EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Azerbaijani President Visits Washington

EURASIA INSIGHT

AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT VISITS WASHINGTON
4/26/06

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev began a three-day visit to Washington on April 26 that could help determine whether the Bush Administration pursues a military option against Iran as part of its ongoing effort to thwart Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

The key talks of the hastily arranged trip will come on April 28, when Aliyev is scheduled to meet with US President George W. Bush. Aliyev has long sought a photo-op with Bush out of the apparent belief that the US presidential imprimatur of approval would greatly enhance the Azerbaijani leader’s legitimacy. Aliyev’s election win in 2003 was marred by widespread irregularities and police repression against demonstrators. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. US officials had resisted inviting Aliyev to a White House, feeling that an Oval Office meeting would be perceived internationally as undermining the Bush Administration’s global democratization mission. The administration’s ardor for pressing an international democratic agenda has cooled perceptibly in recent months, as its concern over Iran’s nuclear program has risen. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Apparently aiming to burnish his image, Aliyev on April 26 met with representatives of prominent non-governmental organizations that promote civil society, including Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and the Open Society Institute. [EurasiaNet operates under the auspices of the Open Society Institute].

Aliyev’s discussions with various US officials are expected to focus on geopolitical issues in the Caucasus, including the response to Iran’s nuclear program, breaking the stalemate in Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks and Caspian Basin energy-related issues.

US officials are believed to be most interested in discussing Iran, Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor. Since the announcement earlier this month that Aliyev would be traveling to Washington, Baku has buzzed with speculation that the Bush administration wanted to enlist Aliyev’s support for a blitz against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Such plans were reported by the American weekly magazine The New Yorker. However, US officials have denied the magazine report. Nevertheless, Bush on April 18 emphasized that "all options remain on the table," including the potential use of force, as Washington ponders ways to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

All indicators show that securing Azerbaijan’s participation in any offensive military operations against Iran will be an extremely tough sell for Washington. Azerbaijani officials have shown no interest in confronting Iran. On April 20, Foreign Ministry spokesman Tahir Taghizadeh indicated that Azerbaijan remains interested in balancing its relations with both Iran and the United States. "In general Baku’s position remains unchanged in two directions: Every country has right to develop a nuclear program with peaceful goals, and our region is vulnerable enough due to existing conflicts [to preclude] adding a new source of tension," Taghizadeh said.

Azerbaijani public opinion is also solidly opposed to a potential conflict with Iran. Local newspapers and broadcast media have carried reports in recent weeks critical of Bush’s confrontational approach, and have urged the government to refrain from granting basing rights to US forces, or providing any other form of assistance that would facilitate an attack against Iran. In urging Baku’s neutrality in the standoff, the reports have expressed alarm over a possible flood of Iranian refugees into Azerbaijan, or retaliatory strikes by Tehran against Azerbaijani targets.

Iranian officials have done nothing to discourage speculation in Azerbaijan about military retaliation. Azerbaijani media have given prominent play to recent comments made by Iranian National Security Council chief Ali Larijani, who said that an attack against Azerbaijan’s economic lifeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, could not be excluded in the event hostilities between the United States and Iran.

Aliyev moved quickly to quash expectations that Azerbaijani officials could be persuaded to change their minds, telling members of the Council on Foreign Relations during a closed-door meeting April 26 that Baku would not be a participant in "any kind" of military operation against Tehran. Although Aliyev appears committed to sitting out any possible military clash between the United States and Iran, he may be playing a diplomatic role aimed at heading off a conflict.

On April 19, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar visited Baku ostensibly for talks on mutual security issues. However, some political analysts in Baku believe that Najjar passed an Iranian message for Washington to Azerbaijani officials. Najjar helped fuel such conjecture by saying Azerbaijan can act as a mediator in the US-Iranian dispute. "Azerbaijan is our closest neighbor and ... Ilham Aliyev can convince the United States to understand Iran’s position properly," Najjar said.

Other observers say Najjar’s visit was designed to remind Baku of the high risks it would take if it opted to join an American coalition against Iran. Uzeyir Jafarov, a Baku-based military expert, said Najjar probably delivered a blunt message that Azerbaijan could not expect to escape unscathed if Iran was attacked. "The Iranian minister likely reminded Ilham Aliyev that in case of [Baku’s] participation in any action against Iran, Azerbaijan would be the first to suffer," Jafarov said.

Hikmet Hajizade, the political analyst and vice-president of FAR-center, a Baku-based NGO, suggested that the consequences could be devastating for Azerbaijan. "Even pre-attack tension will impact our interests. ... If military action takes place, Azerbaijan could experience retaliatory strikes against the BTC pipeline. Besides, one day we could find Iranians naval vessels along the Azerbaijani coast." At the same time, Hajizade indicated that the worst possible geopolitical scenario in the Caucasus for Azerbaijan could involve a nuclear-armed Iran. "Azerbaijan’s interests [might] suffer more if Iran develops its nuclear weapon," he said.

If Aliyev is indeed acting as a messenger, there would seem to be an opportunity in the near future for the Azerbaijani leader to pass along any back-channel communication conveyed by the Bush Administration. Iranian President Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad is planning to visit Baku on May 4 to attend a summit of the Organization of Economic Cooperation. Jafarov said that President Aliyev could update the Iranian leader on any US proposals, counter-proposals or ultimatums at that time.

A few opposition politicians and political experts in Baku have suggested that Aliyev explore the possibility of a quid pro quo involving Azerbaijani support for a US attack against Iran in exchange for Washington’s unequivocal support for Baku on the Nagorno-Karabakh question. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Currently, the United States is a member of the OSCE Minsk Group that is acting as the chief mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Some recent statements by Azerbaijani officials have prompted speculation of a possible linking of Iran and Karabakh. On April 22, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov caused a sensation when he suggested that some Azerbaijani regions currently under Armenian occupation could become embroiled in a possible US-Iranian conflict, the Turan news agency reported.

Hajizade and other experts downplay such a connection. "The Karabakh conflict is not just about United States’ will and the question is: will the Washington able to push on Russia, which in its turn would push Armenia to give up [some] of its claims. So far I do not see any opportunity for US-Russia agreement on the issue," Hikmet Hajizade said.

Vardan Oskanian, the Armenian foreign minister, dismissed the possibility of a US-Azerbaijani quid pro quo involving Karabakh. "It is not a way that the United States operates. And such a deal would not end with any positive result," Oskanian said on April 19.

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