EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Turkey Grapples with Constitutional Crisis Surrounding Presidential Vote

EURASIA INSIGHT

TURKEY GRAPPLES WITH CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS SURROUNDING PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
Nicholas Birch 4/27/07

Turkey’s presidential vote was cast into disarray April 27, as opposition politicians engaged in political maneuvering in the hopes of thwarting the election of a moderate Islamist candidate.

Opposition MPs, including those from the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), boycotted the April 27 session of parliament convened to select the country’s next president. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. They argued that their action deprived parliament of a quorum, thereby rendering the legislature incapable of holding a valid presidential election. They went on to file suit in Turkey’s Constitutional Court, calling for the annulment of the presidential vote and seeking new parliamentary elections. In the opposition’s best-case scenario, a new legislative election would deprive the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of an outright majority, and possibly sink the candidacy of the party’s present presidential candidate, Abdullah Gul. Under the Turkish Constitution, the presidency is a largely ceremonial post.

Two-thirds of MPs, or 367 deputies, were required to be present for the first round of voting to be valid. Controversy erupted on the parliament floor over whether that total was actually achieved. Opposition leaders insisted that their boycott succeeded, despite an appeal by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for all MPs to attend. By one count, only nine independents joined the 352 AKP deputies -- six short of 367. Erdogan, however, insisted 368 MPs were in attendance.

Whatever the actual number of MPs in the chamber, Gul was named only on 357 ballots when the first-round votes were counted, falling short of the number required for election. The AKP scheduled the next round of voting for May 2. If that round again fails to produce a two-thirds majority for a candidate, then the threshold falls to a simple majority of 276 votes for successive ballots. Thus, Gul would appear assured of victory in the third round, if not sooner.

The Constitutional Court, however, could block the AKP’s plans, at least temporarily. It has signaled that it will rule on the opposition suit before the second round occurs. The turn of events represents a major political coup for CHP leaders, who have led the secularist charge against an AKP-led government that they claim has not renounced political Islam. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Constitutional Court case is just the latest twist in a lengthy electoral saga. While France has known its presidential candidates for months, Turkey only learned who its new head of state was likely to be on April 24, just a few days before the first round of voting. Widely expected to stand himself, the charismatic, but abrasive Erdogan announced instead that Gul -- currently foreign minister -- was AKP’s choice to become the next head of state.

With the exception of the CHP members, other assorted nationalist-secularists and conservative elements within the military, most Turks appeared happy with Erdogan’s choice. A political analyst with the business daily Referans, Cengiz Candar, called Gul "the optimal choice" for president. The traditionally pro-secularist chief editor of daily Hurriyet and Turkey’s most powerful journalist, Ertugrul Ozkok, wrote two columns praising Gul, and chiding secularists for their inability to modernize as successfully as the AKP.

International investors, meanwhile, appear to retain confidence in the Turkish economy. After Gul’s candidacy was revealed, Istanbul’s stock exchange hit a record high on April 25. Fitch Rating, a US financial evaluation agency, greeted news of Gul’s candidacy with hints that it might raise Turkey’s rating later this year.

Much of the market’s optimism was a response to the end of weeks of political uncertainty. But it was also buoyed by the assumption -- widespread outside Turkey -- that Gul represented a compromise for the AKP, and a proof of political maturity on the part of Erdogan.

To an extent that is true. Widely respected at home and abroad, untouched by allegations of corruption, an economist by training and a diplomat by nature, Gul raises fewer secularist hackles than the prime minister. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

At the same time, Gul has always been closer to traditional Turkish political Islam than Erdogan has. While Erdogan’s power base has always been Istanbul, where he was mayor in the 1990s, Gul was a top lieutenant of former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, the grand old man of Turkish political Islam. Gul parted ways with Erbakan a long time ago, leading the rebellion against him after Erbakan’s party was forced out of power by the army in 1997. Despite that, though, there is strong evidence to suggest that Gul’s selection represented a victory for the party’s conservative Islamist wing.

"Gul was neither Erdogan’s first or second candidate for president", Hurriyet’s economics editor Erdal Saglam points out. First, of course, was Erdogan himself. Second was a caretaker president from further down the ranks of the party, one of the few AKP members whose wife doesn’t wear an Islamist headscarf.

That was something the AKP’s number three, Bulent Arinc, who serves as parliamentary speaker and is the leader of the party’s conservative wing, could not tolerate. Days before the announcement of Gul’s candidacy, Arinc promised that his party would "elect a religious president." Later, he reportedly told Erdogan that he would personally stand as a candidate if Gul was not selected.

Faced with the threat of an AKP split, Erdogan caved in and tapped Gul. The choice ultimately suited him well too: like his own wife, Gul’s wife, Hayrunnisa, wears a headscarf. With her ensconced in the presidential palace at Cankaya, Erdogan could turn to his supporters and say he had not caved into secularist pressure.

For analyst Mehmet Ali Birand, though, the one clear victor of these last minute machinations is Arinc. "His power within the party has grown in full view of the public", he says. "With Gul outside the parliament, he will now take the party’s number 2 spot."

Fluent in Arabic and English, Gul represents a marked contrast to out-going president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who speaks only Turkish and leaves Turkey as rarely as possible. The head of the European Parliament’s Liberal faction, MEP Graham Watson, was among many outside observers who lauded Gul’s selection. "As a progressive pro-European, he has the ability to inject new momentum into [Turkey’s] EU accession proceedings," Watson said of Gul.

Turkish analysts tend to be more pessimistic about the extent of Gul’s possible influence as president. Many analysts, including Birand, characterized Gul’s likely election as president as "exile" -- an act that could severely damage Turkey’s EU accession efforts. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. When Turkey’s EU project came close to collapse in December 2004, it was Gul who saved it, he points out. "Nobody in the AKP believed in the EU as much as Gul. Nobody followed through the reforms as tenaciously as he did."

There is also the issue of who will replace Gul as foreign minister if he becomes president. Many experts are predicting the current finance minister, Ali Babacan, could take over the foreign portfolio. Such a development might unsettle financial markets, as Turkey’s business community has grown comfortable with Babacan’s stewardship.

Even if Babacan stays where he is, some observers say delicate balances in the party will be lost with Gul’s effective departure from day-to-day politics. "Babacan has kept relations with the IMF on a constantly good footing", Hurriyet’s Erdal Saglam wrote in an April 26 commentary. "But he has always been unwilling to put direct pressure on [Erdogan] when it came to making difficult decisions. He has had a tendency to fall back on Abdullah Gul, to persuade Erdogan via Gul."

Editor�s Note: Nicolas Birch specializes in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East.

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