLICY HEFT
Joanna Lillis: 4/18/07

Kazakhstan is expanding its foreign policy outlook, as energy profits transform the Central Asian state into an increasingly important creditor nation. Astana’s aims are twofold: to secure energy transit and economic interests, and to boost Kazakhstan’s influence over regional geopolitical developments.

Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has relied on a so-called multi-vector approach that seeks to develop strong ties with Russia, China, the United States and European Union. “The [official foreign policy] position of Kazakhstan is to be a bridge, but from a historical and geographical point of view we are a corridor,” said Didar Kassymova, a foreign policy lecturer at the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research.

Of late, Kazakhstani officials have been tweaking the multi-vector approach, according to Anuar Ayazbekov, a research fellow at the Institute for Economic Strategies-Central Asia. “If the original connotation for the multi-vector policy was the maintenance of links with all great powers interested in Kazakhstan, today a multi-vector foreign policy includes policies toward not only great or regional powers, but also towards smaller countries, such as Slovakia or Qatar,” he said.

Kazakhstan is also exploring closer relations with its neighbors. In an April 9 television interview, President Nursultan Nazarbayev repeated his call for a Central Asian union. Analysts are doubtful, however, whether current conditions are conducive to the formation of a regional economic bloc. “The problem is that Central Asian states are not ready for integration and not ready for cooperation, for many reasons. One reason is the way the [Central Asian] presidents personally relate to this,” said Dosym Satpayev, the director of the Assessment Risks Group, an Almaty-based think tank. At present, Satpayev pointed out, Uzbekistan is shunning close relations with its neighbors, and Turkmenistan retains an “isolationist position,” even after the death of that country’s former leader, Saparmurat Niyazov. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Nazarbayev indicated during his April 9 interview that Kazakhstan’s policy choices are being based on cold calculations. “We are only pursuing the interests of Kazakhstan here. … Here there is pure pragmatism in the interests of our people and country,” he said. The country will not make decisions based solely on political considerations, he added. “Russia says: ‘why are we going into Baku-Ceyhan?’ The Americans say: ‘why are we building a pipeline to China?’ I shall explain: we are doing that not for political predilections, but because there is commercial benefit,” Nazarbayev said.

“If it is beneficial for us to transport all Kazakhstan’s oil and gas through Russia, we will go that way,” the Kazakhstani president continued. “If transportation via Baku-Ceyhan is 15 dollars cheaper, we will go that way. And if neither is beneficial, we will go to China.”

Kazakhstan has already committed to the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Atasu-Alashankou route to China. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Kazakhstan is also eyeing a stake in the Russia-backed Burgas-Alexandroupolis route, and has expressed interest in the Odessa-Brody pipeline -- but only on condition that Russia is involved. Of late, Astana has additionally revived interest in building trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. “For [other states’] geopolitical prospects, Kazakhstan is just something in the middle,” Kassymova, a foreign policy expert, said in an interview with EurasiaNet. “We have no other choice but to play these pipelines.”

Along with energy exports, foreign investment opportunities are starting to guide policy decisions, said Satpayev, the think tank director. “President Nazarbayev is now actively lobbying Kazakhstan firstly as an economically-booming state, and secondly as a state that has money, and, consequently, [a state that can] invest that money in countries which don’t have that money.” Kazakhstan’s investment of $152 million in Georgia last year significantly boosted the importance of the Caucasian state for Kazakhstan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A few commentators have questioned why Kazakhstan -- a key Russian ally in Eurasia -- is pursuing contacts with states that do not enjoy warm relations with Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. After Nazarbayev met in March with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, some reports in Russian and Kazakhstani media hinted at a chill in bilateral relations.

Many analysts in Kazakhstan, however, believe that Kazakhstani-Russian ties are still strong. “Bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Russia remain very cooperative and friendly,” Ayazbekov, the research fellow, told EurasiaNet. “Kazakhstan’s interest in Georgia and Azerbaijan should be viewed through the prism of economics. … It is a false assumption that Kazakhstan deliberately talks to countries that have an anti-Russian position.” Nurlan Yezimbetov, a political scientist at the Alternativa think-tank, agrees: “I would not attach significance [to such reports]. ... I don’t think Kazakhstan would do anything [unnecessary] to spoil relations with Russia.”

But Satpayev is more circumspect: “We are competitors in the oil and gas sector.” At the same time, he argues, Russia has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Kazakhstan. “For Putin, for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Kazakhstan is an important partner. They [Russian officials] understand that in the former Soviet Union, Russia has few friends – very few friends. … Putin understands that Russia needs Kazakhstan’s support in Central Asia.”

Editor’s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.