EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic Muscle During Visit to Kyrgyzstan

EURASIA INSIGHT

NAZARBAYEV FLEXES DIPLOMATIC MUSCLE DURING VISIT TO KYRGYZSTAN
Joanna Lillis 5/01/07

Kazakhstan’s president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is striving to turn his energy-rich Central Asian nation into a force for regional stability. On a recent visit to Kyrgyzstan, Nazarbayev dangled the prospect of increased investments in return for a commitment from Kyrgyz leaders to forswear political infighting.

Nazarbayev’s motives aren’t purely altruistic. They are rooted in pragmatism: he is interested in taking preventative action that defends Kazakhstan’s economic interests. Perhaps the greatest threat today to the continuation of Kazakhstan’s economic boom is instability in neighboring countries, a trend that could potentially fuel radical Islam, produce a refugee crisis and/or cause disruptions to existing export routes.

During his April 25-26 trip to Bishkek, Nazarbayev delivered a clear message to his Kyrgyz counterpart, Kurmanbek Bakiyev: Focus on developing Kyrgyzstan’s economy, and the severity of political problems will begin to fade. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"We propose Kazakhstan’s experience of development and modernization, which only comes in conditions of stability. Investment does not come to an unstable country," Nazarbayev said in remarks broadcast by Kazakhstan’s state-owned Khabar TV. Kazakhstan is "ready to invest billions of dollars in Kyrgyzstan’s economy," provided that Kyrgyzstan demonstrates a greater degree of political maturity, Nazarbayev added.

The failure of Bakiyev’s administration to heed his warning could have dire consequences, Nazarbayev said. Speaking in an interview given jointly to Khabar and Kyrgyz state TV, Nazarbayev adopted an unprecedented stance of bluntly commenting on Kyrgyz domestic political matters. "First, all [the factions] must sit at the negotiating table, second, one must respect authorities who have been elected by the people, and these authorities must use their power to establish order in the country in a democratic and lawful way," Nazarbayev said.

"If neither the first nor the second solutions are accepted, Kyrgyzstan will be left with the alternative of being the same as Afghanistan was in its time: disturbances, anarchy -- everybody will do whatever he wants to -- extremism, terrorism, drugs trafficking -- all this. In this case, Kyrgyzstan will turn into an enclave of instability," Nazarbayev continued. "Does anybody really want this? I would rather not wish this on the Kyrgyz people."

As a means of encouragement, Nazarbayev offered $100 million dollars in humanitarian aid for Kyrgyzstan, as well as wheat and fuel supplies. Kazakhstan is already Kyrgyzstan’s largest investor, with $300 million invested in the economy, accounting for 30 percent of total investment. With trade between the two countries standing at $400 million in 2006, there appears to be room for growth in economic cooperation, Nazarbayev said, pointing to Kazakhstan’s business interests in Georgia as an example. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

To attract further Kazakhstani investment, Kyrgyzstan will not only have to forge a more stable political environment, the president and parliament in Bishkek will need to cooperate on the adoption of legislation that enhances investor rights. Amid their power struggle, Bakiyev and his parliamentary foes largely ignored policymaking and implementation responsibilities. In a report, titled Asian Development Outlook 2007, the Asian Development Bank pointed to political instability as a factor that "distracted [Kyrgyz] authorities and hampered structural reforms, including the passage of key economic legislation."

In response, Bakiyev told Nazarbayev that trade and economic cooperation with Kazakhstan was one of his administration’s top foreign policy priorities. Bakiyev acknowledged existing deficiencies in Kyrgyzstan’s investment framework and expressed a commitment to closing legal gaps that hamper the country’s ability to attract foreign capital. In addition, the two presidents signed a joint statement calling for an expansion of political and economic relations. It specifically called for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, organized crime, drug-trafficking and illegal migration. It also contained a provision for joint action in "preventing threats to each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity."

Nazarbayev and Bakiyev agreed to set up an interstate council for discussing bilateral issues. Some regional experts saw the council’s creation as a step toward the establishment of a Central Asian union, a concept that Nazarbayev has championed of late.

There was one concrete outcome of Nazarbayev’s visit -- the establishment of a joint venture involving state-owned companies from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The new venture is expected to finish construction on two hydroelectric power stations located on the Naryn River -- Kambarata 1 and Kambarata 2 � the Kazakhstan Today news agency reported.

Analysts in Kazakhstan generally lauded Nazarbayev’s trip as a diplomatic victory for Kazakhstan and for the president personally, burnishing his image as a power broker, and possibly boosting the country’s bid to chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2009. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "I think that one of the priority goals of the visit was to show the leadership capacity of Kazakhstan in Central Asia; to send a message to the international community that Kazakhstan is willing to contribute its resources to [promote the] political and economic stability of its neighbors," Anuar Ayazbekov, a research fellow at the Institute for Economic Strategies-Central Asia, told EurasiaNet.

Ayazbekov and others noted that Nazarbayev, while proffering possible solutions to Kyrgyzstan’s political woes, was careful not to get too deeply involved in the internal affairs of a neighboring state. "Even if the visit was planned to show support for Bakiyev, it was done in a very careful manner," Ayazbekov said. "Kazakhstan’s foreign office certainly realizes that extending support only to one political group in Kyrgyzstan can entail long-term consequences in the event of change of the regime."

Nazarbayev had originally planned to make an address in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, which contains many of Bakiyev’s strongest opponents, but he ended up not appearing before MPs. "It clearly was a wise decision, since during [such a] meeting a lot of politically sensitive issues that concern the elites of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could have been raised by radical MPs," Ayazbekov said.

Bakiyev, ultimately, might have benefited more from the visit than Nazarbayev, suggested Dosym Satpayev, the director of the Assessment Risks Group consultancy in Almaty. "Bakiyev needed this more politically. He wants to show he is in control of the situation in the country," Satpayev said.

Editor�s Note: Joanna Lillis is a freelance writer who specializes in Central Asian affairs.

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