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EURASIA INSIGHT

ALIYEV’S HEALTH ISSUES RAISE SPECTER OF SUCCESSION CRISIS IN AZERBAIJAN
Stephen Blank 4/23/03

Over the past decade, Azerbaijan’s relative stability has rested on the foundation of President Heidar Aliyev’s image of unchallenged authority. That image was seriously tarnished by the recent, public display of Aliyev’s frail health. Now, members of Azerbaijan’s political and intellectual elite are raising concerns about Aliyev’s ability to run the country. They are also worried that lingering leadership questions could invite a new era of instability in Azerbaijan.

Aliyev’s doctors attributed the president’s April 21 collapse during a televised speech to a sudden drop in blood pressure. Although Aliyev has a lengthy history of health problems – including surgeries for a heart bypass, prostate condition and a hernia in recent years – the April 21 incident marked the first time that the president had faltered in public. Aliyev and his aides have tried to downplay the episode, but speculation is rife in Baku about the president’s ability to handle the responsibilities of power.

Opposition newspapers have dismissed government reports that Aliyev is able to carry out his full workload. On April 22, the Hurriyet daily, citing a source familiar with the president’s condition, reported that Aliyev was receiving round-the-clock care, and had been instructed not to speak or "move around much during the day."

"Heidar Aliyev’s image of immortality was destroyed [on April 21]," a Hurriyet editorial said. Prior to the incident, the editorial continued, "they [the president’s political backers] had managed to hide what had been taking place [Aliyev’s health woes] from the public. … Now, the clan [Aliyev’s political machine], which witnessed everything [on April 21], has received a signal to start taking a good look at their future."

There are indications that leaders of the governing New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), which has served as Aliyev’s main pillar of political support, have already started to grapple with the political succession issue. There are also signs that there is a lack of consensus on the succession process. According to a report by the opposition Yeni Musavat newspaper April 22, top YAP leaders, along with leading members of Aliyev’s administration and pro-presidential legislators, held an emergency meeting late on April 21. The newspaper alleged that a "serious dispute" erupted over who should chair the meeting, an indicator of sharp divisions within the governing apparatus.

Aliyev’s own preferred succession scenario appears to be a transfer of power to his son, Ilham. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Aliyev had made clear that he intended, despite his advanced age, to run for another five-year term in presidential elections scheduled for October. Many political observers believed Aliyev’s re-election plans were being driven by a desire to gain more time for Ilham to build a sturdier power base of his own.

Aliyev’s collapse, however, raises questions about his viability as a presidential candidate, and thus sows doubts about his ability to ensure a stable transfer of power. Without Aliyev to offer cover for his son, many observers give Ilham, who lacks the political instincts of his father, little chance of surviving on his own for long.

Aliyev critics, who have long assailed the administration for engaging in systematic rights abuses, have wasted little time in calling for the president’s resignation. "Aliyev should urgently hand over power," wrote opposition journalist Rauf Arifoglu. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "He [Aliyev] should go in a normal way without disasters. Our nation might pardon him because of his age and his illness."

Meanwhile, Etibar Mammedov, leader of the National Independence Party, characterized Aliyev’s administration as representing a "danger" to Azerbaijan and called for an overhaul of the governing apparatus. "This regime must be replaced," the Turan news agency quoted Mammedov as saying April 22.

The leadership question is arising at a delicate time for Azerbaijan, given the changing geopolitical environment in the region brought on by the US military’s ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Baku’s ability to influence long-standing diplomatic dilemmas – in particular a Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement or an agreement on the Caspian Sea’s territorial limits – would be severely hampered by a possible succession struggle.

Azerbaijan under Aliyev has been pro-Western and has built close ties with the United States and Turkey. These ties have at times helped Baku promote the country’s interests in a variety of foreign policy spheres, especially in the development of Caspian Basin energy resources. Aliyev’s own personal authority – which is rooted in his experience as a top Soviet KGB official and Communist Party Politburo member – also has significantly enhanced Azerbaijan’s ability to negotiate from a favorable position.

At the same time, Azerbaijan has tense relationships with most of its neighbors, in particular with Armenia, Iran and Russia. The disputes are mainly connected to ethno-territorial issues and to control over the area’s abundant energy reserves. A possible leadership crisis might influence any or all of these disputes in ways that would likely be detrimental to Azerbaijan’s interests.

At the very least, a succession struggle in Baku would likely mean an indefinite delay in efforts to resolve the Karabakh question. The Karabakh peace process is now at a standstill, largely because both Armenia and Azerbaijan do not appear in position to make the compromises necessary for a lasting settlement. Strong political leadership will be required on both sides to sell a peace deal to wary citizens in both countries.

The hint of political instability also could prompt Russia to step up efforts to reassert its influence in Azerbaijan. Aliyev over the past few years has succeeded in stabilizing Baku’s relationship with Moscow. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. However, any perception of an erosion of Aliyev’s authority may encourage Russian leaders to meddle in Baku’s domestic affairs. Some experts believe Moscow may attempt to make a diplomatic deal with Aliyev, under which Russia would offer to act as a guarantor of Ilham’s authority in exchange for enhanced influence over Azerbaijan.

Given Azerbaijan’s huge energy holdings and centrality to major international energy issues, an Azerbaijan that was Moscow’s client would have major international repercussions. Should Russia gain a decisive voice in Azerbaijani politics, it could block the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and frustrate Turkey’s hopes of playing a major role in the Caucasus. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Such a development would also increase the geopolitical pressure on Georgia, increasing the odds that Tbilisi, along with Baku, would slip back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.

At the same time, an attempt by Moscow to boost its influence over Azerbaijan could prompt similar action by other interested parties, namely the United States, Turkey and even Iran. Apart from the risks of internal destabilization, some experts worry that Azerbaijan could be riven by international rivalries, emulating in a way the experience of Afghanistan. None of the above-mentioned scenarios augurs well for Azerbaijan, or its neighbors.

Editor’s Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.

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