EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Campaign: Mud Already Flying

EURASIA INSIGHT

KYRGYZSTAN’S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN: MUD ALREADY FLYING
5/04/05

Kyrgyzstan’s presidential election campaign is in its early stages, yet accusations of impropriety on the part of the leading candidates are already flying. Brewing political antagonism could end up polarizing voters and undermine the Kyrgyz revolution’s democratization drive.

At present, the field for the presidential election, scheduled for July 10, is crowded. However, most political analysts in Bishkek give only two candidates – interim President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Feliks Kulov, leader of the Ar-Namys Party – a realistic chance of winning the election. Not surprisingly, both Bakiyev, a leading politician from southern Kyrgyzstan, and Kulov, who has quickly emerged as the defender of northern Kyrgyz interests, find themselves having to dodge political darts. Both have been accused of engaging in activity inimical to the country’s revolutionary aims.

Both Bakiyev and Kulov cast themselves as staunch defenders of Kyrgyzstan’s March 24 revolution. Kulov has come out forcefully for the establishment of a parliamentary republic. At the same time, Bakiyev, in a televised address April 30, expressed hope that the presidential election would help unify the country. He also said he would foster a "state that is responsible and capable of answering for its results."

In addition, Bakiyev vowed during his address to "build a new architecture of power" and to "extirpate corruption" – moves designed to prevent the revival of "autocracy." He went on to pledge that he would pursue genuine market reforms and bring "young leaders" into government.

Bakiyev critics have been quick to point out that while his rhetoric implies a radical departure from Askar Akayev’s administration, the interim president seems to be availing himself of many of the same "administrative tools" used by the disgraced former leader to establish and maintain political dominance in Kyrgyzstan. Specifically, some critics charge that Bakiyev is manipulating state-run media to favor his campaign.

Kulov, meanwhile, is fending off allegations of skullduggery lobbed his way by the Moya Stolitsa Novosti (MSN) newspaper, formerly a leading opposition media outlet. In recent weeks, Kulov supporters allege, the newspaper has become a Bakiyev mouthpiece. To support their contention they point to an April 29 article, in which the paper’s political editor Rina Prizhivoit attacks Kulov for harboring ambitions of becoming a "tsar." The article also seeks to tar Kulov for having presumably nefarious dealings Akayev, as well as the former president’s daughter, Bermet Akayeva.

Kulov "claims that he did not give a security guarantee to Bermet Akayeva when she returned to Bishkek," the article said. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "But, according to our sources, he did."

The Bakiyev-led provisional government has aggressively sought to uncover the extent to which Akayev and his family members were involved in government corruption and illicit business activities. Many Bishkek political analysts say the effort to discredit the old regime could attract a significant number of votes come election day. Likewise, any link to the Akayevs, if established beyond doubt, would likely sink the candidacy of a presidential hopeful, analysts believe.

In an interview broadcast by Radio Liberty, Kulov characterized the allegations contained in the MSN article as "pure conjecture." He repeated a previously stated complaint that his political enemies were using "dirty technology" to undermine his candidacy. "I did not meet with Akayev, or with his relatives or with his close associates," he insisted. Kulov supporters also fired back, saying that Bakiyev intended to appoint the author of the article, Prizhivoit, to a diplomatic post in Austria as a quid pro quo for the media attack.

Just over a week ago, Bakiyev and Kulov explored a political partnership, in which the runner-up in the presidential election would become prime minister. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Now, given the recent political jockeying, the chances of such an arrangement coming to pass would seem close to nil. Bakiyev supporters openly indicate that if the interim president wins the election, Daniyar Usenov, currently an interim vice premier, would be a leading candidate to become prime minister.

The early campaign trend has raised concerns that the election will exacerbate Kyrgyzstan’s North-South rivalry, rather than rallying the population around the democratization drive. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A widening North-South gap could create space for counter-revolution, some observers say. Even before the campaign got underway, a few analysts warned that the provisional government was heading in the wrong direction. "The [March 24] revolution is in danger," political analyst Musurkul Kabylbekov wrote recently in the Agym newspaper.

Provisional leaders do not "want to understand that the current moment in Kyrgyzstan is completely similar to the one in ... 1917 in Russia," Kabylbekov added. "Kurmanbek Bakiyev is doing a good job of acting out the role of [Alexander] Kerensky." During the difficult summer of 1917 in St. Petersburg, following the ouster of Tsar Nicholas II, Kerensky struggled to keep Russia’s provisional government afloat. He was eventually driven from power by the Lenin-led Bolshevik coup in November 1917.

Posted May 4, 2005 © Eurasianet
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